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ABSTRACT 
  
   Islamic banking is a growing worldwide phenomenon involving a variety of institutions and 
instruments. Previously, Islamic banks’ transactions made up a small part of the total banking 
industry. Recently, Islamic banks have significantly expanded their network, and have been able 
to mobilize a large amount of funds and upgrade many economic ventures. Given the unique 
behavior of Islamic banks and their involvement in both social and economic activities, there has 
always been a question about their long run financial sustainability, particularly in adverse 
market conditions. Thus, a reliable and unbiased estimation of Islamic banks’efficiency and 
productivity performance is essential for the evaluation of Islamic banking operations within and 
outside its traditional borders of Muslim economies.  
 
   Due to the short history of Islamic banking in Europe, and consequently the lack of sufficient 
data, empirical researches on the financial performance of Islamic banking have concentrated 
primarily in Muslim-majority countries and focused on the theoretical issues and descriptive 
statistics rather than rigorous statistical and econometric estimation. The main purpose of our 
analysis is to bridge this gap in the global and cross-country literature and to contribute to the 
ongoing debate regarding the performance of Islamic banking. Therefore, the orientation of this 
thesis is chiefly quantitative in nature. 
 
   The aim of this thesis is primarily to shed some light on the emergence and the continual 
global growth of Islamic banking all over the world. It also tries to assess, for the first time, the 
relative performance of Islamic commercial and investment banks operating in Europe against 
counterparties-conventional banks in Europe and also against Islamic banks from Muslim-
majority countries. Our methodology in this academic work clearly differs from the literature 
researches. This thesis is, basically, divided into two main parts. In first part, we specifically 
discuss the basic features and principles of the Islamic banking and finance. We then reviewed 
several in-depth market analysis results concerning Islamic banking and finance that were 
performed by well-known specialized financial institutions. In the second part, we primarily 
utilize different empirical approaches to examine the performance of our sample banks which 
shows a great variety, ranging from large active banks to new and small banks. More 
specifically, we use the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) method to calculate the commercial 
banks’ efficiency scores and investment banks (cost)-X-efficiency levels; the DEA-based Malmq-  
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uist Productivity Index (MPI) to estimate the banks productivity indices; the common financial 
ratios to measure the banks financial performance; the T-Test to determine the differences of 
investment bank's performance pre- and post- the financial crisis that hit the world’s economy in 
2007; the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS)-regression to determine the impact of internal and 
external factors on bank's efficiency and also to check the robustness of the overall results 
obtained from DEA scores; Spearman's rho correlation to investigate the association of the DEA-
efficiency scores with the traditional accounting ratios; and eventually the efficiency–
profitability matrix in order to determine the characterization of the banks' performance and the 
factors that influence efficiency. Our analysis is carried out, primarily, over the period from 2005 
to 2008. This indeed helps to account for the impact of the recent financial crisis on the 
efficiency and productivity performance of the selected banks.  
 
   The preliminary review of the market surveys-based analysis shows that the Islamic finance 
and banking is one of the fastest growing sectors in the financial world. Islamic financial 
products and services are increasingly being regarded as a viable investment opportunity, making 
them very attractive for Muslims and non-Muslims alike. Leading Islamic banks from Muslim 
countries are expanding their network. Several European banks have directly involved in 
providing Islamic financial products in order to satisfy the special needs for Muslim customers 
and the non-Muslims who seek ethical financial and investment solutions. Eventually, European 
governments have also started to amend their legal, tax, and regulatory systems to allow the 
establishment of Islamic banks. 
 
  Most importantly, from an empirical point of view, our presented results suggest that the 
Islamic commercial banks in Europe are found to be relatively technically inefficient. They have 
also, on average, poor financial performance and under-performing practices. Moreover, Islamic 
banks in Europe actually suffer from significant productivity losses over the sample years 
driven, to a large extent, by the regress in banks’ technology innovations. By and large, the 
bank’s inefficiency stems from both the sub-optimal size of operations and the lack of 
management knowledge and skills. Findings suggest that the optimal size for Islamic banks to 
achieve better levels of performance is neither large nor small rather medium. Therefore, 
increasing banks size through mergers and acquisition will substantially enhance their technical 
efficiency and productivity progress. 
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  The period prior to the current financial crisis was marked by the most stable economic 
environment for generations. Our results illustrate that Islamic banks lag relatively, before the 
emergence of the crisis, behind their conventional peers in terms of estimated efficiency scores 
and productivity changes. Strikingly, conventional banks gradually lose their superiority over 
Islamic banks in subsequent years, but remain, on average, a head of Islamic banks. Islamic 
banks are, indeed, less vulnerable to the effects of the crisis as compared with counterparties-
conventional banks. They exhibit only slight inefficiency and productivity regress during this 
severe crisis and therefore, produce a consistent and remarkable positive trend in technical 
efficiency, productivity performance, and financial profitability. This might be because of the 
beliefs in the power of petro-dollars in the Gulf region, the fact that the Islamic banks are 
relatively small and young at present, and could also be due to the religious financial constraints. 
Such factors might have played an important role in preventing Islamic banks from being 
severely affected by the crisis. Overall, results suggest that the small and new Islamic banks in 
Europe can be as efficient and productive as large and old Islamic and conventional banks. They 
also have long run sustainability, substantial room for improvements, and a great potential in the 
banking industry to sustain their competitive edge not only in Muslim countries but also in the 
European financial system.  
 
   The estimated findings pertaining to the performance of Islamic investment banks in Europe 
suggest that these banks experience low (cost)-x-efficiency and poor allocative-efficiency 
compared with counterparties-conventional banks. Bank’s inefficiency is caused largely by the 
under-utilization of inputs, the bank's diseconomies of scale, and also appears to be due to the 
regulations not controlled by management due to fluctuations and instability in factor prices. 
Islamic investment banks additionally show a clear paradox between their high calculated 
efficiency scores and low achieved profitability ratios. They are also less risky, more solvent, 
and operate with lower use of debt. Nevertheless, Islamic investment banks suffer a gradual 
deterioration in liquidity position. The banks' supply of Murabaha (cost-plus loans) financing 
appears to be most dominant and has increased significantly in importance. 
 
   Overall, findings seem to reveal that the banks that are technically more efficient are larger in 
size (total assets), financially more profitable, have greater loans intensity, acquire lower levels 
of debt, invests more in appropriate human skills, have a lower market share (total deposits), and 
operate in countries with higher GDP-per capita. Such results reflect the strong and high associat- 
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ion between the DEA-efficiency measures and the standard accounting measures, suggesting that 
the DEA approach can be adopted separately or concurrently along with financial ratios to make 
comparisons of Islamic banks performance more robust.  
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ZUSAMMENFASSUNG DER DISSERTATION 
 
   Das Islamische Bankwesen ist ein weltweit wachsendes Phänomen mit einer Vielzahl von 
Institutionen und Instrumenten. In der Vergangenheit bildeten die Islamischen Bankgeschäfte 
einen kleinen Teil der gesamten Bankindustrie. In letzter Zeit haben Islamische Banken ihr 
Netzwerk jedoch erheblich erweitert und konnten eine Vielzahl an Geldmitteln mobilisieren und 
viele wirtschaftliche Vorhaben verbessern. Angesichts des außergewöhnlichen Verhaltens der 
islamischen Banken und ihrer Beteiligung an sozialen und wirtschaftlichen Aktivitäten wurde 
ihre langfristige Wirtschaftlichkeit häufig in Frage gestellt, insbesondere bei ungünstigen 
Marktbedingungen. Somit ist eine zuverlässige und neutrale Einschätzung der Effizienz und 
Produktivitätsentwicklung der islamischen Banken für die Bewertung ihrer Operationen 
innerhalb und außerhalb traditioneller Grenzen islamischer Volkswirtschaften erforderlich. 
Aufgrund der noch jungen Geschichte des islamischen Bankwesens in Europa und dem 
einhergehenden Mangel an Daten haben sich empirische Forschungen über die finanzielle 
Leistungsfähigkeit des islamischen Bankwesens in erster Linie auf Länder mit muslimischer 
Mehrheit und theoretische Fragen sowie deskriptive Statistiken anstelle von ökonometrischen 
Methoden konzentriert. Das Hauptziel unserer Analyse ist es diese Lücke in der globalen und 
länderübergreifenden Literatur zu überbrücken und zu der laufenden Debatte über die 
Leistungsfähigkeit islamischer Banken beizutragen. Folglich ist die Ausrichtung dieser 
Dissertation in erster Linie quantitiver Natur. 
 
   Das Ziel dieser Dissertation ist es etwas Licht in die Entstehung und in das kontinuierliche 
globale Wachstum des islamischen Bankwesens zu bringen. Die Dissertation versucht außerdem, 
zum ersten Mal überhaupt, die relative Leistungsfähigkeit der in Europa tätigen islamischen 
Geschäfts- und Investmentbanken im Vergleich zu konventionellen Banken und zu islamischen 
Banken in Ländern mit muslimischer Mehrheit zu beurteilen. Die Methodik dieser 
wissenschaftlichen Arbeit unterscheidet sich deutlich von der Literaturrecherche. Im Grunde ist 
diese Dissertation in zwei Hauptteile gegliedert. Im ersten Teil werden die grundlegenden 
Merkmale und Grundsätze des islamischen Bank- und Finanzwesens besprochen. Daraufhin 
werden mehrere tiefgründige Ergebnisse von Marktanalysen, welche von nahmhaften 
spezialisierten Finanzinstituten durchgeführt worden sind und das islamische Bank-und 
Finanzwesen betreffen, überprüft. Im zweiten Teil verwenden wir in erster Linie verschiedene 
empirische Ansätze, um die Leistung der von uns gewählten Banken zu untersuchen.  Diese sind 
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sehr vielfältig und reichen von Großbanken bis hin zu kleinen neuen Banken. Genauer gesagt 
verwenden wir die Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA)-Methode, um die Effizienz-Ergebnisse 
der Geschäftsbanken und die (Kosten)-X- Effizienzlevel der Investmentbanken zu berechnen; 
den auf DEA-basierenden Malmquist Produktivitätsindex (MPI) um die Produktivitätsindizes der 
Banken zu schätzen; die gängigen Finanzkennzahlen um die finanzielle Leistungsfähigkeit der 
Banken zu messen; den T-Test, um die Unterschiede der Leistungsfähigkeit der 
Investmentbanken vor und nach der Finanzkrise, welche die Weltwirtschaft im Jahr 2007 
getroffen hat, zu bestimmen; die Ordinary Least Squares (OLS)–Regression, um die 
Auswirkungen von internen und externen Faktoren auf die Effizienz von Banken zu bestimmen, 
aber auch um die Robustheit der generellen Ergebnisse der DEA-Ergebnisse zu testen; 
Spearmans Rangkorrelationskoeffizient um die Verbindung der DEA-Effizienz-Ergebnisse mit 
den traditionellen Bilanzkennzahlen zu untersuchen; und schließlich die Effizienz-
Rentabilitätsmatrix, um die Performance von Banken sowie die Faktoren, welche die Effizienz 
beeinflussen, zu charakterisieren. Die Analyse wurde hauptsächlich über den Zeitraum von 2005 
bis 2008 durchgeführt. Hierdurch können die Auswirkungen der jüngsten Finanzkrise auf die 
Effizienz und Produktivität der ausgewählten Banken bestimmt werden. 
 
  Die einleitenden Untersuchungen der auf Marktumfragen basierenden Analyse zeigen, dass das 
islamische Finanzwesen einer der am schnellsten wachsenden Sektoren der Finanzbranche ist. 
Die islamischen Finanzprodukte und Dienstleistungen werden zunehmend als eine rentable 
Investitionsmöglichkeit angesehen, was sie sehr attraktiv für Muslime und Nichtmuslime 
gleichermaßen macht. Führende islamische Banken aus muslimischen Ländern erweitern ihr 
Netzwerk. Mehrere europäische Banken sind direkt an der Bereitstellung islamischer 
Finanzprodukte beteiligt, um die speziellen Bedürfnisse der muslimischen Kunden zu 
befriedigen sowie die von nicht-Muslimen, die ethische Finanz- und Anlagelösungen suchen. 
Schließlich haben auch die europäischen Regierungen damit begonnen, ihre rechtlichen, 
steuerlichen und regulatorischen Systeme zu ändern, um die Einrichtung von islamischen 
Banken zu ermöglichen. 
 
  Am wichtigsten, aus empirischen Gesichtspunkten, ist das vorgestellte Ergebnis, dass islamische 
Geschäftsbanken in Europa technisch relativ ineffizient sind. Sie haben außerdem, im 
Durchschnitt, schlechte finanzielle Leistungen und leistungsschwache Aktivitäten.  Des Weiteren 
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leiden islamische Banken in Europa über die betrachteten Jahre an einem signifikanten 
Produktivitätsverlust, der zu einem großen Teil von einem Rückschritt bei den technischen 
Innovationen der Banken getrieben wird. Im Großen und Ganzen beruht die Ineffizienz der 
Banken auf einer suboptimalen Geschäftsgröße sowie einem Mangel an Managementwissen und 
–fertigkeiten. Die Ergebnisse weisen darauf hin, dass die optimale Größe islamischer Banken, 
um bessere Leistungsniveaus zu erzielen, weder zu groß noch zu klein ist. Deshalb führt eine 
Erhöhung der Bankengröße durch Fusionen und Akquisitionen zu einem wesentlichen Anstieg 
der technischen Effizienz sowie des Produktivitätsfortschrittes. 
 
   Die Zeit vor der heutigen Finanzkrise war durch das stabilste wirtschaftliche Umfeld seit 
Generationen gekennzeichnet. Die Ergebnisse zeigen auf, dass die islamischen Banken, vor 
Ausbruch der Krise, im Hinblick auf die geschätzten Effizienz-Ergebnisse und 
Produktivitätsveränderungen relativ zu ihren konventionellen Peers zurückgeblieben sind. 
Auffallend ist, dass die konventionellen Banken in den Folgejahren allmählich ihre 
Überlegenheit gegenüber islamischen Banken verlieren, im Durchschnitt jedoch vor islamischen 
Banken bleiben. Die islamischen Banken sind, im Vergleich mit konventionellen Banken, in der 
Tat weniger anfällig für die Auswirkungen der Krise. Diese weisen während dieser schweren 
Krise nur geringe Ineffizienzen und Produktivitätsrückgange auf und erbringen daher einen 
konstanten und bemerkenswert positiven Trend hinsichtlich technischer Effizienz, 
Produktivitätsentwicklung und finanzieller Rentabilität. Dies könnte der Fall sein, da der Glaube 
an die Macht des Petrodollar der Golfregion sehr hoch ist, sowie die Tatsache, dass die 
islamischen Banken derzeit relativ klein und jung sind. Ein weiterer Grund könnten die religiös 
begründeten finanziellen Zwänge sein. Solche Faktoren könnten eine wichtige Rolle dabei 
gespielt haben, dass islamische Banken kaum von der Krise getroffen wurden. Im Großen und 
Ganzen weisen die Ergebnisse darauf hin, dass die kleinen und neuen islamischen Banken in 
Europa genauso effizient und produktiv wie große und alte islamische sowie konventionelle 
Banken sein können. Sie weisen außerdem langfristige Nachhaltigkeit, erheblichen Spielraum 
für Verbesserungen sowie ein großes Potenzial in der Finanzindustrie auf, ihre 
Wettbewerbsfähigkeit nicht nur in muslimischen Ländern, sondern auch im europäischen 
Finanzsystem aufrechtzuerhalten. 
 
   Die geschätzten Ergebnisse bezüglich der Leistung islamischer Investmentbanken in Europa 
weisen darauf hin, dass diese Banken über geringe (Kosten)-X-Effizienz und eine schlechte allok- 
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ative Effizienz im Vergleich zu konventionellen Banken verfügen.  Die Ineffizienz der Banken 
wird weitgehend durch die Unterauslastung der Inputs verursacht, durch die Größennachteile der 
Bank und, wie es scheint, auch aufgrund der vom Management nicht kontrollierten 
Regulierungsvorschriften, die angesichts von Fluktuationen und der Instabilität von 
Faktorpreisen existieren. Die islamischen Investmentbanken offenbaren zusätzlich einen 
deutlichen Widerspruch zwischen ihren hohen Effizienz-Ergebnissen und ihren niedrigen 
Rentabilitätskennzahlen. Sie sind außerdem weniger riskant,  zahlungsfähiger und arbeiten mit 
geringerem Einsatz von Fremdkapital. Dennoch erleiden islamische Investmentbanken eine 
allmähliche Verschlechterung ihrer Liquiditätssituation. Das Bankenangebot der Murabaha-
Finanzierung (Kostenaufschlag-Darlehen) scheint sehr beherrschend zu sein und hat deutlich an 
Bedeutung gewonnen. 
 
  Insgesamt scheinen die Ergebnisse zu zeigen, dass Banken, die technisch effizienter sind, zum 
einen größer sind (Gesamtvermögen), profitabler sind, eine höhere Kreditintensität aufweisen, 
über eine geringere Fremdkapitalaufnahme verfügen, mehr in zweckmäßige 
Mitarbeiterfähigkeiten investieren, einen niedrigeren Marktanteil besitzen (Gesamteinlagen), 
sowie in Ländern mit höherem Pro-Kopf-Einkommen tätig sind. Diese Ergebnisse reflektieren 
die starke Verbindung zwischen den DEA-Effizienz Maßen und den üblichen Maßen des 
Rechnungswesens. Dies weist darauf hin, dass der DEA-Ansatz getrennt oder auch zusammen 
mit Finanzkennzahlen übernommen werden kann, um die Vergleiche der Performance 
islamischer Banken robuster zu machen. 
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GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
  
 
  Banking is considered one of the main components of the financial systems. It has a broad 
impact on the entire financial market stability and the real strength of the economy. Banking 
system connects the fundamental economic units and plays the role of financial intermediation. It 
helps in the creation of wealth through the establishment of a series of interconnected economic 
relations. Consequently, any disturbance in the conventional banking sector has significant 
implications for the overall economic, primarily due to the banks' heavy reliance on interest rates 
which are either market forced or state governed.  
 
 While conventional banking uses the interest rate mechanisms to perform its operational tasks, 
Islamic banking, by contrast, neither charges nor pays interest but rather relies on the principle of 
profit-and-loss sharing. Based on this concept, Islamic transactions are similar to equity-based 
transactions in rewarding performance. Specifically, Islamic law requirements ensure that more 
emphasis is placed on reward for effort rather than reward for merely owning capital. However, 
given the special features and characteristics of Islamic finance, modern Islamic banking has 
developed techniques that replace interest income with cash flows from productive sources. It 
particularly attempts to find more socially acceptable and attainable substitute to the interest-
bearing modes of financing in the desire to provide justified distribution of wealth and income.  
 
 Because of its moral values, Islamic finance has gradually gaining universal acceptance and 
attracted funds from Muslims and non-Muslims alike. The clientele for Islamic banking is not 
confined to just Muslim countries. It, by contrast, spread all over the world. In Europe, it is 
unusual to make the financial system subject to religious prescriptions. Despite of that and given 
its increasing popularity and high market growth rates, Islamic finance is attracting European 
market players and investors seeking to tap into new ethical and truly unique green investment 
opportunities. The UK is considered the western leader in offering Islamic financial products to 
target the local Muslim minorities and also to attract non-Muslims who are looking for ethical 
values in their financial dealings. Currently, Islamic banking is thriving and growing fast in 
many other western nations which are aiming to become Islamic finance centers. 
 
  Facing the severe financial crisis experienced in 2007, fostered by the highly-leveraged financial 
markets, the banks’ clients call for more credibility and safe financial doctrine that promise justice 
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and moral behaviors. These values are, indeed, inherent in the Islamic banking system and thus, 
it is reasonable to encourage European financial institutions to offer financial products that are in 
compliance with the Islamic law. The global economic crisis, therefore, presents a unique 
opportunity for Islamic banking to show it is viable alternative to conventional finance in 
Europe, as it has the capacity and capability to bring stability to the market. 
 
  In spite of the considerable spread of Islamic banking sector, there are still very limited 
empirical studies focusing on the efficiency and productivity performance of Islamic financial 
institutions. Most previous attempts focused primarily on the conceptual issues underlying 
interest-free financing and also concentrated in Muslim-majority countries. Similarly, the 
empirical studies that have been carried out to measure the performance of Islamic banks in 
Europe are very rare. This is due to the short presence of Islamic banking in this continent and 
consequently the lack of sufficient data. It remains, however, questionable whether Islamic 
banking has a long run sustainability and bear promising potential for more success in Europe, 
where conventional and Islamic banking coexist alongside each other. Therefore, in order to 
examine the development likelihood of Islamic banking outside its traditional borders of Muslim 
economies, this thesis offers the first comprehensive empirical analysis of the efficiency and 
productivity performance of the European Islamic banks against conventional banks operating in 
Europe, and also against Islamic banks from Muslim countries. Our analysis covers primarily the 
period of 2005-2008. This time span helps to account for the impact of the world economic crisis 
emerged in 2007 on the performance of the selected banks. 
 
  The thesis is primarily structured in seven-major chapters (Exhibit 1). Chapter 1 presents and 
discusses the main concepts, features, and teachings of Islamic finance and banking. The chapter 
also attempts to give the reader some relevant information about Islamic finance modes of 
operation in addition to the common Islamic financial products in the areas of banking, Takaful 
and the Islamic capital market. Eventually, the chapter provides an overview of the special risks 
and challenges associated with Islamic finance. 
 
 Despite the general lack of the valuable Islamic financial data in the world at large, Chapter 2 
provides an in-depth market analysis for Islamic banking and finance, and explores the evolution 
dynamics in this novel concept. It takes rather a narrow view to focus more on the emergence and  
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3, on the other hand, points out the various factors 
It further looks at the nature 
financial market. The effects of the crisis in 
Islamic banks are also shortly outlined 
                                                     Exhibit
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thesis. Consequently, this thesis will show
should view Islamic finance without bringing in faith based commentary. To this end, f
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specifically, Chapter 4 utilizes a
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ank of Britain (IBB), the first stand-alone full-fledged Islamic commercial bank in the West, 
against small and large conventional banks in the UK and also against small and large Islamic 
banks from Turkey, Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)-States, and Malaysia. In the second stage, 
we regress efficiency scores on a set of explanatory variables to determine their potential 
influence on the bias-corrected efficiency scores. To further complement the results of the 
efficiency measures, the consistency of the DEA based efficiency scores were checked by 
examining their statistical relationship (i.e. the Spearman's rho correlation coefficients) with 
traditional non-frontier (financial) based performance indicators. We finally use the efficiency-
profitability matrix based on the efficiency scores and the bank’s profitability ratios in order to 
enable the characterization of the banks' performance profile.  
 
  Additionally, in Chapter 5, we employ the DEA methodology to generate efficiency scores in 
order to empirically examine and evaluate the differences in performance of Bosna Bank 
International (BBI) in Bosnia and Herzegovina and IBB in the UK. The comparative analysis of 
both banks is carried out relative to small conventional banks in both countries on the one hand, 
and also relative to small and large Islamic commercial banks from GCC-States, Malaysia, Turkey, 
and Azerbaijan, on the other hand. We then applied the DEA-based Malmquist index approach in 
order to calculate Islamic bank’s indices of changes in Total Factor Productivity (TFP), 
technology, and technical and scale efficiency. Moreover, to test the association of efficiency 
estimates with variables that are not inputs or outputs, we perform a two-stage DEA method. To 
this end, after solving for DEA in the first-stage, the efficiency scores are then regressed upon the 
environmental variables which could potentially influence the efficiency of a bank.  
  
  In chapter 6, we try to assess the financial performance of the first-established Islamic 
investment, wholesale, and private banks operating in Europe. We divided the chapter into two 
main parts. In the first part, we use the DEA-approach to assess the (cost) X-efficiency of 
Islamic banks operating in the UK and Switzerland relative to conventional banks. In the second 
part, we primarily use the most common accounting ratios to examine the financial performance 
of the first European Islamic investment bank in the UK. Furthermore, to determine the 
differences of the bank’s performance in pre- and post- the economic crisis of 2007, we employ 
the inter-temporal analysis of data using "t-test for equality of means". Eventually, conclusions, 
overall remarks, and the future extension of our work are presented in chapter 7. 
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UNDERSTANDING ISLAMIC ECONOMICS, 
FINANCE AND BANKING: A BASIC GUIDE 
ــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــ  
 
1.1. Background 
 
  Islam is not merely a religion, but it is also a comprehensive socio-economic and political sys-
tem for the Islamic society, where it is necessary to apply the ethical principles of the Holy Qu-
ran and the ‘Sunnah’ (Prophet Muhammad's statements and actions). Islamic economics refers to 
a system which identifies and promotes economic and financial orders that are consistent with 
the principles of Islamic law, the Shari’ah. Set of principles substantially differentiate Islamic 
economics from the conventional economics, as it goes beyond the pure economic and financial 
issues. Specifically, Islamic law prohibits the collection and payment of interest. Muslims earn-
ings must come from permissible means, and must also be spent on Islamically acceptable cate-
gories of expenditure. Consequently, Islam prohibits investing in businesses that are considered 
unlawful or contrary to the Islamic teachings and values. Moreover, the distribution of wealth is 
considered to be the primary concern in Islamic economics. Wealth in Islam should be shared, 
not become concentrated in few hands (rich people). For Muslims, concern for others, particular-
ly the poor and the needy, is deeply inscribed in the pillars of Islam. Islam, therefore, encourages 
Muslims to maximize their wealth as long as they do not create a situation that is socially disrup-
tive or violate the norms of Islamic justice (Dusuki, 2006). 
 
  In discussing Islamic economics, we take a rather narrow view and focus, to some extent, on 
Islamic banking and finance. Islamic finance is as old as the religion itself. It’s practices have 
been really used throughout the last 1500 odd years across the Muslim world. Islamic finance 
has, however, moved from a mere old theoretical concept to a practical reality. A natural conse-
quence of this progress is the opening up of new avenues for its advancement. Islamic finance is, 
indeed, a growing sector with its diversity in different segments in various parts of the world. 
Islamic finance has not taken root solely in Muslim-majority countries but has also spread to 
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non-Muslim countries. It specifically caters to religious Muslims in Muslim’s societies, as well 
as in countries where Muslims are in minority.  
  Muslims need financing services as much as anyone in order to finance their business ventures, 
to facilitate capital investment, and/or to undertake trading activities, etc. Muslims attempt to 
restructure their financial lives on the basis of Islamic law, and consequently to find out the 
means to fulfill their financial requirements in view of prohibition of interest in a world where 
the entire financial system is based on interest-usury. Their intent is to create a just, ethical and 
socially inclusive financial and business system across the broad spectrum of society. It is, there-
fore, the biggest challenge and the formidable task for them to reform their financial institutions, 
products and services, instruments and contracts on an interest-free basis in order to bring them 
in harmony with the dictates of Islamic law and within the constraints of Islamic regulations.  
 
  This chapter aims at showing the contours and characteristics of the Islamic economic system. 
It is mainly theoretical rather than empirical. It specifically attempts to give the reader a better 
understanding of the fundamental principles and features of Islam that underpin Islamic econom-
ics and finance. This chapter discusses also the Islamic financial contracts (modes of operation) 
in addition to the most used Islamic financial products in the areas of banking, insurance and 
capital market. It eventually highlights the most significant challenges and risks particularly as-
sociate with Islamic finance.  
 
1.2. Basic principles, features and characteristics of Islamic economics and finance  
 
  Shari’ah principles are widely utilized in Islamic finance. As Islamic financial institutions seek 
to structure more innovative products for customers, it is, therefore, important to understand the 
principles of Islamic finance and the specific features of each principle (Exhibit. 1.1). Conven-
tional investors also need to understand these standards in order to be able to provide the services 
demanded by consumers who want to comply with Islamic guidelines, as well as to know the 
potential implications of the interaction between Islamic and conventional financial institutions. 
 
1.2.1. Prohibition of the interest (Riba): Rationality and economic wisdom  
 
  According to Shari’ah, "riba technically refers to the premium that must be paid by the borrow-
er to the lender along with the principle amount as a condition for taking the loan" (Chapra, 1984). 
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                         Exhibit 1.1: Overarching principles of the interest prohibition-driven finance 
                         Source: Booz & Company, (2011) 
 
Some later Muslim scholars define riba as the explicit increase imposed on the debtor at the ma-
turity of the debt in case he/she fails to repay the principal amount plus any interest and wants to 
roll it over (Siddiqi, 2004). By and large, the consensus (Ijma') among Muslim scholars and juri-
sprudents is that riba is generally seen as unjustified earning, where a person could receive a 
monetary advantage without giving an equitable (a just) counter-value (Chapra, 1986).  
 
  The prohibition of riba clearly means that money can be, in practice, lent lawfully merely for 
either charitable purposes or for doing lawful business on the basis of profit-and-loss sharing 
(PLS) (Khan, 2008). Islam, however, made a clear distinction between trade and riba (Chapra, 
1986). The business risk is allocated evenly among all the parties involved in a trading, whereas 
in riba, it often lies heavily and directly on the borrower. "In its widest general implication, riba 
signifies any increase of capital not justified by a risk taken" (Iqbal, 2009). 
 
    The Muslim jurists have generally classified interest "Riba" into two broad types, namely: I) 
"Riba al-Fadl", which is described as the "unlawful" excess in the exchange of two "counter-
values" (i.e., inequality of quantity or weight and dissimilarity of quality) (Chapra, 1984; Shahid, 
2007). In order to be lawful, the exchange of identical commodities must occur immediately (on 
spot) and there must be no disparity in amount. II) "Riba al-nasi'ah ", which is related to the ar-
tificial extension of the repayment period of a loan for additional payment of money. This im-
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plies that fixing beforehand a positive return (interest) on a loan, as a reward for waiting, is not 
allowed in Islam (Chapra, 1984). "In this sense, riba has the same meaning as interest. It makes 
no difference whether the loan is for consumption, or business purposes, or whether the return is 
a fixed or a variable percentage of the principal. It also makes no difference whether an absolute 
amount to be paid in advance or on maturity, or received in the form of a gift or a service if sti-
pulated as a condition in the loan contract or an extension in its maturity" (Jarhi and Iqbal, 2001). 
  
1.2.1.1. Profit-rate in Islamic banking: The use of interest rate as a benchmark. 
 
   It is not prohibited to make profit in Islam, as Islam encourages people to use money in "Hal-
al" (Islamically permissible) investments. Making a profit, as against to interest, is based on tak-
ing risks either on the assets, which are sold by seller, or on the capital invested by an investor to 
earn profit (AMIS, 2005). The current concern in Islamic financial industry is the acceptability 
of the profit rate used by Islamic banks as an alternative to the interest rate. Table 1.1 summariz-
es briefly the main difference between "riba" and "profit" from an Islamic point of view.   
 
Table 1.1 
The difference between (Riba) and (Profit) from an Islamic perspective*  
RIBA PROFIT 
Riba is pre-fixed (guaranteed in advance) and thus, always positive. 
It is always tied to the time period and the amount of the loan. Riba, 
however, can at best be very low or zero. 
 
By definition, Riba is an increment in a loan or debt "paying money 
for the use (rent) of money", whether this applies to consumption 
loans or production loans.  
 
Riba means effortless profit or "surplus value without counterpart", 
and thus, lending on interest does not add value. It transfers only the 
use of funds temporarily from one person to another. 
Profit is post-determined, and thus its amount is not 
known until the activity is done. Profit, however, can 
be zero, positive, or possibly negative. 
 
Profit, by definition, is the recognized reward for capi-
tal when capital employed only in permissible produc-
tive business. It represents the effort and the risks un-
dertaken by the supplier of capital in an enterprise. 
Profit can only be claimed in the instance where either 
risk of loss has been assumed or effort has been ex-
pended.  
    * Based on Iqbal and Mirakhor, (2007), and other sources. 
   
  In practice, despite that the Muslim jurists on  the  Islamic  institutions  continue  to  proclaim  
all  forms  of  interest  as  riba,  which  is subject  to  the  most  severe  Qur'anic  prohibition, the  
bulk  of  Islamic  financial  operations  formally base  their rates  of return or costs  of capital  on  
a  benchmark  interest rate such as the  London  Inter-bank  Offer Rate (LIBOR) (El-Gamal, 
2003). However, benchmarking against LIBOR is permitted in Islam primarily because of the 
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absence of an internationally accepted Islamic profit benchmark, and also due to the apprehen-
sion in the bank's customers’ mind that they may end up paying higher mark-up if it is fixed as 
compared to the fluctuating benchmark-based interest rate charged by traditional banks. As there 
are relatively few Islamic banks as compared to the large number of conventional banks, it be-
comes more important for Islamic banks to remain comparative and, as such, adjust their "profit" 
earnings close to the market. In light of the actual practices of Islamic financial providers, using 
LIBOR as a benchmark is only acceptable if it used particularly for determining the amount of 
periodic mark-up (Kettell, 2011). 
 
  From another point of view, the argument that Islamic banks must calculate their mark-up 
based on interest refers to a situation where the profits of all projects offered to the bank for fi-
nancing are "known with certainty in advance". Therefore, it remains hard to distinct between 
interest and profit. Specifically, the banks receive deposits from depositors who do not want to 
deal in interest and keep their money in a separate account to invest them in an Islamic way and 
share the resulting profit with them. Thus, the profits earned are likely to be almost the same as 
interest. Even though if profit sharing basis rather than the mark up basis is used, the banks have 
no alternative but to determine a profit that would assure that the banks profit is almost the same 
as the interest on the interest-based operations. This is because it is almost impossible to calcu-
late the actual profit earned on the interest-free deposits. It is also impossible to determine the 
amount of cost has been incurred on the deployment of deposits (Khan, 1984; Zarqa, 1981). 
 
   Khan (1984) further argued that the need of Islamic banks arises "only" when the profits are 
really uncertain. Thus, Islamic banks attract, in contrast to conventional banks, only the (more) 
risky projects. Islamic bank's revenues from profit-and-loss sharing financing would not, in his 
opinion, exceed the revenues of average conventional banks out of their interest loan business. 
However, Islamic banks will accept earning on a marginal project a rate of return on their funds 
which equal at least to the expected rate of return in the overall economy. The rate of return on 
investment in the economy should be higher than the interest rate by definition because it con-
sists of both the premium of risk and the cost of capital. The return on all the projects therefore 
will be higher than the interest charged by conventional banks. This factor is, indeed, considered 
to be the most important factor leading customers to refrain from taking funds from Islamic 
banks. 
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1.2.1.2. Zero interest-rates : An economic point of view 
 
  A zero nominal interest rate occurs when the interest rates match the inflation rates. Some 
economists argue that a zero interest rate is a necessary condition for optimal allocation of re-
sources (Friedman, 1969); while others show that it is not only necessary but also sufficient con-
dition (Cole & Kocherlakota 1998). According to Al-jarhi, this is because "after switching from 
metallic to fiat money, adding one marginal unit of real balances costs no real resources to the 
community. Thus, imposing a positive price on the use of money would lead traders to econo-
mies on the use of money, in their pursuit to minimize their transactions costs. They would then 
use some real resources instead of money". However, when the rate of interest equal zero, traders 
will have no incentive to substitute real resources for money. Thus, more real resources can be 
addressed to consumption and investment, which benefits the society as a whole (Wilson, 1979; 
Al-Jarhi and Iqbal, 2001).  
  Taking into account the economic cycle, during recession time, central banks tend to lower no-
minal interest rates. If they cut interest rates very fast, they then can start to approach the level of 
inflation. Inflation often rises when interest rates are cut too quickly, since these cuts have a si-
mulative effect on the economy. Additionally, in order to reach an optimal allocation of re-
sources, economists would be expected to search for the set of monetary policies that could bring 
the rate of interest to zero. Thus, it appears that deflating the economy at a rate equal to the real 
rate of interest would set the rate of interest to zero. This would be the optimal monetary policy 
that insures that financial resources are allocated efficiently (Al-Jarhi, 2009).  
  At the country level, the only ways to control the deficit, according to most governments, are to 
raise taxes or to cut government spending. Considering that the deficit continues to grow simply 
because of the exorbitant amounts of compound interest added to the original debt, one of the 
most effective ways to reduce the deficit would be to reduce interest rates. As a matter of fact, at 
zero-interest, the debt would not grow and the large amounts of money spent in servicing the 
debt could be used to pay it off (Bleher, 2008).  
  By and large, there is still ongoing debate among economists regarding the notion of zero-
interest rat. While there are many economists who support zero-level of interest rates, others are 
worry about the existence of a liquidity trap when the rate of interest is zero (Uhlig, 2000). They 
may also worry that when the rate of interest becomes very low, monetary authorities have less 
leeway with adjusting it downwards in the face of recession. 
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1.2.2. Commitment on paying Al-Zakah:  "The social duty to benefit society" 
  Zakah is the religious tax to be deducted from wealth and to be paid to the poor people. Zakah 
means purification and growth, and is considered as a major mechanism for the allocation of re-
sources and the redistribution of income and wealth. This tax is a compulsory levy, one of the 
five basic tenets of Islam. Zakah is payable on genuinely owned, productive and surplus assets 
that have been possessed for a full year. This means that casual acquisitions and perishable 
goods are not subject to Zakah (Clarke, Craig, and Hamid, 1996). More specifically, genuine 
ownership means that the asset is free of claims by others. Productive assets are regarded to cash 
in hand and/or at bank, stocks, shares, bonds, inventories of finished goods intended for sale, 
earnings from rented fixed industrial assets and net receivables. Assets which are being used or 
consumed are exempt from paying Zakah.  
 
  Islamic regulations outline that the generally accepted amount of the Zakah is 2.5% of Muslim's 
annual wealth in cash or kind from all forms of assessed wealth reached or exceeding "nisab", 
the minimum amount one have to possess. This indicates that if the sum of the property owned 
by Muslims is below the "nisab" at the time Zakah falls due, Muslims do not have to pay. 
 
1.2.3.   Prohibition of uncertainty or speculation (Gharar and Maysir) 
  
  Gharar is defined as the uncertainty, hazard and game of chance (gambling) (AL-saati, 2003). It 
technically refers to the sale of probable items whose existence or characteristics are not certain, 
or a sale involving excessive risk or moral hazard (Ayub, 2007). This, to some extent, makes this 
way of trade similar to gambling. The reason of prohibition is that speculators generate their pri-
vate gains at the expense of society at large (Elmelki and Ben Arab, 2009). Gharar does not 
create additional wealth. "It only transfers wealth from its (losing) owners to new (winning) 
ones" (Siddiqi, 2009). Transactions containing risk are supposed to enhance uncertainty and de-
ceptive behaviors. However, in practice, as it is involved in every economic activity, minor un-
certainties and certain degree of risk are Islamically permitted (Siddiqi, 2008).  
 
   "The unjustified enrichment through games of pure chance" in order to amplify wealth without 
making effort is called Maysir (Algaoud and Lewis, 2007). Maysir is involved in contracts where 
the ownership of a good depends on the occurrence of a predetermined but uncertain event in the 
future (Gassner and Wackerbeck 2007). This means that if the business contract is signed, there 
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will be a gain for one party and a loss for the other party, but it is not sure beforehand who will 
be the winner or the looser.  
 
  Overall, the ban of Gharar and Maysir has particular relevance for financial markets, notably 
the derivatives market (for more information on derivatives, see Table 1.4-part (C) in the appen-
dix) and the insurance business (Algaoud, and Lewis, 2007). Therefore, the trade of all conven-
tional derivates instruments is unacceptable in Islamic finance. 
 
1.2.4.   Islam discourages heavy debt  and support a policy of bad debt cancellation 
  
  Islam discourages accruing heavy debt, except in cases of real necessity, because it can lead to 
harmful consequences. Islam permits and encourages assuming debt within reasonable limits. If 
debts are incurred, a full repayment is then important. If the borrower defaults on his/her pay-
ments, then Islam encourages lenders to either wait until such time as the existing loan can be 
repaid or to re-schedule the loan repayments but with no penalties (Hassan and Kayed, 2009).  
 
1.2.5.   Prohibition of financing certain economic sectors (or companies) 
  
  Investment is forbidden in socially and ethically detrimental activities. These include, for ex-
ample, gambling, pornography, alcohol...etc. It is also not permissible to acquire the shares of the 
companies providing financial services on interest like conventional banks and insurance com-
panies whose business are not acceptable by Islam.  
 
  Islam encourages Muslims to avoid investing in companies for which Total Debt divided by 
Trailing 12-Month Average Market Capitalization is ≥ 33%. Muslims also should exclude the 
following companies from their investment portfolios: I) Companies for which the  sum  of Cash  
and  Interest Bearing  Securities  divided  by  Trailing  12-Month Average Market Capitalization 
is ≥ 33%. II) Companies for which Accounts Receivables divided by Total Assets is greater than 
or equal to 45% where the Accounts Receivables = Current Receivables + Long-Term Recei-
vables. III) Companies for which non-operating interest income divided by revenue is ≥ 5% 
(DJI, 2005). However, "if a company has non-operating interest income but the net income is 
negative, it is then excluded. A company with negative net income while there is no non-
operating interest income may still be included" (Obaidullah, 2009). 
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1.2.6. Profit-Loss Sharing (PLS): No pain, no gain principle 
 
  There is a substantial difference between profits resulting from entrepreneurial activities and 
profits generated by granting loans. The latter is defined as receiving a monetary advantage 
without giving a counter value, and is, therefore, forbidden on ethical grounds. Islam is not op-
posed to profit or financial gain, as long as: an effort is performed, (partial) liability is accepted 
for the financial result of a venture, the venture is productive (led to an increase of value), and 
the profit is made in line with the Shari’ah (Schacht, 1964).  
 
  The Islamic solution, commonly referred to as Profit-Loss Sharing (PLS), suggests an equitable 
sharing of risks and profits between the parties involved in a financial transaction. Under PLS, 
"the lender and the borrower assume the investment’s risk based on a pre-agreed formula". PLS 
acquires several forms depending upon the type of contract e.g. Mudaraba (Joint venture) and 
Musharaka (partnership and collaboration). In both of these forms, the financier makes the funds 
available, not as a lender, but rather as an investor (Benjelloun, 2010). The financier shares the 
profit (loss) and is not assured, in advance, of a positive rate of return. Losses must be shared by 
the financier in proportion to his share in the total financing while profits may be shared in any 
mutually agreed ratio. However, the financier liability remains limited to the extent of financing 
provided by him and no more (Luca and Vasudevan, 2002). 
 
1.2.7. Tangible Asset-backing principle (TAB) 
 
  Money in Islam is not considered an asset class and, thus, may not necessarily earn a positive 
return (NBR, 2008). Money, therefore, should always be tied to and underpinned by an identifia-
ble and tangible underlying asset. This suggests that all financial transactions should "collatera-
lized by a reference portfolio of on-balance-sheet assets of the originator" (Zainal, 2009). 
 
1.2.8.    Money as a “Potential” capital : Characteristics of money and commodities 
 
  Based on Islamic economic principles, money is considered as “potential” capital. That is, it 
becomes actual capital only when it is invested in a productive activity. Islam recognizes the 
time value of money, but only when it acts as capital, not when it is “potential” capital (Iqbal, 
1997). Taking into consideration that the modern finance are based on the concept of money’s 
time value, Islamic finance does not revoke the time’s monetary valuation. "Shari’ah does not 
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prohibit increment in loan in the price of a commodity in any sale contract to be paid at a future 
date. It does prohibit making money’s time value an element of a lending relationship where it is 
claimed as a predetermined value (Khan, 1991). In this case, Shari’ah requires that a loan be paid 
back in the same currency by which it was given" (Ahmad and Hassan, 2007).  
 
  "According to the capitalist theory, there is no difference between money and commodity in so 
far as commercial transactions are concerned. Both are treated at par and can be sold at whatever 
price parties agree upon. For them selling 100 $ for 110$ is the same as selling a bag of rice cost-
ing 100$ for 110$" (AIMS, 2010). Money and commodity, however, have different characteris-
tics under the Islamic law, as compared with the capitalist theory. Islam, for example, does not 
recognize money as a commodity, such that there should be a price for its use. Money is used for 
buying and/or selling of other goods not buying and/or selling of money per se. The later action 
could make money not perform its original function of measure of value, store of value and me-
dium of exchange in asset-oriented economy, primarily because such transaction will become the 
person's main goal (Ghazanfar & Islahi, 1990).  
 
   In other words, "while money is recognized in Islam as a means of exchange, it may not law-
fully be regarded as a commodity for exchange" (Iqbal, 2009). Money has no intrinsic value in 
itself but is only a measure of value and/or a medium of exchange therefore, should not used to 
generate more money. "Money, by itself, is not capable of fulfilling human needs unless con-
verted into a commodity. A commodity can, on the other hand, fulfill human needs directly, and 
can be of different quality while money has no differential quality in the sense that a new note is 
exactly equal in value and quality to an old note. Also, commodities are transacted (or sold) by 
pinpointing the commodity in question or at least by giving certain specifications. Money cannot 
be pinpointed in a transaction of exchange. Even if it is, it would be of no use since the different 
denominations of money summing into equal amount are exactly the same" (AIMS, 2010).  
 
1.3. Islamic financing contracts (modes of operations) 
  
  There are many contracts and institutional forms used within the Islamic finance industry. Fi-
nancing tools that have been widely exercised by Islamic banks are primarily based on two gen-
eral principles: the PLS principle and the mark-up (MUP) principle. The first principle states that 
the bank (financer) is allowed to profit from a given loan under the condition that the bank is 
willing to share the investment risk. Contracts that are based on this principle (e.g. Mudaraba and 
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Musharaka financing) can possibly be seen as equity investments. Under the MUP principle, the 
bank may purchase a good/service or lease an asset in barter for a margin. Contracts that are 
based on this principle include debt-based financing modes such as: Murabaha, Salam, Istisnaa 
and Leasing (i.e, pure Ijarah and Ijarah & Iqtina) and referred to as “fixed return financing based 
on the “mark-up” or “cost-plus” concept. For more information and details regarding the most 
common Islamic financing contracts see Table 1.2 and Fig. 1.6-1.11 (appendix). 
 
  Specifically, the permissibility of risky capital investment without explicit interest earning ge-
nerates 3 forms of Islamic financing for both investment and trade (Hesse, Jobst and Solé, 2008): 
I) synthetic loans (debt-based) through a sale-repurchase agreement or back-to-back sale of bor-
rower or third party-held assets. II) Lease contracts (asset-based) through a sale-leaseback 
agreement (operating lease) or the lease of third-party acquired assets with purchase obligation 
components (financing lease). III) Profit-sharing contracts (equity-based) of future assets. As 
opposed to equity-based contracts, both debt- and asset-based contracts are initiated by a tempo-
rary (permanent) transfer of existing (future) assets from the borrower to the lender, or the acqui-
sition of third-party assets by the lender on behalf of the borrower (Jobst, 2005).  
 
  In reality, Islamic finance industry relies on debt-based structures instead of equity-based ones. 
This might be due to the fact that the capital adequacy requirements for equity-based products, in 
order to maintain high capital ratios and prevent dilution of banks ownership rights, are higher 
than debt-based ones. Also, the taxation treatment of debt makes it more attractive than equity. 
However, if Islamic banks use equity-based structures, their operations will be riskier. Specifi-
cally, while the larger payouts to depositors in the short term may increase deposits and thus, 
could provide some comfort in the present economic scenario, the rate of return to depositors at 
Islamic banks will be low in the long term which could, in turn, encourage deposit withdrawals 
leading to a potential liquidity and solvency problems, particularly due to the compliance with 
regulatory and taxation rules (Brownlow and Shafique, 2009; Abedifar, et al., 2012).  
 
1.4. Islamic financial services  
  
  The most well established forms of Islamic finance are: banking and Sukuk (Islamic bonds). 
Takaful (the Islamic insurance) and funds are also evolving. Islamic private equity and Islamic 
private wealth management still need an innovation (Fig. 1.1). 
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Table 1.2 
 
A Brief Definition of the Main Islamic Modes of Financing 
 
Musharaka (Active Partnership "joint venture"-PLS): 
 
A contract similar to that of the Mudaraba, with the difference 
that in the case of Musharaka both partners participate in the 
management and provision of capital. They also share in the 
profit and loss of the investments. More specifically, profit is 
distributed between partners in accordance with agreed ratios, 
but loss must be distributed in proportion to the share of each 
partner in the total capital.  
 
Mudaraba (Passive  Partnership-PLS): 
 
It is a special kind of partnership (two tiered transaction for an Islamic 
bank) where one partner gives money (the capital owner-financer) to 
another (the investment manager-mudarib) for investing it in an enter-
prise. The Profit is distributed between the two parties in accordance 
with the ratio that they agree upon at the time of the contract. Financial 
loss is borne by the capital owner. The manager will loss the "opportuni-
ty cost" of his own labour, which failed to generate any positive income. 
 
Diminishing Musharaka (Co-ownership) : 
 
A contract between the bank and beneficiary. The two parties 
agree to enter into a partnership to own an asset, on the condi-
tion that the financier will gradually sell his share to the bene-
ficiary at an agreed price and in accordance with an agreed 
schedule. As a result, the withdrawing partners share diminish-
es gradually along with the share of the profits, in line with 
their declining equity stake. 
 
Ijarah wa iqtina’: A lease ending in the purchase of the 
leased asset 
 
"Ijarah wa iqtina’ is simply a financing contract in which the 
ownership of the leased asset is to be transferred to the lessee 
at the end of the lease agreement. This transfer of the owner-
ship is made through a contract, in which the leased asset is 
either given to the lessee as a gift or is sold to him at a nominal 
price at the end of the lease agreement". 
 
Istisna* 
 
A contract in which a party orders another to manufacture and 
provide a commodity. The description of, delivery date, price 
and payment rate are all set in the contract. Hence, it is a kind 
of sale where a commodity is transacted before it comes into 
existence. However, it is necessary for the validity of istisna’ 
that the price is fixed with the consent of the parties and the 
necessary specification of the commodity is fully settled be-
tween them. "The price may be paid in installments, in step 
with the progress of the work, or partly at the front end and the 
rest at the time of delivery".  However, after the manufacturer 
starts the work, the contract cannot be cancelled unilaterally. 
 
 
Sources:  AIMS,  IIBI, Ayub (2007), El-Gamal (2006), Visser 
(2009), Al- Jarhi & Iqbal (2001), Ariff & Igbal (2011), Usmani 
(2000), and Siddiqi(2007). 
 
*all are considered as a debt instruments (Ijara is Quasi-debt  in-
strument) 
Murabaha * 
 
Murabaha is considered a sale contract between the Islamic bank and his 
client. The client orders the bank to purchase for him a certain commodi-
ty from a third party at a specific price, promising to purchase this 
commodity, from the bank, once it has been bought, but at deferred 
price. The deferred price includes an agreed upon profit margin "mar-
kup" in the favor of the bank as a  return for its services.   
 
Ijarah (Leasing) * 
 
The term 'Ijarah' is used particulalry in two different situations. On the 
one hand, it means to employ the services of a person on wages given to 
him as a reward for his hired services. On the other hand, 'Ijarah' means 
to transfer the usufruct of a particular property to another person in 
exchange for a rent claimed from him. In this case, 'Ijarah' is analogous 
to the term 'leasing', as used in modern business terminology. Here the 
lessor is called 'Mu’jir', the lessee is called 'musta’jir' and the rent paya-
ble to the lessor is called 'ujrah'.  
 
Qard hasan (beneficence loans). 
 
This is the zero return type of loan that the Islam urges Muslims to make 
available to those who need them. The borrower is obliged to repay only 
the principal amount of the loan, but is permitted to add a margin at his 
own choice. 
 
Tawarruq 
 
Tawarruq is a sale of an asset to a purchaser with deferred payment. The 
purchaser then sells the asset to the third party on cash with a price lesser 
than the deferred price, for the purpose of getting cash. However, every 
tawarruq transaction creates a debt. This debt is consistently larger than 
the cash it transfers to the client. 
 
It is considered lawful in fiqh (jurisprudence) to charge a higher price for 
a good if payments are to be made at a later date (Bai' muajjal). Accord-
ing to fiqh, this does not amount to charging interest, because it is not 
considered as a lending transaction but rather a trading one. Bai’ 
Mu’ajjal is valid; however, if the due date of payment is fixed in an 
unambiguous manner. The deferred price may be more than the cash 
price, but it must be fixed at the time of sale. Once the price is fixed, it 
cannot be decreased in case of earlier payment, nor can it be increased in 
case of default. 
 
Salam*(or Bay' As-salam: the Islamic alternative to conventional 
derivatives) 
 
Salam is a sale contract whereby the seller undertakes to supply a specif-
ic good to the buyer at a definite future date in exchange of an "advanced 
price fully paid at spot". The price is cash, but the supply of the pur-
chased goods is deferred. "It is one of the basic conditions for the validi-
ty of a sale in Shari’ah that the commodity (intended to be sold) must be 
in the physical or constructive possession of the seller".  
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1.4.1.   Islamic banking 
  
  Islamic banks are banking institution whose activities include all currently known banking ac-
tivities. They have the same purpose as conventional banks except that they make money by 
lending out capital in accordance with the rules of the Islamic law. Islamic banks have to set up 
Shari’ah Committees (SC) to ensure that they conduct their affairs in accordance with the Sha-
ri’ah principles. Islamic banks advance funds on a profit-loss-sharing (PLS) principle or on a de-  
  
                                                           Fig. 1.1:  Main Islamic financial services 
 
bt-creating basis. They provide finance to enterprises through either sharing directly in the net 
results of their activities or financing their purchases of assets, goods and services (AL-jarhi, 
2005). In an Islamic mortgage transaction, Sarker (1999) stated that instead of loaning the buyer 
with money to purchase an item, a bank might buy the item itself and re-sell it to the buyer at a 
profit, while allowing the buyer to pay the bank in installments. However, because the bank's 
profit cannot be made "explicit", there are therefore no additional penalties for late payment. 
Consequently, Islamic banks ask for strict collateral in order to protect themselves against 
default and thus, the purchased item is registered to the name of the buyer from the start of the 
transaction in form of Murabaha financing. Moreover, Islamic banks lend money to companies 
by issuing floating rate interest loans which is pegged to the company's individual rate of return. 
This practice is called Musharaka, where the bank's profit on the loan is equal to a certain 
percentage of the company's individual profits. 
  
   Additionally, Islamic banks mobilize funds on the basis of a Mudaraba or Wakalah contracts 
(Shahid, 2007). They can also accept demand deposits which are treated as interest-free loans 
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from the clients to the bank and are certainly guaranteed. In theory, Islamic banking is often syn-
onymous with full-reserve banking, with banks achieving a 100% reserve ratio (Harcourt, 2004). 
This is, however, not always the case in practice (Njanike, 2009). Islamic banks further play the 
role of an investment manager for the owners of time deposits (usually called investment depo-
sits: restricted or unrestricted (Fig.1.2)). They provide the owners of funds the opportunities to 
place their financial resources profitably, as they become implicit partners of those institutions that  
  
 
                                       Fig. 1.2: Islamic bank depositors' groups 
 
 
share in their net profit, while carrying a proportional share in their risk. In a way that depends on 
the size and date to maturity of each deposit, an Islamic bank shares its net earnings with its de-
positors  who must be informed in advance of "the formula used for sharing the net earnings with 
the bank" (Al-Jarhi, 2004). From a comparison point of view, Islamic banking and conventional 
banking are extremely different in many ways. Table 1.3 illustrates the main differences between 
Islamic and conventional banks (systems). 
 
1.4.2. Islamic investment funds 
 
   The term Islamic investment fund means a joint pool wherein the investors contribute their sur-
plus money for the purpose of its investment to earn Islamically acceptable profits in strict con-
formity with the precepts of Islamic Shari’ah (Usmani, 2005). The validity of Islamic funds (i.e. 
Equity Fund, Ijarah Fund, Commodity Fund, Murabaha Fund and Mixed Fund) will be subject to 
two basic conditions: The first condition illustrates that instead of a fixed return tied up with their 
face value, as in conventional fund, Islamic fund must carry a pro-rated profit and thus, neither 
the principal nor a rate of profit can be guaranteed (Ayub, 2007). The subscribers enter into the f-  
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Table 1.3 
 
Main distinguishing features of the Islamic banks (system) from conventional peers 
 
Conventional  Banking  System Faith-Based (Islamic ) Banking  System 
 
Lending money and getting the principle back with interest is 
the fundamental function. The general relationship between the 
bank and its client is primarily that of a debtor and creditor. 
Conventional banks mostly act as intermediaries between 
lenders & borrowers enjoying almost a risk-free spread. Spe-
cifically, banks do not usually indulge in equity financing. 
They carry much less risk, major part of such risks being 
transferred to the borrowers.  
 
 
The status of Islamic bank in relation to its clients is that of 
partners, investors and trader, buyer and seller. Participation in 
partnership business based upon the principles of equity fi-
nancing and real economic activities is the fundamental func-
tion. Greater share of potential risks forces Islamic banks to 
manage it more professionally to ensure better returns than 
conventional accounts. Depositors & investors have the oppor-
tunity to earn higher returns but also could suffer losses.  
 
The purpose of investments is to maximize private profit & 
wealth without any restriction. The emphasis then is primarily 
on credit-worthiness of clients.  
 
The purpose of investments is to increase beneficial output to 
the community as whole. Thus, it gives greater emphasis on 
the viability of the projects. Islamic banks also aim at max-
imizing profit but subject to Shari’ah restrictions.  
 
 
Conventional banks guarantee the capital (value of the depo-
sits) and rate of return (interest rate).  
Islamic banks, working on the principle of PLS, they cannot, 
by dentition, guarantee any fixed rate of return on deposits. 
Islamic banks can only guarantee deposits for deposit account, 
which is based on al-wadiah and thus, the depositors are guar-
anteed repayment of their funds. However, if the account is 
based on Mudarabah, for example, clients have to share in a 
loss position. 
 
In case of debtors default, the bank can charge additional 
money (compound penal rate of interest). In case of banks 
bankrupts, depositors are paid before the shareholders. How-
ever, for commercial banks, borrowing from the money market 
is the main source of liquidity. 
  
No additional charge or small amount of compensation is 
charged but if so, these proceeds are given to charity. An in-
vestment account holder will have similar rights as sharehold-
ers. However, for the Islamic banks, it is comparatively diffi-
cult to borrow money from the money market.   
 
Transactions are financial asset based money. Debt burden 
arising out of excessive use of credit leads to bankruptcies and 
waste of financial resources. Due to absence of goods & ser-
vices behind the money while distributing funds, the expansion 
of money takes place, which creates inflation. Bridge financing 
and long term loans are not made on the basis of existence of 
capital goods; rather they are distributed on the basis of win-
dow dressed project feasibility of the entrepreneur. 
   
Financing is backed by real assets and meant for productive 
use to reduce the overall debt burden. Due to the existence of 
goods & services, no expansion of money takes place and thus, 
no inflation is created. For example, Musharkah & Diminish-
ing Musharkah agreement are made after making sure the exis-
tence of capital good before disbursing funds for a capital 
project. 
 
Money is a product besides medium of exchange and store of 
value. Money commonly used to make more money. Time 
value is the basis for charging interest on Capital. 
 
 
Real asset is the product. Making money from money is not 
Islamically acceptable. Money is just a medium of exchange. 
Profit on exchange of goods & services are the basis for earn-
ing profit.  
    
Debt financing gets advantage of leverage for an enterprise due 
to interest expense as deductible item from taxable profits. 
This causes huge burden of taxes on salaried persons. Thus, the 
saving and disposable income of the people is affected badly. 
This results decrease in the real GDP. 
 
Sharing profits in Mudaraba and sharing in the business ven-
ture in Musharaka provides extra tax to Federal Government. 
This leads to minimize the tax burden over salaried persons. 
Due to which savings & disposable income of the people is 
increased, this leads to an increase in the GDP. 
Trading and dealing in derivatives are widely considered as the 
main source of liquidity in the conventional financial, com-
modity and capital markets.  
 
The existence of uncertainty in a contract is prohibited. “Full 
disclosure” by both parties is the norm in contracts. Deriva-
tives trading are considered as having elements of Gharar.  
 
 
 
Source: AIMS-UK website (based on: Al-Jarhi & Iqbal (2001)), 
Ayub (2007), El-Gamal (2006), Al Baraka bank Lebanon website 
and Lafferty Group website.  
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und with a clear understanding that their return is tied up with the "actual" profit earned or loss 
suffered by the fund. The second condition suggests that the amounts pooled together must be 
invested in a business acceptable to Shari’ah. This particularly means that the channels of in-
vestment as well as the terms agreed with them must conform to the Islamic principles (Usmani, 
2005). Table 1.4 (a) illustrates the main types of Islamic investment funds. 
 
1.4.3. Islamic insurance  (Takaful) 
 
  Despite of the belief in God or Fatalism, Muslims, like all human beings, should find suitable 
means to avoid the possibility of meeting catastrophes and disasters and also to minimize finan-
cial losses, as efforts to avoid risk are not against the Islamic tenets. One possible way out is to 
buy an Islamic insurance cover called "Takaful". "Takaful originates from the Arabic word 
'Kafalah', which means “guaranteeing each other” or "joint guarantee" (Karim et al. 2008). In 
Takaful, "a group of individuals pay money into a fund, which is then used to cover payouts to 
members of the group when a claim is made". Takaful is considered as a risk sharing entity "mu-
tual risk- pooling" that allows for the transparent sharing of risk by pooling individual contribu-
tions for the benefit of all subscribers (Austrade, 2010).  
 
  The main objective of Takaful is to "pay a defined loss from a defined fund" (WTC-report, 
2008). Takaful has no contact with uncertainty and /or excessive Gharar. This is basically be-
cause the part of installments paid by each participant is considered to be a donation (Tabarru') 
which is particularly directed to a special Islamic fund. When an insured accident occurs, this 
fund is used to provide the compensation. In addition to paying the money necessary to cover for 
a damage, the participant can be sure he/she will be paid the (income) from the other part of in-
stallments on the basis of PLS system, regardless of the occurrence of insurance accident. The 
operator is actually aware of the amount of his/her share that the terms of a contract provide. The 
income from Takaful depends, however, exclusively on the Islamic operations carried out by the 
insurance company and does not appear to be a fixed interest (AIMS, 2010). 
 
   The majority of the Shari’ah scholars believe that the conventional insurance is unlawful due to 
involvement of Riba, Maisir and Gharar. Ayoub (2007) indicates that the distinction between the 
conventional insurance and Takaful business is more visible with respect to investment of 
funds. More specifically, insurance companies invest their funds in interest (Riba)-based busi-
nesses. Takaful companies, by contrast, undertake only shari’ah based businesses practices and 
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distributed profits (if any) in accordance with the pre-agreed ratios in the initial agree-
ment. Likewise, they share in any surplus (loss) from the pool collectively. "Takaful system has a 
built-in mechanism to counter any over-pricing policies of the insurance companies because what-
ever may be the premium charged, the surplus would normally go back to the participants in 
proportion to their contributions". Moreover, Takaful is principally based on the concept of "so-
cial solidarity, cooperation and mutual indemnification of losses of members" (Khan, 2005; Ga-
foor, 2007).  
  
  According to Standard & Poor’s (2006) and A.M. Best's Takaful Review (2012), a takaful 
manages two separate funds: one for shareholders and the other one for policyholders who con-
siders as participants in the venture. The participants pay the takaful company a "Wakala" fixed-
management fee or a "Mudaraba" profit-sharing fee, or a combination of both, as well as pre-
mium contributions to cover potential claims. In return, the insurer manages the various risks and 
pays claims against the accumulated funds.1 The takaful company invests participants' contribu-
tions in Shari’ah acceptable assets to yield return. The investment management expenses are 
borne by the takaful company which in return shares in the profits with participants. If the accu-
mulated fund runs short (cannot pay claims), shareholders are required to provide an interest-free 
loan "qardh hasan" to cover the deficit. On the other hand, if the accumulated fund runs a sur-
plus, the excess may be distributed to policyholders. However, a Takaful model based on Muda-
raba transaction is illustrated in the appendix (Fig.1.11). 
 
1.4.4. Islamic bonds (Sukuk)  
  
  A bond is a contractual debt obligation whereby the issuer is contractually obliged to pay inter-
est and principal to bondholders on certain specified dates (Thomas, Cox and Kraty, 2005). Su-
kuk commonly refers to the Islamic equivalent of bonds. Since interest bearing bonds are not 
permissible in Islam, Sukuk securities are structured to comply with the Islamic law and its in-
vestment principles. Sukuk are asset-backed, stable income and tradable Shari’ah compatible inv 
investment certificates. Sukuk is well described as "Trust Certificate" that grants the investor a sh- 
 
___________________________ 
1 Takaful products are based on two main business models: I) The Mudarabah model which is essentially a basis for sharing profit and loss between the 
takaful operator and the policyholders. The takaful operator manages the operation in return for a share of the surplus on underwriting and a share of profit 
from investment. The profit as universally defined by conventional insurance companies is then shared according to a mutually agreed ratio between the 
participants and the operators. Management expenses of the operator including agency remuneration, if any, shall be borne by the shareholders' fund and 
not from the takaful funds. II) The Wakala model which is a contract of agency replaces surplus sharing with a performance fee. The takaful operator in 
this case acts as an agent for participants and manages the takaful/retakaful fund in return for a defined fee. The paid-up capital is contributed as donation 
by the shareholders. Therefore, the shareholders do not expect and probably do not mind for not receiving any returns on the capital donated (Economic 
Research & Consulting, 2011).  
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are of an asset along with the cash flows and risk commensurate with such ownership (Thomas, 
et al. 2005). Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI) 
defines Sukuk as being: “Certificates of equal value representing after closing subscription, re-
ceipt of the value of the certificates and putting it to use as planned, common title to shares and 
rights in tangible assets, usufruct and services, or equity of a given project or equity of a special 
investment activity”.  
 
  In practice, the basic condition of issuance of different types of Sukuk is the existence of assets 
on the balance sheet of a financial institution. The identification of suitable assets is arguably the 
most important step in the process of issuing Sukuk. This differentiates sukuk from traditional 
bonds as the latter proceed over interest bearing securities, whereas sukuk are, principally, in-
vestment certificates comprising of ownership claims in a pool of real assets (Kamali, 2007). 
"This discourages over-exposure of the financing facility beyond the value of the underlying as-
set, given that the issuer cannot leverage in excess of the asset value" (AIMS, 2005). The hold-
ers' of Sukuk claim an undivided beneficial ownership in the underlying assets. Sukuk holders, 
however, are entitled to share revenues generated by the sukuk assets, as well as, being entitled 
to share in the proceeds of the realization of the sukuk assets. Another distinguishing feature of 
sukuk is that they will not be tradable on the secondary market, but instead they held until matur-
ity or even sold at par.  
 
  Sukuk can be of many types and techniques depending upon the type of Islamic modes of fi-
nancing and trades used in its structuring. Among the 14 eligible sukuk identified by the 
(AAOIFI), the most important and common types of sukuk funds are shown in Table 1.4 (b) in 
the appendix. 
 
1.5. Risks and challenges associated with Islamic finance and banking 
 
  The use of financial products that conform to the Islamic principles pose special risks and chal-
lenges. Consequently, efficient risk management in Islamic financial institutions has assumed 
particular importance as they try to cope with the challenges of globalization. This, however, re-
quires the development of a suitable regulatory framework and new financial instruments to pro-
vide an enabling operational environment for Islamic finance. This section briefly highlights 
some of these risks and challenges which are particularly associated with Islamic finance.  
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1.5.1. Risks 
 
  There are general factors that make the operation of Islamic financial institutions riskier than 
conventional counterparts do: I) fewer risk-hedging instruments and techniques, II) under-
developed or non-existent of the inter-bank money markets 2 and government securities, and III) 
the limited availability of and access to the lender-of-last-resort operated by central banks. By 
and large, Islamic financing contracts are exposed to market, liquidity, operational and credit 
risks, along with other risks resulting from the unique asset and liability structures of Islamic 
finance (Fig. 1.3) (Mounira and Anas, 2008). 
 
 
                                               Fig. 1.3: Islamic banking specific risks  
 
1.5.1.1. Market risks 
  
  Like conventional banks, Islamic banks are also exposed to market risks. According to the 
IFSB, market risk refers to “the potential impact of adverse price movements on the economic 
value of an asset” resulting in a “loss in on- and off-balance sheet positions”. In other words, 
market risk is the current and potential risk to earnings and stockholder's equity resulting from 
adverse movements in market rates or prices.  
 
   Market risks, however, generally consist of: interest rate risks, exchange rate risks, commodity  
_______________________ 
 
2 Islamic money market products include for example: Al-Mudaraba Inter-bank Investment (MII), Islamic Inter-bank Cheque Clearing System 
(IICCS), Government Investment Certificate (GIC) and Islamic Accepted Bills (IAB), etc.  
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risks and equity price risks. Interest rate risk is one of the most important market risks faced by 
conventional financial institutions. Since Islamic banks do not deal in interest-based instruments, 
it has been argued that they relatively do not face this kind of risk. In reality, Islamic banks are 
indirectly confronted with this risk through the markup price of deferred sale and lease-based 
transactions. Islamic banks can’t go against the traffic. The effective returns on Islamic deposit 
and financing accounts need to be of the same scale as the interest rate of conventional counter-
parties. The disparity in real returns may potentially represent a threat to the Islamic banking in-
dustry. Islamic banks may face the dilemma that their returns may be significantly above the 
rates achieved by conventional banks. Thus, may face the commercial risk of being over-
whelmed by an influx of funds for which there is no short-term liquid market. They alternatively, 
may face the ethical dilemma of reducing the real return on their PLS investments to bring them 
in line with the low interest rates of conventional banks (Sarker, 2006).  
 
  Islamic banks explicitly use the (LIBOR) as a benchmark in their financing operations. There-
fore, it is natural for their assets to be exposed to the risk of changes in the LIBOR rate (El-
Gamal, 2003). A rise in LIBOR will lead to a rise in the mark-up and thus, lead to increase the 
payment of higher profits to future depositors compared with those received by the banks from 
the users of long-term funds. Chapra and Khan (2000) argue that the nature of investment depo-
sits on the liabilities side of an Islamic bank adds an additional dimension to this risk. Profit rates 
to be paid to Mudaraba depositors by an Islamic bank will have to respond to changes in the 
market rate of mark-up. However, profit rates earned on assets cannot be raised because the price 
has been fixed on the basis of the mark-up rates of the previous period. In other words, any in-
crease in new earnings has to be shared with depositors, but it cannot be re-adjusted on the assets 
side by re-pricing the receivables at higher rates (Sarker, 2006). 
 
  Additionally, Islamic banks are exposed to commodity price risk because, unlike conventional 
banks, they typically carry inventory items. They are also directly exposed to equity price risk as 
the vary nature of Islamic banking is equity financing through the PLS modes. Islamic banks are 
eventually exposed to the exchange rate risk in the same way as conventional peers 
(Sundararajan and Errico, 2002).   
 
1.5.1.2.         Liquidity risks 
 
  Liquidity risks is the current and potential risk to earnings and market value of stock-
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uity that result from banks inability to meet obligations as they come due. This is especially when 
there is an unexpected decline in a bank's net cash flow, or clearing obligations in a timely and 
cost effective manner. Liquidity risks refer also to the ability of a bank to cheaply and easily bor-
row a fund (Koch and MacDonald, 2009). In the conventional banking system with a well-
developed interbank market, there are a variety of instruments available that the banks can make 
use of. Frequently, for the short-term requirements and to cover mismatches in maturity, the 
access to interbank money markets for short-term borrowings gives considerable flexibility to a 
bank to adjust its short-term cash flow. Secondary markets in financial instruments have also be-
come an important source for liquidity, which banks can rely on to manage their liquidity position 
(Abdul Majid, 2003). As an insurance against being unable to cover an expected shortage of cash 
flow in the interbank market, banks desire to hold a portfolio of marketable securities that can be 
quickly liquidated in time of need (Lucas and McDonald, 1989). A bank can also use the discount 
window from the central bank as lender of last resort. 
 
  Similarly, Islamic banks have to meet their liquidity obligations to enable the smooth running 
of their business. The nature of Islamic banks have additional issues to be addressed in order to 
meet their liquidity needs in a Shari’ah complaint base (Malik and Mustafa, 2011). Many factors, 
however, come together to cause such a risk specific to Islamic banking (Fig. 1.4). The conven-
tional mechanisms of liquidity management are all based on interest therefore, are not permissi-
ble for Islamic banks. Islamic banks are forced to hold higher non-productive liquidity reserves 
which could lead to a lower profitability and could ultimately destroy the shareholders value.  
 
                                       Fig. 1.4: The causes of liquidity problems in Islamic financial institutions 
                                    Source: Abdul Majid, International Conference on Islamic Banking: Risk Management, Regulation and Supervision -2003 
 
  The Islamic banking financing activities must be backed by tangible (real) assets, whereas in 
conventional banking, these activities can be carried out back-to-back without being backed by 
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any assets. Islamic assets are pre-dominantly long-term and relatively illiquid. This does not, 
however, present a problem because the majority of Muslim countries are flush with huge 
amount of cash. Under the normal market conditions, the mismatch between the assets duration 
which are long-term and illiquid and the liabilities which are short-term, can present a serious 
challenge. For Islamic banks, it is problematic to obtain cash at reasonable cost and to sell assets 
at a profitable price. This is mainly due to the strict Shari’ah restrictions on the securitization of 
debt instruments leading to the fact that banks have problems to sell its receivables.  
 
1.5.1.3.      Operational risks 
 
  Operational risk is considered a fundamental part of doing business and hence, cannot be fully 
eliminated. It has also considered a dominant risk and has contributed an even larger share of 
banks total risk. Operational risks refer particularly to the possibility that operating expenses 
might vary significantly from what is expected which could produce a decline in the net income 
and banks value (Koch and MacDonald, 2009; Grier, 2007). The Basel committee defines opera-
tional risk as "the risk of loss resulting from inadequate or failed internal processes, people and 
systems, or from external events". Operational risks are likely to be more significant for Islamic 
financial institutions due to their specific contractual features. According to the IFSB, operation-
al risk in Islamic banks is associated with the loss resulting from "inadequate or failed internal 
processes, people and system, or from external events, including losses resulting from Shari’ah 
noncompliance and the failure in fiduciary responsibilities". 
 
  Operational risks in the Islamic framework may be due to various sources including: the unique 
corporate governance (CG) and control activates that Islamic banks should perform internally, 
the non–standardized nature of Islamic financial products and services (Sundararajan and Errico, 
2002), the lack of an efficient Shari’ah system to enforce financial contracts and also the sub-
stantial fiqh-related risks which make banks as well as supervisory staff are not well-oriented in 
the knowledge of fiqh, this has had the effect of depriving Islamic banks of the utilization of 
many genuine risk management concepts which may not necessarily be in conflict with the Sha-
ri’ah (Chapra and Ahmed, 2002). Overall, operational risks arising in Islamic banks generally 
lead to shortfalls in bank's net income as compared with that expected and thus, create significant 
management problems (Chapra and Khan, 2000). 
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1.5.1.4.       Credit risk 
 
  Credit risk in banking is commonly defined as “the potential that the counterparty fails to meet 
its obligations in accordance with agreed terms” (BIS, 2005). In an Islamic bank, credit risk is in 
the form of payment risk arising when one party to a business transaction pays money or deliver 
assets before receiving its own assets or cash, thereby exposing it to potential loss (Khan and 
Ahmed, 2001). Islamic banks need to be more rigorous in their credit appraisal system than con-
ventional banks. Islamic banks face credit risk in most of the modes of financing they generally 
use. Credit risk can arise out of Mudaraba and Musharaka contracts in two ways: i) the entrepre-
neur might face a debt liability when he/she is liable to guarantee the capital in the case of negli-
gence; ii) when the capital of Mudaraba and/or Musharaka is employed in a deferred sale, the 
capital’s owner bears a risk pertains to the ability of the counterparties to repay (Elgari, )2003 .  
 
 
1.5.2.       Challenges facing Islamic banking and finance 
 
  There are many challenges which are common to conventional banks. But there are several 
challenges which are particularly specific to Islamic financial institutions. Some of the most im-
portant challenges facing Islamic financial industry are identified briefly as follows (Fig. 1.5): 
 
                                              Fig. 1.5: Main challenges facing Islamic banking 
 
1.5.2.1. Shari’ah arbitrage 
  
There is a diversity of opinion as to whether particular practices or services and products are sh- 
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ari’ah compliant or not (Wilson, 2007). This indicates that some products and services may be 
approved as being Islamic by some Shari’ah scholars but not by others. The significant differ-
ences in the well-known Muslim scholar's interpretation of the Islamic law relating to financial 
transactions can apply not only to products and services, but also to operations and financial sys-
tems. According to Akhtar (2007), reaching consensus and harmonized guidance among Islamic 
scholars of different beliefs, would let the industry significantly grow and strongly compete on 
level playing field. Additionally, a flexible and simpler interpretation of the basic Islamic tenets 
would also enhance the public acceptability for Islamic products. 
 
1.5.2.2.     Shari’ah compliance throughout the Islamic product’s life cycle (PLS) 
 
  For Islamic finance providers, gaining approval from the Shari'ah Supervisory Board (SSB) on 
Shari’ah compliance of a product before its launch is not only necessary, but vital. What is also 
important for Islamic banks is recognizing that the Shari’ah compliance is a continuous process 
which particularly means that their products (or services) are adequately monitored (Mahmood, 
2009). This has, however, implications for an Islamic bank’s prudential requirements as well as 
conduct of business. Some products, if they breach Shari’ah compliance rules, "can adversely 
affect a bank’s solvency by converting an asset into a liability on the balance sheet". However, 
efficient monitoring of Shari’ah compliance may involve reinforcing more effective SSB over-
sight through the internal auditing process and by developing knowledge and more expertise 
within an Islamic bank (Ainley et al. 2007; Toronto Financial Services Alliance, 2010). 
 
1.5.2.3. Shortage of experts in Islamic banking 
 
  One main challenge to expanding the Islamic banking industry is the scarcity of not only the 
appropriately qualified Shari’ah scholars who must give their approval that an Islamic financial 
product does not contradict the religion's principles before it can be marketed, but also the 
executive specialists who are typically experts and well-versed in international and Islamic 
banking operations. In practice, the supply of trained and experienced bankers has lagged behind 
the expansion of Islamic banking (Ahmed, 2010). To cater the needs of the Islamic industry, 
both business and religious schools should offer specialist courses  in  conjunction  with  indus-
try  experts  to  prepare  the  next  generation of  Shari’ah scholars.  
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Appendix- Ch.1 
Table 1.4.   Types of Islamic investment funds, Islamic bonds, and Islamic derivatives. 
 
A. Types of Islamic In-
vestment Funds  
 
Equity Funds 
In an equity or mutual fund the amounts 
are invested in the shares of joint stock 
companies. The profits are derived 
through the capital gains by purchasing 
the shares and selling them when prices 
are increased. Profits are also earned 
through dividends distributed by the 
relevant companies.  
 
Ijarah Funds 
Ijarah means leasing. In this fund the 
subscription amounts are used to pur-
chase assets like real estate, motor 
vehicles or other equipment for the 
purpose of leasing them out to their 
ultimate users. The ownership of these 
assets remains with the Fund and the 
rentals are charged from the users. 
These rentals are the source of income 
for the fund, which is distributed pro 
rata to the subscribers. 
 
Commodities Funds 
In commodity funds, subscriptions 
amounts are used in purchasing differ-
ent commodities in order to resale them. 
The profits generated by the sales are 
the income of the fund, which is distri-
buted pro rata among the subscribers. 
 
Murabaha Funds 
 
Murabaha is a specific kind of sale 
where the commodities are sold on a 
cost-plus basis. The contemporary 
Islamic banks and financial institutions 
as a node of financing have adopted this 
kind of sale. They purchase the com-
modity for the benefit of their clients, 
and then sell it to them on the basis of 
deferred payment at an agreed margin 
of profit added to the cost. 
 
Mixed Funds 
Another type of Islamic Fund may be of 
a nature where the subscription amounts 
are employed in different types of 
investments, like equities, leasing, 
commodities etc. This may be called a 
Mixed Islamic Fund. In this case if the 
tangible assets of the Fund are more 
than 51% while the liquidity and debts 
are less than 50% the units of the fund 
may be negotiable. However, if the 
proportion of liquidity and debts ex-
ceeds 50%, its units cannot be traded in 
according to the majority of the con-
temporary scholars. In this case the 
Fund must be a closed-end Fund. 
B. Types of  Islamic Bonds 
- Sukuk Funds 
 
Mudaraba Sukuk  
 
These are investment sukuk that 
represent ownership of units of equal 
value in the Mudaraba equity and are 
registered in the names of holders on 
the basis of undivided ownership of 
shares in the Mudaraba equity and its 
returns according to the percentage of 
ownership of share. The owners of such 
sukuk are the "rabbul-mal". Mudarba 
sukuk are used for enhancing public 
participation in big investment projects. 
Musharaka Sukuk 
These are investment sukuk that 
represent ownership of Musharaka 
equity. It does not differ from the 
Mudaraba sukuk except in the organiza-
tion of the relationship between the 
issuer and holders of them, whereby the 
party issuing sukuk forms a committee 
from the holders of the sukuk who can 
be referred to in investment decisions. 
Musharaka Sukuk are used for mobiliz-
ing the funds for establishing a new 
project or developing an existing one or 
financing a business activity on the basis 
of partnership contracts. The certificate 
holders become the owners of the 
project or the assets of the activity as per 
their respective shares. These Mushara-
ka certificates can be treated as negotia-
ble instruments and can be bought and 
sold in the secondary market. 
 
Ijara Sukuk 
 
These are sukuk that represent owner-
ship of equal shares in a rented real 
estate or the usufruct of the real estate. 
These sukuk give their owners the right 
to own the real estate, receive the rent 
and dispose of their sukuk in a manner 
that does not affect the right of the 
lessee, i.e. they are tradable. The hold-
ers of such sukuk bear all cost of main-
tenance of and damage to the real 
estate. Ijarah sukuk are the securities 
representing ownership of well defined 
existing and known assets tied up to a 
lease contract, rental of which is the 
return payable to sukuk holders. Pay-
ment of ijarah rentals can be unrelated 
to the period of taking usufruct by the 
lessee. It can be made before beginning 
of the lease period, during the period or 
after the period as the parties may 
mutually decide. This flexibility can be 
used to evolve different forms of con-
tract and sukuk that may serve different 
purposes of issuers and the holders. 
 
Murabaha Sukuk  
In this case the issuer of the certificate 
is the seller of the Murabaha commodi-
ty, the subscribers are the buyers of that 
commodity, and the realised funds are 
the purchasing cost of the commodity. 
The certificate holders own the Mura-
baha commodity and are entitled to its 
final sale price upon the re-sale of the 
Commodity. The possibility of having 
legally acceptable Murabaha-based 
sukuk is only feasible in the primary 
market. The negotiability of these 
Sukuk or their trading at the secondary 
market is not permitted by shariah, as 
the certificates represent a debt owing 
from the subsequent buyer of the Com-
modity to the certificate-holders and 
such trading amounts to trading in debt 
on a deferred basis, which will result in 
riba. Despite being debt instruments, the 
Murabaha Sukuk could be negotiable if 
they are the smaller part of a package or 
a portfolio, the larger part of which is 
constituted of negotiable instruments 
such as Mudaraba, Musharaka, or Ijara 
Sukuk. Murabaha sukuk are popular in 
Malaysian market due to a more liberal 
interpretation of fiqh by Malaysian 
jurists permitting sale of debt (bai-al-
dayn) at a negotiated price. 
Salam Sukuk 
Salam sukuk are certificates of equal 
value issued for the purpose of mobiliz-
ing Salam capital so that the goods to be 
delivered on the basis of Salam come to 
the ownership of the certificate holders. 
The issuer of the certificates is a seller 
of the goods of Salam, the subscribers 
are the buyers of the goods, while the 
funds realized from subscription are the 
purchase price (Salam capital) of the 
goods. The holders of Salam certificates 
are the owners of the Salam goods and 
are entitled to the sale price of the 
certificates or the sale price of the 
Salam goods sold through a parallel 
Salam, if any. Salam-based securities 
may be created and sold by an SPV 
under which the funds mobilized from 
investors are paid as an advance to the 
company SPV in return for a promise to 
deliver a commodity at a future date. 
SPV can also appoint an agent to 
market the promised quantity at the 
time of delivery perhaps at a higher 
price. The difference between the 
purchase price and the sale price is the 
profit to the SPV and hence to the 
holders of the Sukuk. All standard 
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shari’ah requirements that apply to 
Salam also apply to Salam sukuk, such 
as, full payment by the buyer at the time 
of affecting the sale, standardized 
nature of underlying asset, clear enume-
ration of quantity, quality, date and 
place of delivery of the asset and the 
like. One of the Shari‘ah conditions 
relating to Salam, as well as for creation 
of Salam sukuk, is the requirement that 
the purchased goods are not re-sold 
before actual possession at maturity. 
Such transactions amount to selling of 
debt. This constraint renders the Salam 
instrument illiquid and hence somewhat 
less attractive to investors. Thus, an 
investor will buy a Salam certificate if 
he expects prices of the underlying 
commodity to be higher on the maturity 
date. 
Istisna Sukuk 
Istisna sukuk are certificates that carry 
equal value and are issued with the aim 
of mobilizing the funds required for 
producing products that are owned by 
the certificate holders. The issuer of 
these certificates is the manufacturer 
(supplier/seller), the subscribers are the 
buyers of the intended product, while 
the funds realized from subscription are 
the cost of the product. The certificate 
holders own the product and are entitled 
to the sale price of the certificates or the 
sale price of the product sold on the 
basis of a parallel Istisna, if any. Istisna 
Sukuk are quite useful for financing 
large infrastructure projects. The suita-
bility of Istisna for financial intermedia-
tion is based on the permissibility for 
the contractor in Istisna to enter into a 
parallel Istisna contract with a subcon-
tractor. Thus, a financial institution may 
undertake the construction of a facility 
for a deferred price, and sub contract 
the actual construction to a specialized 
firm. Shari‘ah prohibits the sale of these 
debt certificates to a third party at any 
price other than their face value. Clearly 
such certificates cannot be traded in the 
secondary market. 
Hybrid Sukuk 
Considering the fact that Sukuk is-
suance and trading are important means 
of investment and taking into account 
the various demands of investors, a 
more diversified Sukuk - hybrid or 
mixed asset Sukuk - emerged in the 
market. In a hybrid Sukuk, the underly-
ing pool of assets can comprise of 
Istisna, Murabaha receivables as well as 
Ijara. Having a portfolio of assets 
comprising of different classes allows 
for a greater mobilization of funds. 
However, as Murabaha and Istisna 
contracts cannot be traded on secondary 
markets as securitized instruments at 
least 51% of the pool in a hybrid Sukuk 
must comprise of Sukuk tradable in the 
market such as an Ijara Sukuk. Due to 
the fact the Murabaha and Istisna 
receivables are part of the pool, the 
return on these certificates can only be a 
pre-determined fixed rate of return. 
Source: Data are directly obtained" as is" from 
AIMS-UK, (2011); Ayub, (2007); Usmani( 2004), 
and Bond.my (2009-2010) 
 
C. Islamic derivatives 
 
  Financial derivatives are instruments 
whose payoffs are linked to previously 
issued securities. These are for exam-
ple forwards, futures, options and 
swaps. In the conventional banking 
sector, derivative instruments are 
extensively used for two reasons, 
hedging and speculation. The purpose 
of hedging is to reduce the bank’s and 
customers’ exposure to certain risks 
while speculators generate risk so they 
can benefit from the increased return 
that risk brings. Due to the obvious 
involvement of Gharar and Maysir, all 
forms of speculation are regarded 
islamically unacceptable despite their 
importance for financial sector devel-
opment. Consequently, the use of 
derivatives for speculation is not per-
missible (Salehabadi and Aram, 
2002). Hedging is allowed for Islamic 
financial institutions as the derivative 
instruments and the underlying assets 
are structured and chosen in conformi-
ty with Islamic law requirements. 
Some Shari’ah scholars accept to 
consider hedging as islamically per-
missible with the aim of protecting 
investors from risks of increased mar-
ket’s volatility.  
 
  The features of conventional deriva-
tives that originally contradict with 
Shari’ah requirements are: Firstly, the 
underlying asset is not actually deli-
vered to the owner but rather he/she 
receives in cash the difference be-
tween the strike price and the spot 
price of the underlying.(3) In this way, 
the contract is about “a fictitious 
good” which contradicts the basic 
principles of Islamic finance. Second-
ly, for many conventional derivatives 
both payment and (fictional) delivery 
take place in the future. This is gener-
ally non-permissible for Islamic 
finance contract as well as the trade of 
liabilities. Finally, the evaluation of 
conventional derivatives is often based 
on the interest-based models. Hence, 
they cannot be used for risk mitigation 
by Islamic financial institutions 
(Gassner and Wackerbeck, 2007).  
 
  However, general approaches can be 
used to find a solution for the above 
mentioned problems. On the one hand, 
a number of contracts exist in Islamic 
finance could be considered a basis for 
derivative contracts within an Islamic 
framework particularly Salam struc-
tures. On the other hand, new Islamic 
products are developed, which are not 
applied in practice so far such as 
Khiyar and Istijrar (Bacha, 1999). For 
both approaches, the admissibility is 
disputed by Shari’ah scholars. The 
Islamic Financial Services Board 
(IFSB) holds that: “For risk mitigation 
instruments (in particular, derivatives) 
such as the Islamic profit rate swap, 
foreign exchange swap, forward (us-
ing the Salam principle), forward 
foreign exchange (using Wa`d prin-
ciple), options (using `urbun prin-
ciple), futures contract and Bay` al-
Istijrar contracts, only half of the 
jurisdictions surveyed accepted these 
contracts as Shari’ah permissible". 
However, the different Shari’ah inter-
pretations among jurisdictions have 
resulted in non-uniformity in the ac-
ceptance and design of Shari’ah com-
pliant alternatives. Therefore, in reali-
ty, adequate alternatives to conven-
tional derivatives are very rare in the 
novel Islamic financial industry and 
far between in countries where the 
compatibility of capital market (4) 
transactions with Islamic law requires 
the development of Shari’ah-
compliant structures. 
___________________________ 
(3) Spot: commodity and money exchanged simulta-
neously, both on (t+0). Future: both money and 
commodity are deferred until the future (t+1). De-
ferred: commodity is delivered (t+0), but money is 
paid on a deferred basis (t+1). Salam: the opposite of a 
deferred contract; in Salam money is paid immediately 
(t+0), but the commodity is delivered in the future 
(t+1). According to the vast majority of Shari’ah 
scholars, the three types of transactions (spot, deferred 
and Salam) are valid contracts. However, in futures 
contracts, the delivery is generally done by cash (i.e. 
the monetary difference is settled) rather than physical 
exchange of the commodity. As a result, some scho-
lars contend that such contracts are primarily used for 
speculative purposes (Islamicbanker.com, 2011). 
 
(4) The Islamic capital market functions as a parallel 
market to the conventional capital market for capital 
seekers and providers. Like any capital market, the 
primary function of Islamic capital market is to allow 
people, companies, and governments with surplus 
funds to transfer them to those who need the funds. 
Basically, there are two products largely responsible 
for the serious growth of the Islamic capital market: 
Shari’ah-compliant equity funds and Sukuk (Islamic 
bonds). However, the market has expanded to include 
exchange-traded funds, derivatives, swaps (the Islamic 
swap market is a subset of the overall Islamic deriva-
tive market. A swap is a derivative instrument that is 
used to transfer risk. The major Islamic swap struc-
tures are the profit rate swap to a hedge against 
fluctuations in borrowing rates, and the cross-
currency swap to transfer the risk of currency fluctua-
tion), Islamic Unit Trusts, Islamic Exchange-Traded 
Funds, and Islamic Commodity Funds. 
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        Fig. 1.6-1.11: Islamic modes of finance: some examples 
 
 
                   Fig. 1.6: Mudaraba transaction,Gassner & Wackerbeck, (2007)   Fig. 1.7:  Musharaka transaction,Gassner & Weckerbeck, (2007) 
 
                 Fig. 1.8: Murabaha transaction, Colditz, (2009)  
  
Fig. 1.11: Takaful model based on Mudaraba, Gassner and Weckerbeck, (2007) 
 
                 Fig. 1.9: Pure Ijara transaction, Colditz, (2009)  
        
Fig. 1.10: Salam transaction, Colditz, (2009)  
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2.1.    Foreword  
 
 Recently, Islamic finance is crossing the religious boundaries and has witnessed incredible 
growth, both in terms of assets and geographical spread. This is primerly because it is being seen 
as an ethical business model. Islamic finance is maturing into a global phenomenon as hig-
hlighted by the increasing appetite for Islamic instruments across the international financial mar-
ket. Consequently, Islamic finance has the potential to emerge as a mainstream alternative to 
conventional investments, either in Muslim or non-Muslim world.  
 
  However, this chapter explores the emergence, evolution and rapid growth of Islamic finance 
within and outside the interest-based financial systems. More specifically, it provides a detailed 
overview of the Islamic banking and finance sector worldwide: firstly, by presenting a brief 
analysis of the Islamic finance penetration in the Middle East and Africa; secondly, by analysing 
the development of the Islamic finance within Europe and the rest of the world.  
 
2.2.  International Islamic financial market (IIFM): An overview  
 
  It is generally accepted that the modern Islamic finance came in the first part of 1960s with the 
establishment of the Myt Ghamr local savings bank in Egypt and the Pilgrims' Management and 
Funds in Malaysia (Kahf, ahmad and homud, 1998). In 1975, Dubai Islamic Bank (DIB), the 
world’s first Islamic commercial bank was established in UAE followed by the establishment of 
Islamic Development Bank (IDB) in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia (Iqbal and Molyneux, 2005). During 
the 1980s, 1990s and beyond, the industry of Islamic finance expanded steadily and spreading 
around the globe. The demand for Islamic investments began to grow rapidly within and outside 
Muslim-majority countries (HM-Treasury, 2008). Nowadays, the ideas and concepts of Islamic 
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finance are attracting Muslim and non
portunities in many parts of the world
 
   The Islamic banking and finance industry is set to
growth has become particularly visible since 2001 mainly due
GCC-states (Ayoub, 2007). The GCC
ing hub. In 2020, the Gulf Stat
the world’s oil supplies and thus, will achieve average annual growth of 4.5% compared with the 
aggregate global rate of 3.3%. Consequently, Gulf investors and sovereign wealth funds intens
and diversify their Shari’ah-compliant 
mist, 2009). Another possible reason for such growth in Islamic finance is 
tion of capital to the Gulf region from Muslims 
"Due to this attack, experts forecast that Islamic banking could wrongly be brought into low a
preciation. In fact, the opposite was the case, although Islamic banking indeed was acceptable 
than ever before. Capital invested by Muslims in the US did flow back to Arab countries due to 
the unproven claim of money laundering for the purpose of terrorism financing. Arab entrepr
neurs instead feared that their accounts would be frozen in the US. This flow back of capital 
triggered an even faster development of Islamic banking by Islamic banks and Islamic windows 
of conventional banks in Muslim countries"
Exhibit 2.1: Map Showing Concentration of Sovereign wealth funds in Islamic 
Source: Wyman, O., (2009) 
    
  The coverage and extent of Islamic banking and finance vary considerably from countries 
where the sector is totally Islamic such as Pakistan and Iran, to others where conventional and 
Islamic systems coexist with each 
allowed conventional banks to set up Islamic windows
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-Muslim investors seeking to invest into new business o
.  
 grow 15-20% annually (CBB, 2008). This
 to the increased oil wealth across 
-States is growing in importance as an economic and tra
es is projected to be a US-$2 tr. economy, providing nearly 1/4 of 
assets into Asia and Africa (see Exhibit 2.1
the 
around the world after the attacks of Sep
 (Burghardt and Fuss, 2004).  
financial mark
other such as Malaysia and GCC-States. Many countries also 
1
, opening the way for
OF ISLAMIC FINANCE
 
 
p-
 
d-
ify 
) (The Econo-
enormous repatria-
. 11. 
p-
e-
 
ets 
 some of the promi-
CHAPTER 2: THE GLOBAL EMERGENCE AND GROWTH OF ISLAMIC FINANCE 
 
35 
 
nent international banks to get involved. The growth in Islamic finance, however, has been dri-
ven mostly by Muslim countries from GCC-States and Asia, and is designed to meet the needs of 
Muslims around the world. In most countries, financial institutions that involved in Islamic 
finance are growing faster than counterparties-conventional banks due to the strong demand for 
products and services complied with the ethical and moral Islamic investment guidelines. 
 
  Islamic financial sector is expanding in the local Islamic financial sector to serve Muslims and 
non-Muslims who favor ethical and socially useful investments. For example, up to 25% of Is-
lamic accounts in Islamic banks in Malaysia are opened by non-Muslims (BBC News, 2006). 
However, despite that the key centers of Islamic financial services are concentrated in Muslim c- 
ountries, the trend is increasingly going global where large group of European countries opening 
their arms to welcome Islamic finance. They even outweigh some Muslim countries in adopting 
and implementing Islamic banking structures and operations. The UK, for example, is said to be 
the eighth-largest global center for Islamic finance in 2007, behind countries such as Saudi Ara-
bia and the majority of the GCC-countries but, surprisingly, ahead of Pakistan, Egypt, Sudan, 
Bangladesh and Turkey (IFSL, 2010). Moreover, the UK’s first stand-alone Islamic commercial 
bank, the Islamic Bank of Britain (IBB), reported an increase in the number of non-Muslim cus-
tomers. This was primerly because High Street banks in the UK offer fewer opportunities for 
house mortgages, particularly during the economic crunch of 2007. Such trends have prompted 
many to conclude that the Islamic banking provides a viable alternative to conventional banking 
and is now being treated seriously by regulators (Wilson, 2009). 
 
  In practice, the most well-established Islamic finance forms are: Sukuk, funds, banking and Ta-
kaful. Products that may be the subject of innovation include private equity, private wealth man-
agement, hedge funds and derivatives. By and large, commercial banks account for the bulk of 
the global Islamic assets with investment banks, sukuk issues, funds and takaful making up the 
balance (IFSL, 2010). 
 
  The Islamic tradable bonds (Sukuk) market has been the most rapidly growing segment of Is-
lamic finance. The global market of these asset-based Islamic investment certificates has increased 
_________________________________________ 
1 Islamic Financial Institutions (IFIs) can be divided into three main types:  I) institutions whose entire businesses are conducted in compliance 
with the Islamic law [so-called "fully" (IFIs)], II) Islamic window which is best described as segregated division of a conventional financial 
institution specialising in Shari’ah-compliant products and services, and III) Islamic subsidiary of a conventional institution where the operations 
are completely Islamic and separated from the parent conventional institution. The Islamic product range in the Islamic subsidiary is generally 
broader than that of an Islamic window. Typically, only Islamic products are provided although a customer relationship may be managed by both 
conventional and Islamic sides of a bank. Most importantly, capital funding is provided by the parent company on the basis of Shari’ah approved 
contracts. 
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more than five-fold from 2004 to 2007 (Jobst, Kunzel, Mills
estimated to be US-$ 70 bn in 2008 and is projected to reach US
2007a). According to Morgan Stanley
40% of which are international issues 
have been issued internationally by sovereign and corporate entities
countries (Fig.2.1). It is reported by Dubai Chamber Economist 
majority of the Sukuk issuance has been by governments and related entities (74.6%), followed 
by corporations (22.6%) and then by financial institutions (2.8%). 
and periods) of Sukuk are divided in accordance with the issue prospectus
be issued on a short-term, medium or long
sukuk is much greater than that for th
 
Fig. 2.1: Global Sukuk issuance by type of 
Source: Zawya and Oliver Wyman analysis (2010)
 
  The Bahrain Monetary Agency was among the first central banks to issue Sukuk in 2001. S
kuk has been dominated by Malaysia and the UAE which, for example, issued 55% and 20% o
Sukuk to 2008, respectively (Fig.
  
                                        Fig. 2.3:  World Sukuk Issuance by Country during 2001
                                             Source: DB research based on Zawya (2008)
UK
0.4
USA
0.2
Germany
0.2
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 and Amadou, 2008). The market is 
-$100 bn by 2010 (Zawya, 
, the value of sukuk is estimated to be US
- up from less than US- $1 bn in 2002.
, particularly 
based on S&Ps
The maturity profiles (times
-term. Fig. 2.2 ensures that the appetite for short
e longer tenure.  
issuer                      Fig. 2.2: Global Sukuk issuance by type duration
 
 2.3). The trend, however, goes global to non
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such as: China, Japan and Thailand (Morgan Stanley, 2008). In Europe, for example, the German 
State of Saxony-Anhalt became the first non
in 2004, raising €100 m or so via a Sukuk issue in 
of investors. Such a trend is, however, due to the fact that 
being a Muslim. 
 
  Overall, Musharaka, Ijara and Murabaha
lar Sukuk structures with the 
leased-back as "real assets", not debt instruments (Gulf one Investemnt bank, 2008)
cifically, Ijarah based- sukuk is the most 
global sukuk transactions were based on Ijara mode of financing in 2008), (Fig.
(Standard & Poor's, 2009). Due to the unprecedented challenges in 2008,
and low liquidity, the global Sukuk issuance decreased by rel
(IFSL, 2009). The Ijarah Sukuk witnessed a moderate decline of 8% due to the global financial 
crisis. Musharaka and Mudaraba Suk
trast, Murabaha Sukuk issuance strikingly in
crease was witnessed across many of the key issuance markets
instance, the GCC-States and Malaysia have been the hardest hit, experiencing declines in Sukuk 
issuance of 55% and 59%, respectively (Moody’s Investors Service, 2009)
 
            
      Fig. 2.4: Global Sukuk Market - Issuances (
      Source: Booz & Company, (2011) 
  Concerning the Islamic fund market, 
recent years (IFSL, 2009). From
total number of Shari’ah compliant funds during 2008 hav
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-Muslim issuer to tap the global Islamic debt market 
an innovative effort to appeal to a 
an investor can invest ethically without 
 based-Sukuk are clearly the most 
condition that at least 51% of the underpinning assets must be 
dominant type of Islamic bonds (e.g. over 50% of the 
 lack of standardization 
atively 52% compared with 2007 
uk also declined by 83% and 68%, 
creased by 60% or so. Overall, 
 in Muslim majority countries
.
 
by Structure) 
    
    
  Fig. 2.5:   Composition of Global Sukuk, 2008
  Source: Gulf one Investment bank based
 
the total number of Islamic funds has expanded rapidly
 around 150 funds in 2000, the "Eurekahedge
ing risen to approximately 680 (
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1%
Mudaraba
Ijara
54%
Wakala
12%
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2.6). Ernst & Young estimates that the total value of 
2003 to US-$44bn in 2008. Equity funds account for the largest segment
fixed income (16%), real estate & private equity 
up the balance. At the country level, 58% of the funds are invested in a portfolio covering the 
Middle East and Africa. A further 20% are in a global portfolio, 
residual 1% elsewhere. 
  
  Based on the fund size, Eurekahedge
more telling statistic (Fig. 2.7
skewed towards smaller-sized funds with a significant
Hence, the bulk of Islamic funds are small scale with 67% being less than USD
many of these having attracted only USD
       
            
                Fig. 2.6: Industry Growth over the Years
                Source: Eurekahedge, 2008 
 
   
  Within the Islamic investment funds, the equity funds market is one of the 
growing sectors. Since the 1990s, Islamic equity funds is said to grow by 12
(MONEYworks Guide, 2008)
some, target the Middle East and Gulf regions, while others cater Muslim communities in Eur
pean markets. As a result of the increasing demand for Islamic equity investment, the Intern
tional Investor (of Kuwait) in collaboration with FTSE Gr
Company (based in London), launched the first Islamic equity index  series, FTSE Global Isla
ic Index Series (GIIS) at the end of 1998. Subsequently, in 1999
market index (DJIMI) was launched to track the performance of companies whose activities are 
THE GLOBAL EMERGENCE AND GROWTH  
38 
Islamic funds has grown from US
(13%), cash, commodities and other funds
15% in Asia, 6% in US and the 
 (2008) suggested that "the number of funds pro
), as this is not a bell-shaped curve as might 
 tail extending to larger
-$10m to USD-$15m (IFSL, 2010). 
  
        
       Fig. 2.7:  Funds by Assets under management
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consistent with Islamic principles from 34 countries
today more than 70 indexes and remains t
measures (DowJownes, 2008).
  
   According to the leading fund monitoring company 
reveal in 2008 that there are globally 
ly, there are about 200 Shari’
lated assets under management of about US
spite the considerable growth in 
play a limited role in Islamic financial markets.
bution, some of funds have closed down. For example, the Global Equity 2000 Sub
Ibn Majid Emerging Markets were closed and their assets 
2006). Islamic equity funds also suffer
and 93% of the launched funds in 2007, 2008
 
                                             Fig. 2.8:
                                                  Source: The gulf, business news and analysis, 
 
  In terms of the Islamic financial assets, 
tutions (IFIs) shows that the global total of Islamic assets grew by 29.7% over 2006 to reach US
$ 500,482 m in 2007.2 The IFSL based on the Banker and Ernst 
February 2010 that the Islamic financial services global market, as 
estimated to have reached US-
______________________________________________________
2
 
"Although this is relatively small compared with the US
latest global listing, the massive growth taking place in Islamic institutions is unassailable and can be expected to a
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 (Hussein, 2004). This series encompasses 
he most comprehensive family of Islamic market 
 
called "Failaka Advisors
over 300 Islamic equity funds by the end of 2007
ah-compliant mutual funds available in the market, with accum
-$ 250-300 bn (Cihak, Martin and Hesse, 2008).
Islamic equity funds they, however, remain in their infancy and 
 As a result of the lack of interest and poor distr
were liquidated in 2002 (Smyth, 
ed from the adverse market conditions and thus, 6%
 and 2009 have respectively liquidated (Fig. 
 Global Islamic funds – launched and liquidated 
(2010) 
Banker’s survey of the top 500 Islamic 
and Young (E&Y)
measured by Islamic assets,
$ 951 bn at end-2008, 25% up from $785 bn
 
-$74,232.2 bn in total assets amassed by the Top 1000 World Banks in The Banker’s 
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 in 2006 and 73% up 
ccelerate" (The banker, 2007).  
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on the 2006 total. Oliver Wyman (2009) estimates that by 2012, Islamic assets will reach
$1,600 bn. According to the Euromoney Islamic Finance Review for 2007/08, IFIs have risen 
from one institution in one country in
75 countries in 2008. While Islamic banking assets were calculated at US
2007 and the forecasts indicate that this number will reach US
tional Monetary Fund (IMF) puts the total assets of Islamic banking expected
by 2016 (Blominvest, 2009). 3
expected to grow annually at 5%, Islamic banking is expected to grow at 22%
2.10) (Booz & Company, 2011). Oliver
worldwide would opt for Islamic finance
sets and their returns on turn. This could be ha
entrants has not dented economic returns as revenue growth has been running ahead of asset 
growth with a CAGR of 44% over the past five years (Fig. 
 
         Fig. 2.9: Worldwide banking assets, USD 
         Source: Booz & Company,  (2011) 
  As mentioned earlier in this chapter, Islamic commercial banks accounted for the majority of 
Islamic assets (74% of total assets).
the remainder. Funds and Takaful sectors are made a contribution (Fig.
retail banking is also a very attractive market given its strong growth and long term market p
tential. Islamic retail banking assets and revenues have been growing at over 25% per year since
2003 (Fig. 2.13). The market is set to 
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3
 Since the first experience of Islamic banking seems to have been in the Middle East in the 1960s it is, therefore, a relative
no body really can estimate the exact size in modern times
institutions vary considerably. For example, Mckinsey & Co. estimates that the global Islamic finance assets could reach USD
whilst Moody’s predicts that it could reached USD
than 300 institutions in 2008, the Association of Islamic Banking Institutions Malaysia (AIBIM) estimated that there are arou
institutions around the world offering Islamic produ
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 1975 to more than 300 institutions operating in more than 
-$ 750 bn worldwide in
-$ 1,000 bn by 2010. The Intern
 However, from 2007 to 2010, while the global banking assets are 
’s surveys (2009) suggest that half of the 1.4 bn Muslims 
 which will dramatically increase the global Islamic a
ppened if given a competitive from numerous new 
2.11).  
 
tr Fig. 2.10: Worldwide Islamic banking  
 
 
  
 Investment banks and Sukuk issues are 
2.1
expand further since nearly 50% of Muslims would 
 
. Estimates of the size of Shari’ah-compliant assets and the number of Islamic financial 
-$ 4 tr in 2015. Furthermore, while IMF estimates that the number of IFIs has risen to more 
cts. 
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Islamic retail banking if given a competitive and high
ing. This is underpinned by the strong 
pulation of the top 10 Muslim countries will grow by nearly 200 MM, with over half of 
population still under age 25. As this new generation enters adulthood, the retail customer base is 
set to double in the same period" (Oliver Wyman, 2009).
 
 
Fig. 2.11: Islamic finance-Revenues 2003
Source: Oliver Wyman analysis based on Bankscope, 2009
 
  
 The Wholesale banking segment is clearly considered to be one of the biggest markets for Is
lamic finance with over $420 bn and $28 bn of assets and revenues
sets have been growing at 34% per annum since 2003 (Fig.
by 2012 with revenues of more than $60 bn (Oliver W
banks (Commercial, Wholesale
 Fig. 2.13: Islamic retail banking-Assets                                         
 Source: Oliver Wyman, (2009) 
 
centration in Muslim countries (Fig.
the global financial crisis reached some 28%. The assets of the 700 Islamic banks went up to 
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-quality alternative to conventional ban
demographics of major Muslim countries. By 
 
 
-2012 
 
   
Fig. 2.12: Global assets of Islamic 
Source: IFSL, (2010) 
, respectively. Wholesale a
 2.14) and is estimated to reach $1 tr 
., 2009). Overall, the number of Islam
 and Retail) is increasing greatly around the world, with the con
 
    Fig. 2.14: Islamic wholesale banking
 2.15 and Fig. 2.16). Surprisingly, the rate of increase during 
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$822 bn in 2009 from $650bn in 2008 and 
ness, 2009). 
   Fig. 2.15: Number of Islamic banks in 
     Source: Bankscope, (2009) 
  Broadly speaking, the Islamic 
jority of GCC-countries (Table 
of the world’s total Islamic assets 7
most of it’s overall growth by 39.4% to reach US
gan Stanley as on Feb. 2008, Islamic finance assets will grow at a rate of between 20% to 
the Gulf by 2010, as their global worth ascend to about US
  
   Table 2.1 
 
Islamic finance by country: Banking, t
and fund assets-$bn 
   Source: IFSL (2010) based on "The Banker
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institutions grew by 29.9% to reach US-$ 176.8 bn. Asia, led by Malaysia, Brunei and Pakistan, 
is the third largest region in the world for Islamic assets, growing by 20.9% to US-$ 119.3 bn. 
Such a growth is driven largly by the the wide acceptance of Islamic banking products. For ex-
ample, 20% of the banking clients in the Gulf and Muslim Asia who would spontaneously 
choose an Islamic financial product over a conventional one with a similar risk-return profile 
(S&P Ratings Services, 2008).  
   
  Despite the fact that the Islamic Republic of Iran has the largest quotient of the global Islamic 
banking and finance (accounting for 35.6% of the global Shari’ah-compliant assets4 (Table 2.1)), 
it cannot be recognized as a proper example of how to develop and improve Islamic finance op-
erations. This is due to the fact that the clients in Iran have no choice but to use the Islamic sys-
tem because the whole banking system has been Shari’ah-compliant due to the law on interest 
free banking that was passed in 1983. Furthermore, Islamic banks are state-owned and have little 
autonomy, even in determining what deposit and financing products to offer. Let alone the fact 
that banks in Iran do not have Shari’ah committees which is considered as one of the main re-
quirements to establish any Islamic bank (Wilson, 2007a).5 
 
  Banking penetration is relatively low in Africa. According to the Moody's special report in 
2008, Africa has witnessed a modest growth in Islamic finance practices. Recently, around 37 
IFIs operate in Africa to serve the Muslim population of "412" m inhabitants, the second largest 
Muslim population in the world. Assuming that banking entrenchment in Africa represents an 
average 50% of its total GDP-per capita, the Islamic finance market on the continent is potential-
ly worth relatively US-$ 235 bn. As of year-end 2007, the actual depth of Shari’ah-compliant 
financial intermediation in Africa was US-$ 18 bn, equating to a market share of less than 8%. 
The industry however, is now highly concentrated of its development in some African countries. 
Specifically, more than 50% of African’s assets are located in Sudan, with Egypt ranking second 
with a much  lower share of around 20%. Taking into consideration that the continent continues 
to economically grow at its current pace incremental wealth creation will make it easier for the  
______________________ 
4"According to statistics from Asian Banker Research, the consultancy division of "The Asian Banker", the 100 largest Islamic bank’s assets grew 
to UD-$580 bn in 2008, up from US-$350 bn in the previous year (a 66% rise). Compared to 2008, the identities of the largest banks remained 
fairly constant, with Bank Melli of Iran at the top of the list and Al-Rajhi Bank, headquartered in Saudi Arabia, in second place. Indeed, seven out 
of the top 10 institutions are Iranian, and the 12 Iranian banks in the list account for 40% of the top 100 bank’s assets. Four other countries, Ma-
laysia, UAE, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, accounted for most of the rest of the wealth of the top 100 banks. While Iranian banks are often very 
large by assets, they are not necessarily the most profitable. Al-Rajhi Bank had the highest net income at US-$1.74 bn, with the next highest, 
Kuwait Finance House, just under US-$1 bn" (NewHorizon, 2009). 
 
5 
"Islamic banking and finance is about extending choices, not restricting alternatives". Shari’ah compliance is not a matter of national law be-
cause each institution has its own Shari’ah board. Hence, each Shari’ah board passes its own religious rulings, which extends choices in the mar-
ketplace for religious thoughts as well (Wilson, 2007).  
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Islamic financial services sector, including Islamic commercial banking, Takaful, investment and 
microfinance, to develop. In practice, Islamic banks in the North African countries were less af-
fected by the global crisis of 2007 partly due to their limited reliance on international funding 
and thus, have a significant room for growth in penetration in the coming years (IFSL, 2010).  
 
  Recently, the investments through Islamic finance systems are acceptable in a significant num-
ber of Muslim and non-Muslim countries around the world such as: Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, 
Egypt, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Indonesia, Turkey, Japan, China, Kazakhstan, US, France, 
Germany, the UK, Italy, Switzerland, Luxemburg, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Australia, Spain, 
Irlandand US. Recognizing the importance of Islamic finance, Islamic banks are expanding their 
network globally. Conventional banks in Muslim countries along with global conventional bank-
ing majors are also now offering Islamic products and services, either through Islamic windows 
or through newly established Islamic entities. This led, however, to a tremendous growth of Is-
lamic capital market products and services, institutions and banking clients. Since the beginning 
of 2006, "The Banker" has listed (78) new large pure-play IFIs formed or under formation, 60% 
of which are Gulf-based.  
 
2.3.   Demand for Islamic financial products in Europe 
 
  The momentum of Islamic finance originates, long time ago, in Muslim countries not in the 
Muslim communities in Europe. Recently, Islamic banks not confined to just Muslim-majority 
countries but spread all over Europe. Islamic banks in Europe, mainly established in the UK, 
were initiated and/or sponsored by investors from Muslim countries in the Middle East. The fac-
tors affecting the advancements of Islamic banking in Europe are diverse. One of the main driv-
ers for the rapid growth in Islamic finance is an increasing Muslim population. "During 2002-
2006, the Muslim population worldwide grew at an average of 1.9%, higher than the world’s 
population growth rate of 1.2%" (Blominvest, 2009). As at the end of 2009, Pew Research Cen-
ter estimates that the global Muslim population stood at 1.6 bn. It is, however, expected that the 
Muslim population will account for 30% of the world’s total by 2025 (Blominvest, 2009). West-
ern debt crisis spurs also the global growth of Islamic finance. The European banks, which suffer 
from the credit crunch of 2007, have to investigate on new possibilities to raise funds. Given the 
excess liquidity in the oil-exporting countries, it becomes reasonable to offer Shari’ah compliant 
investment facilities to attract the foreign investors. By and large, Islamic banking products and 
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services are attractive to non-Muslims due to the certainty of repayments, ethical principles and 
also due to the appeal of the PLS. 
 
  Overall, Islamic finance has existed internationally and has witnessed significant growth in the 
last decades. While the UK has been the first mover in facilitating Islamic banking and finance, 
Europe with its much larger Muslim population has greater potential for Islamic finance. Next 
section discusses the European experience in Islamic banking and finance (the UK, Germany, 
France and Turkey, in particular). It further explains shortly the success requirements for the Eu-
ropean countries and the world to appeal the Islamic investments from around the Islamic coun-
tries. Table 2.3 in the appendix addresses also the emergence and the growth potential of Islamic 
banking and finance in the rest of the world. 
 
2.3.1      Islamic banking and finance in the UK  
 
  The UK has the highest Islamic assets of all Western countries. Islamic finance sector in the 
UK developed recently in regional hubs which are not restricted to London but further have seen 
in other UKs states (IFSL, 2008). Prior to 2003, the only Islamic banking products available in 
the UK were offered either by the UK-based branches of Middle Eastern banks such as the Na-
tional Bank of Kuwait (NBK) or by relatively small institutions such as the West Bromwich 
Building Society. In 2003, HSBC launched its Amanah current account and home finance prod-
ucts, becoming the first Islamic financial solutions provider arm of HSBC. Lloyds TSB has also 
launched a range of Islamic retail banking products including primarily current accounts and 
home finance. Nowadays, London has become one of the biggest centers for Islamic banking and 
finance in Europe. According to the Enterprise Ireland (2010), the UK now accounts for just 
fewer than 2.5% of global Islamic assets and has five fully fledge Islamic banks and many Islam-
ic Windows offering Islamic financial products and services.  
 
   It is no surprise that part of the Islamic finance growth has taken place in the UK given its po-
sition as one of the leading international financial centers. Most of the recent developments and 
growth of Islamic finance in the UK refer mainly to the Government support, to give the UK’s 
large Muslim community the access to financial services consistent with their religious beliefs, 
and the favorable regulatory environment which are encouraging Islamic banks to set up opera-
tions (UK Trade & investment, 2007).  
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   There are several reasons that have made the UK attractive to both conventional and Islamic 
financial institutions: I) the sounder and flexible framework for companies to work in the UK 
(Global Market Briefings (GMB), 2008); II) the few regulatory bodies with the (FSA) as the main 
one; III) it is easy to set up a business in the UK, just 13 days compared with a European aver-
age of 32 days (UK Trade & investment, 2007); V) the increasing number of Muslims plays ra-
ther an important role to increase the need for Islamic finance. The data collected from the Office 
for National Statistics (ONS), Labor Force Survey (LFS) reveals that, in the UK, the Muslim 
population has grown by more than 500,000 to 2.422 million in just 4 years (2004 – 2008), and is 
multiplied 10 times faster than the rest of society.  
 
  As a consequence of considering the UK as the key Western hub for Islamic banking and 
finance, an important feature of the developments has taken places. According to Wilson (1994), 
in 1982, the first Islamic bank was established in London when the Al Baraka Investment Com-
pany acquired “Hargrave Securities”, a licensed deposit taker in the UK, and converted it into an 
Islamic bank. Until 1993, it operated as a retail bank offering current accounts, chequeing facili-
ties, investment deposits and house financing. Products and services were predominantly tar-
geted at Arab visitors to London and high net worth individuals from the Gulf. Due to lacking 
critical mass and a change in British banking law, Al Baraka Bank re-incorporated in 1993 as 
Investment Company, gave up its banking license and closed its three branches. It is now operat-
ing two subsidiaries, being the “Al Baraka Investment Company” dealing with short term financ-
ing and the “Dallah Al Baraka Investment Company” concerned with long term financing (Khan 
and Porzio, 2010). In 1988, the first Islamic mortgages were offered by Al Baraka bank for prop-
erties in London, with mortgages structured through an Ijara rental contract, whereby the bank 
purchases the property and the client repaid by monthly installments and paying rent to the bank 
(Wilson, 2007b). 
  
  According to the IFSL (2009/10), different set of aspects of Islamic finance were established 
recently in the UK: I) Five fully fledged Islamic banks were authorized: 1) The Islamic Bank of 
Britain (IBB), the first FSA approved Islamic bank. IBB commenced banking operations and 
launched on the London Stock Exchange (LSE) - AIM market - on Oct. 2004. It became the first 
stand-alone commercial Islamic bank in the country with over 50, 531 customers as of 2010. Qa-
tar International Islamic Bank (QIIB), Qatar Islamic Insurance Company (QIIC), Her Sheikh 
Hamad Bin Khalifa Bin Hamad Al Thani and Her Sheikh Thani Bin Abdulla Bin Thani Al Thani 
hold approximately 60% of the bank’s shares. 2) The European Islamic Investment Bank (EIIB), 
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the first FSA approved Islamic investment bank. EIIB was incorporated in UK in January 2005. 
It received authorization by the FSA in Mar. 2006. In April 2006, EIIB opened for business. In 
May 2006, the bank completed its IPO and was admitted to London’s AIM market. In Nov. 
2006, EIIB opened a representative office in Bahrain. EIIB aims to deliver a full choice of alter-
native investment opportunities, enabling Islamic investors to construct balanced and sophisti-
cated portfolios which can access a full range of asset classes internationally. 3) The Bank of 
London and the Middle East (BLME). It was opened in 2007 to offer Shari’ah compliant invest-
ment and corporate banking to businesses and high net worth individuals globally. Boubyan 
bank (the Kuwait based bank) holds 14.97% of the bank’s shares in 2008, while Boubyan Capital 
holds only 0.50%. 4) The European Finance House (EFH), a unit of Qatar Islamic Bank (QIB), 
received a banking licensed in 2008. It offers a balanced range of Shari’ah compliant investment 
products and services to clients that include companies and wealthy investors. 5) Gatehouse 
Bank which received the license in 2008. It is a wholly-owned subsidiary of "The Securities 
House K.S.C.C", one of the leading, investment companies in Kuwait, which operates through-
out the Gulf region, as well as in Europe and US. The bank is a wholesale investment bank oper-
ating in capital markets, wealth management, treasury business and advisory services.  
 
II) There are an estimated 17 conventional banks that have set up windows in the UK to provide 
Islamic financial services. These banks are: Ahli United Bank (Manzil Home Purchase Plans), 
Alburaq (the brand name for Islamic financial services that evolved from the Arab Banking Cor-
poration (ABC), through its London subsidiary ABC. International Bank plc (ABCIB), Bank of 
Ireland, Barclays (Barclays capital partnering Dubai Islamic Bank (DIB) for one of the largest 
Sukuk issuance i.e. PCFC) 6, BNP Paribas, Bristol and West, Citi Group, DB, Europe Arab Bank 
plc, HSBC Amanah, IBJ International London, J Aron and Co., Lloyds Banking Group, RBS, 
Standard Chartered, UBS and UNB. III) Twenty Sukuk issues raising US-$ 11 bn listed on LSE, 
exceeded only by Dubai Nasdaq. IV) The first company to offer Takaful to the UK residents 
known as "Principle Insurance Holdings Limited "was authorized in 2008. The shareh- olders are 
institutional and private investors predominantly from GCC countries, including Saudi Arabia 
(KSA), Bahrain, Kuwait, the UAE and Malaysia. V) The presence of twenty law firms supplying 
services in Islamic finance such as; Allen & Overy LLP, Eversheds LLP and King & Spalding 
International LLP. VI) The existence of fifty-five institutions offering educational and training 
products in Islamic finance, more than that provided in any other country worldwide.  
__________________________ 
6
  The PCFC Sukuk, issued on January 2006, is the largest and the first convertible Sukuk issue. It is convertible to 30% equity shares of the 
PCFC entities when they go for the Initial Public Offering (IPO). The Dubai Ports, Customs & Free Zone Corporation (PCFC) has launched a 
US-$3,500 m, two-year Musharaka Sukuk, increased in size from US-$2,800 m after orders were received in excess of US-$11,400 m. Barclays 
Capital and Dubai Islamic Bank were the lead managers of the issuance (Zawya, 2007b). 
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  According to the IFSL survey (2010), the total assets for the full fledged Islamic banks and the 
HSBC Amanah Finance window in the UK reached approximately at the end of June 2009 to 
US-$19,411 bn (Table 2.2). Moreover, the UK set a precedent by issuing the world’s first Sha-
ri’ah compliant Exchange-Traded funds (ETFs), getting better of Malaysia which holds a series 
of “firsts” in the Shari’ah compliant finance market (Aziz, 2008). However, the evolution of Is-
lamic banks in UK has faced many obstacles which considered being a key aspect of supportive 
government policy that has been establishment since 2003. These obstacles fall into the follow-
ing categories: I) the previous tax law provisions, when applied to Islamic finance transactions, 
lead to a double taxation of Murabaha transactions mainly because it involves two sales where a 
financial institution buys a property and then re-sells it to the individual. In response to this di-
lemma, the first tax legislation catering specifically for Islamic finance arrangements came in 
Finance Act 2003, in the area of stamp duty land tax (SDLT). It catered for individuals using al-
ternative property financing arrangements (covering Islamic mortgages), removing the double 
charge to SDLT (Ainley, Mashayekhi, Hicks, Rahman and Ravalia, 2007). II) Previously, if a 
sukuk was issued, the basic problem was that tax costs arose in the issuing SPV company re-
turns. Reforms were made to the arrangements for issues of Islamic bonds, so that returns and 
income payments can be treated ‘as if’ interest. This, however, makes UK a more attractive loca-
tion for issuing and trading sukuk (HM Treasury, 2008; UK Trade & investment, 2007). 
 
Table 2.2 
 
Shari’ah compliant assets in the UK, $ m 
        % change    2008-09     2007-08 2006-07   Year-End The Bank 
9  16537 15194  13960 Jun-09 HSBC Amanah Finance  
6 -  1119 1196  1279 Jun-09 Bank of London and the Middle East 
22  698 570 --- Jun-09 HSBC 
14-  555 648  757  Jun-09 European Islamic Investment Bank  
17  394 337  289 Jun-09 Islamic Bank of Britain 
--- n.a. 94  --- Jun-09 European Finance House 
610  108 15 --- Dec-08 Gatehouse Bank 
8  19411 18055 16285  Total  
Source: IFSL (2010) estimates based on the Banker. 
 
III) The unconditional obligation on part of the bank to repay the amount received (money 
placed on deposit must be capital certain). Deposit is defined under Article 5(2) of the Financial 
Services and Markets Act 2000 (Regulated Activities) Order 2001 as: “a sum of money paid on 
terms under which it will be repaid, with or without interest or a premium, and either on demand 
or at a time or in circumstances agreed by or on behalf of the person making the payment and the 
person receiving it…” (Ainley et al, 2007). This, however, cannot normally happen under Islam-
ic banking principles. Islamic banks cannot just take funds from customers, guarantee the return 
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of the capital sum and pay them profit. That would be like paying them interest on borrowed 
funds which is strongly prohibited. Islamic banks normally raise funds on a PLS arrangement 
through Mudaraba accounts. Under Islamic principles, the bank cannot therefore guarantee the 
repayment of the full amount of the deposit, and that the bank customers could lose part or whole 
of their deposits. This main principle did not meet the requirements of the UK regulations that 
deposits had to be returned in full (Mounira and Anas, 2008). 
 
  The solution for the above mentioned obstacle was to structure a "Mudaraba arrangement" in 
such a manner that the risk of loss of the amount deposited by the customers was very low and 
that the Islamic finance depositors' are entitled to the same degree of protection as depositors at 
traditional banks. To do so, the Islamic bank should set aside reserves earned from the invest-
ment of funds in a "special reserve account" before distribution of profits between the bank and 
its customers. This reserve is to be used primerly to cover any losses that arose from the invest-
ments and to "top up" any shortfall in the amount of profits payable to the banks customers as 
well. In fact, however, most regulatory agencies have made it "compulsory" for Islamic banks, 
either in Islamic banks or in Europe, to be coverd under deposits insurance schemes (Mohd-
karim, 2010).  
 
2.3.2    Islamic banking products in France  
  
  Despite France has the biggest Islamic community in the West, authorities have been not flexi-
ble enough to introduce changes in the regulatory framework to accommodate Islamic financial 
products. Given the possible market potential and the strong interest for Islamic finance in 
France with nearly two-thirds of French Muslims declaring a willingness to change to a Sha-
ri’ah-compliant bank (Fig.2.18), Paris“aims at competing with London as European hub for Is-
lamic finance” (Moody’s Investors service, 2008) by establishing an Islamic financial services 
sector. In 2007, France announced reforms to adapt its banking legislation to allow more banks 
to engage in Islamic finance (WSBI/ESBG, 2009). In May 2008, France’s Upper House of Par-
liament hosted roundtable discussions with politicians, bankers and Shari’ah scholars to discuss 
how to support Islamic finance by raising awareness and changing the legal and fiscal frame-
work (Ramadier, 2008). In July 2008, the Financial Markets Authority (AMF) requested the Par-
is Europlace to establish a working group composed of representatives of the financial industry 
to give market participants a clear picture of the legal and transparency requirements for listing 
Sukuk in France (Gordon, 2008). The findings of the report known as “the Jouini-Pastre report” 
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  French banking sector show also a considerable engagement in Islamic finance operations. For 
instance, "BNP Paribas" stated in their website that it was among the leading banks in recogniz-
ing the importance of Islamic banking since the early 1980s. It established "BNP Paribas Naj-
mah" in 2003 in Bahrain as a global entity in order to provide Islamic solutions. The bank 
launched the first Islamic fund under French law in 2007, called “Easy ETF DJ Islamic Market 
Titans 100” that was capitalized with $20 m in July 2008. Similarly, the Alternative Investment 
Team of the Société Générale Asset Management (SGAM) has launched a Murabaha fund called 
“SGAM AI Shari’ah Liquidité” early in 2008 and a series of Shari’ah compliant index funds 
linked to the S&P’s Shari’ah indices. By and large, it seems that the french government have 
showed a significant interest to attract some of the Gulf-based Islamic investments which is cur-
rently flowing to London offering it a more accommodating legal and fiscal framework in 
France. Consequently, the first Islamic commercial bank namely "Tyseer Bank" was authorized 
and it is, so far, under foundation (The Banker, 2007).  
 
2.3.3.   Islamic finance gaining ground in Germany  
  
  Many economists believe that the Islamic banking has a huge potential for active role in the 
German financial market. Thus, a major feasible demand and a large growth prospects is attri-
buted to the German market for Islamic financial products and services. This is mainly because 
of the large Muslim population of roughly 3.3 million in Germany (Morag, 2011), with the ma-
jority of them being Turkish.  
 
  In practice, the “TNS Emnid” polling institute issued in 2000 a research study entitled “German 
Banks and Insurances from a Turkish point of view". This study showed, in contrast to the beliefs 
of many analysts, that the majority of the Turkish population in Germany accepts non-Islamic 
financing modes. High percentage of German Turks having interest paying savings books and 
thus, it does not seem to be an evident religious conflict of accepting "riba". However, at the time 
of this study, Islamic banking and financial products and services are not offered in Germany 
and thus, the validity of the results is questionable. Furthermore, the study faced plenty of diffi-
culties, particularly in the form of language barriers and cultural background, which makes the 
quality of information that is filtered out of the survey rather low (Burghardt and Fuss, 2004). 
Concerning the sample that was chosen in this study, it can be seen that it represents only 0.03% 
of the total number of Muslims in Germany and thus, is not fairly enough or representative. 
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   In addition to the previous study, another survey has been conducted by Burghardt and Fuss in 
2004. In their study, the authors used interviews with bankers to analyze the German and the UK 
markets for Islamic products and services from both a supply and a demand perspective. They 
argue that the Islamic population in Germany mainly stems from secularized Muslim countries 
where the influence of religion on banking and finance law is low. They, therefore, do not identi-
fy any particular need for German Muslims to actively demand Islamic banking credit products 
in Germany and hence the German market does not seem, in their opinion, to display a sufficient 
demand for a large-scale integration of Islamic banking products. As a result, the offering of 
such products are very limited in their availability and variety. In our opinion, the survey con-
centrated on banks that are most likely to offer Islamic products, have originally based in a coun-
try with a high Muslim population, and have a branch in Germany which consequently reduces, 
without doubt, the volume of data that can be used in the analysis. Moreover, the survey concen-
trates mainly on people with Turkish background although Muslims of different national origin 
should not be ignored as they still constitute a significant group of the total number of Muslims 
in Germany. Eventually, the branches were contacted by telephone, and were only asked if they 
currently offer Islamic banking credit products in Germany, which may lead to misleading re-
sults. Consequently, due to these shortcomings, the accuracy, validity and certainty of the results 
revealed by the study are rather doubtful and questionable as well.  
 
  In practice, according to Gassner (2003 and 2004), there are more than 600,000 Muslim house-
holds in Germany. All households have €15 to 25 bn assets deposited with German banks. Gass-
ner argues that the Muslim households have double the savings rate of German households 
which assigns them promising banking potential that is underexploited at the moment. This is 
mainly due to the fact that the variety of conventional banking services is not used by German 
Muslims. Given the annual household income of €13 bn, an annual demand of €2.7 bn for finan-
cial services in Muslim households can be derived (Colditz, 2009). This invitabily indicates a 
large potential market for Islamic financial products and services in Germany. 
 
  Recently, "according to a survey conducted in 2010, 72% of Muslims living in Germany are 
interested in Islamic finance products. If offered by a German bank, 60% of the respondents con-
sider an investment. An outstanding 94% of them declared interest if the services were offered 
by an Islamic bank. The strongest interest is shown in mortgages 62%, insurance 43% and funds 
42%. Additionally, business consultancy recently has estimated the German market potential for 
Islamic banking products to amount to 1.2 bn Euros" (Dubai Exports and AHK, 2011). 
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  Germany, however, made history in July 2004 when the federal state of Saxony-Anhalt issued 
the first Islamic bonds in Europe which raised €100 m. The Sukuk is for five years with a float-
ing return based on the Euro Interbank Offered Rate (Euribor) plus one percent (Wilson, 2007b). 
It was listed in Luxembourg with 40% of the issue, the other 60% of the issue sold to GCC in-
vestors in Bahrain. Citigroup Global Markets was the arranger for the Sukuk. The Shari’ah advi-
sory board of CITI Islamic investment bank in Bahrain vetted the legal documentation for Islam-
ic law compliance. The state of Saxony –Anhalt acts as Guarantor while the Kuwait Finance 
House acts as lead manager for the issue. The Sukuk was rated as –AA by S&P and –AAA by 
Fitch (The Banker Middle East, 2005). However, Sukuk have to be asset backed and hence, un-
der German law, a "Dutch" foundation, which corresponded to the classical Islamic concept of a 
Waqf, was established. The ministry of finance then transferred usufruct rights to its building to 
the foundation, which served as the underlying asset (Gassner, 2004). The structure of Sukuk is a 
sale and lease back (ijara) arrangement, with the foundation serving as a special purpose vehicle 
(SPV) which is wound up on the termination of Sukuk, when the usufruct rights revert back to 
the Ministry of Finance which no longer pays rent to service the investors (El-Gamal, 2006). 
 
  Albeit in overseas markets, German banks are already well involved in the Islamic banking sec-
tor. For example, Commerzbank structured "Al-Sukoor" European Equity Fund in 2000 on behalf 
of "Al-Tawfeek" company for investments, the part of Jeddah-based Dallah Albaraka Group 
which was largely aimed at Turkish expatriates on Germany and the Benelux countries. The 
bank further offers a variety of interest-free competitive products meeting Islamic finance re-
quirements such as Murabaha deposits. Additionally, HSH Nordbank signed an agreement with 
Dubai-based Al-Salaam Investment to set up a joint venture company in shipping and renewable 
energy. Dresdner Bank and WestLB are also involved in Islamic finance. ABC’s branch, which 
is located in Frankfurt, carries a variety of commercial and treasury products and services includ-
ing Islamic banking and finance (Burghardt and Fuss, 2004). In 2006, Abu Dhabi Investment 
House launched the € 600 m Gulf German Residences Fund, an Islamic real estate fund, which 
invested in a portfolio of 100 buildings located throughout Germany. In the same year, the CCH 
Europe GmBH, a German subsidiary of UK trade finance group, arranged the first Islamic Mu-
rabaha-based trade finance facility of US-$ 20 m for Globexbank of Moscow, with the funds 
provided by a GCC Islamic banks. In 2007, Arab Investment Ltd launched its debut German AIL 
Fund 1 with an investment of € 400 m invested primarily in a portfolio of commercial properties 
and shopping complexes in Berlin, Karlsruhe and Dresden (MENAFN Arab News, 2008). 
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  Most importantly, one of Germany's biggest banks, Deutsche Bank (DB), is pioneering capital 
protected funds in the Gulf. The bank for instance, has co-lead managed MTN issuances for the 
Jeddah-based Islamic Development Bank (IDB). It also pioneered the Islamic Equity Certificates 
with National Commercial Bank of Saudi Arabia, a product which the advocators claimed was 
the first Islamic retail product with universal marketing capability. In 2005, DB announced that it 
acted as a joint book runner for a US-$ 500 m issuance of AAA rated Sukuk securities for the 
IDB (Deutsche Bank media, 2005). In 2007, DB closed an Islamic Profit Rate Collar structure 
with Dubai Islamic Bank (DIB). The transaction was over US-$ 500 m, and is the largest struc-
ture done in the Islamic Markets. In 2008, the bank received the go-ahead from the Bank Negara 
of Malaysia to set up a dedicated Islamic banking subsidiary in Malaysia (WSBI/ESBG, 2009). 
In 2009, DB announced the launch of "Al Mi'yar", a first of its kind platform aimed at facilitating 
the issuance of Shari’ah compliant securities. Al Mi'yar, the Arabic term that means "The Stan-
dard", is a Luxembourg domiciled platform, developed by DB, with Luxembourg Financial 
Group A.G. as the Shari’ah investment manager and Deutsche Bank's Trust & Securities Servic-
es group providing the settlement framework (Deutsche Bank media, 2007). Moreover, the Gulf 
Finance House (GFH) announced it has signed an agreement in 2009 with DB for the placement 
of its second US-$ 100 m, convertible Murabaha facility. The deal with DB, alongside the exist-
ing relationship with Macquarie Groupis indicative of the interest major global financial institu-
tions are now taking in the evolving Islamic finance sector and GFH. The convertible Murabaha 
instrument is also the first of its kind to be deployed and underlines the progressive and innova-
tive Shari'ah structuring capabilities that GFH can call upon (GFH press release, 2009). 
 
  Over and above that, there are many additional activities that have been performed and conse-
quently, are showing the gradual and steady spread of the Islamic finance in Germany. For in-
stance, the financial cooperative baitulmal-finance eGiG for corporate and institutional members 
and the eGiG for private individuals offer the platform for investing the cooperative capital of 
the members directly in Islam-compliant participation, or to invest indirectly at an Islamic bank. 
Moreover, to encounter the existent information deficits in the area of Islamic banking and 
finance and also to clear up the possible and perhaps the justified reservations against the intro-
duction of Islam-conformable investment products, the Institute for Islamic Banking and Finance 
(IFIBAF) came into existence in 2006 in one of the main European finance mega cities, Frank-
furt am Main. Within a short period, the IFIBAF has established itself as the Nr. 1 in the field of 
Islamic banking and finance within the German-speaking world.  
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  Additionally, according to the Kuwait Turkish Islamic Bank’s (KFH-Turkey) chairman "Mo-
hammed Al-Omar" and the CEO "Ufuk Uyan", the Germany's Federal Financial Supervisory 
Authority (BaFin) has given the bank the go-ahead to transform its commercial office in the 
southwest German city of Mannheim into a banking institution providing Islamic banking ser-
vices. The branch starts to operate at the end of the year 2009 and has been available to custom-
ers by the beginning of 2010 (KUNA, 2009). 
 
  Unlike UK, Germany faces legal barriers regardless of the cultural and language barriers. While 
UK may have the pole position in Islamic banking and finance in Europe, Germany could poten-
tially come into view as an even bigger market for Islamic finance on condition that it acknowl-
edges Islamic finance by implementing the appropriate legal framework. To support Islamic 
finance, German authority should be characterized by an approach of equal treatment for con-
ventional and Islamic finance. Therefore, the Government’s financial stability objectives apply 
equally to all conventional and Islamic financial institutions. However, despite the fact that Ger-
many is one of the largest economies of the world, Islamic finance has not featured as strongly as 
it has in London's trade and investment relations with the Muslim countries. By and large, it is of 
course possible to structure Islamic financial transactions in Germany since it already has a more 
competitive market position than the UK (MENAFN - Arab News, 2008). 
 
2.3.4.   The considerable room for growth of Islamic finance in Turkey 
 
  It is slightly hard to talk about the Islamic finance level playing field as compared to conven-
tional banking industry in Turkey. This is due to the fact that, there is no particular government 
support to the sector, Sukuk are pretty infrequent primarily due to the lack of regulatory infra-
structure, and also there are no Islamic windows (Wouters, 2008). However, Turkish Islamic 
houses have not experienced a very remarkable growth as expected. The Turkish participation 
banks cover only 3.5% or so of the total Turkish banks assets (Fig. 2.19). By and large, "with 
penetration rates of only 2-4% in many markets, there is plenty of room to sustain the explosive 
growth currently being experienced in countries like Turkey" (Fig. 2.20) (Oliver Wyman, 2009).  
 
  Following the Decree number 83/7506 in 1983, the authorization was given for Islamic finani-
cal institutions to start operations in Turkey and abroad. Since that date, six institutions have 
been been established (Yuce, 2003). First, foreign Islamic banks have formed partnerships with 
Turkish investors to create joint companies of: Al Baraka Turkish Special Finance Company, 
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          Fig. 2.19: Share of participant banks in the 
             Source:  Ahmet Erturk, 6th IADI- Annual conference, 
 
with only Turkish origins have
Finance Company was declared bankruptcy, Faisal Finance Company and Anadolu Finance 
Company have been sold to new owners. 
finance companies (special finance companies) in Turkey:
the part of the Gulf-based Albaraka Banking Group. 
of Kuwait Finance House (KFH). 
that was founded following the merger of the companies Family Finans and Anadolu Finan
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  "Turkey, an aspiring EU member, has more Islamic bank branches than any other European 
country, although the role of Shari
(Wilson, 2007b). In addition to Dubai Islamic Bank (DIB) and Abc Islamic bank, institutions 
such as: Amlak Finance, Dubai Bank
representative offices (or branches) and formed partnerships in order to take an active role in the 
development of this sector in Turkey. Another transaction that drew a lot of attention in 2006 
was that the Qatar-based Doha Bank officially opened its representative office in Istanbul. This 
followed the strategic alliance between Dubai Bank and Turkey’s Daruma Corporate Finance to 
cooperate in structuring, executing and distributing of Shari
merchant banking services. Eventually, Dubai Islamic Bank (DIB) acquire MNG Bank for value 
estimated at US-$ 160 m (Laurent, 2009), Kuwait
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  By and large, the Islamic finance sector in Turkey as of 2006 was about 340 branch offices (up 
from 290 branches at the end of 2005), and is estimated to grow at a rate of 50 new units per 
year. It is also estimated that the total assets of Islamic banks in Turkey will exceed US-$25 bn 
and will make up 10% of the total banking system (Wouters, 2007). Recently, a growing number 
of Islamic finance houses and operations have a presence in Turkey. Dinar Standard had dis-
closed in 2007 that the HSBC has taken a leading role in the area of Islamic banking and finance 
with its corporate Islamic facilities to Vestel Electronics and Turkcell, together with the IDB. 
According to ABC Islamic Bank press release on December 21, 2006, Abc Islamic Bank (E.C.), 
Gulf International Bank B.S.C. and Standard Chartered Bank are announced the successful close 
of the syndication for a two-year Murabaha financing facility for Kuveyt Turk Katilim Bankasi 
A.S. (“Kuveyt Turk”) (“Facility”). Gulf International Bank B.S.C. and Standard Chartered Bank 
acted as the joint book runners, Abc Islamic Bank (E.C.) is the investment agent while Standard 
Chartered Bank acted as the documentation bank for the Facility. The Facility marks the first 
syndication for a participation bank in Turkey. General syndication for the Facility received 
strong support from the regional and international bank market and the Facility was over-
subscribed by more than 100%. Kuveyt Turk opted to increase the Facility amount from the ini-
tial US$100 m to US$200 m and banks were nevertheless scaled back. The syndicate comprises 
32 leading banks from across Europe and the Middle East.  
 
  Notably, Turkey, nowadays, is internationally recognized as being one of the emerging mar-
kets. This serves to render Turkey a perfect hub bridging the gap between the east and the west. 
Despite the banks operating on Islamic principles in Turkey are small, they are rapidly expand-
ing segment of the Turkish financial sector. 
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Appendix-Ch.2 
Table 2.3 
Islamic banking and finance in the European countries, USA and the rest of World 
 
Bosnia and Herzegoina 
 
  Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) is one 
of the new countries emerged from the 
former Yugoslavia. It is a country on the 
Balkan peninsula of Southeastern Eu-
rope. BiH is considered as a European 
country which faced the task of transi-
tion from a socialist to a market-based 
economy. As a European state with a 
Muslim majority of 40% (Moody's, 
2008), the potential for Islamic banking 
and finance in BiH would appear prom-
ising. However, despite the fervor of 
Muslims to undertake their financial 
transactions and trades based on Islamic 
roles, the spread of Islamic banking and 
finance has been limited. "Much of the 
explanation for this is political, given the 
continuing tensions between the differ-
ent ethnic and religious groups, legal and 
financial, given the small size of the 
economy, as well as the existing banking 
law" (Wilson, 2006). 
 
  The major Gulf involvement in Bosnian 
finance has been through Sarajevo-based 
Bosna Bank International (BBI). The 
share capital of BBI amounted to KM 
47, 52 m which, at that time, was the 
largest paid in capital compared to other 
banks in the country. The shareholders 
of BBI with resources exceeding US-$ 
22 bn are primarily the most powerful 
Islamic financial institutions from the 
Middle East. BBI is jointly owned by the 
Islamic Development Bank (IDB) with 
45.46% of the shareholding capital, 
Dubai Islamic Bank and Abu Dhabi 
Islamic Bank with 54.54% share of 
capital equally divided between the two 
banks. All the financial dealings of these 
founding shareholders are Shari'ah com-
pliant. BBI is also conducting its opera-
tions in a Shari'ah compliant manner. 
  BBI claims to be the first Islamic bank 
in Europe, as it was established on Sep-
tember 2000. Roughly, four years before 
the establishment of the Islamic bank of 
Britain (IBB) in the UK. Like IBB, BBI 
is a small institution with a paid-up 
capital of US-$75 m. The bank faced 
several challenges at its founding. Let 
alone the difficulties in getting a license 
due to negative perceptions amongst 
non-Muslims, there is no stock market in 
Sarajevo. Therefore, BBI cannot match 
IBB in seeking additional equity finance 
through having a listing on a local Alter-
native Investment Market (AIM) (Wil-
son, 2006). Nevertheless, in March 2002, 
the bank received a permit from the 
Banking Agency of the Federation of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina to participate in 
internal payments operations. In the 
same year, BBI received a deposit insur-
ance license from the Deposit Insurance 
Agency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, this, 
however, raises some Shari'ah com-
pliance issues. For instance, although 
guarantees are acceptable for current 
accounts that pay no return, they are not 
acceptable for investment Mudaraba 
accounts where the client shares in the 
bank's declared profits (Wilson, 2004).  
 
  Overall, banks in BiH are not allowed 
to trade. This is an obstacle for BBI to 
implement Murabaha in any form (Is-
lamic Finance Asia, 2009). As Murabaha 
is the most common used instrument in 
Islamic banking and finance, the bank 
had to design different structures that are 
acceptable to both bank’s Shari’ah board 
and Bosnian legislation. Because BBI is 
a small institution with only 11 branches, 
the range of Islamic finance is very tight 
in BiH. Currently, most of the bank's 
operations are retail (Wilson, 2006). 
   
  Financially speaking, despite the global 
financial crisis of 2007, BBI has re-
vealed until the 3rd quarter of the year 
2009 an obvious increase in operations. 
The total bank’s assets have been in-
creased by 2.28% due to the growth of 
client's deposits. Corporate deposits 
increased by 3.93% whereby sight depo-
sits and time deposits increased by 
4.92% and 3.36%, respectively. Due to 
the increase of time deposits, retail depo-
sits increased by 1.65%. Corporate 
finance increased by 1.81%, retail fi-
nancing increased to reach 1.57%. The 
growth rate of housing financing was 
1.54% while long-term financing raised 
by 2.93%. Eventually, short-term financ-
ing and overdraft of current accounts 
mounted up by 3.6%. Thus, we could 
argue that Bosnia and Herzegovina 
would seem a good potential market for 
Islamic finance despite the many con-
straints on market growth. The obvious 
way forward would be for conventional 
banks to open Islamic finance windows 
to provide Shari'ah compliant products 
and for Government to introduce a new 
Federal banking law. 
 
Azerbaijan 
 
  Azerbaijan is a country in the Caucasus 
region of Eurasia. Recently, some 
sources consider Azerbaijan to be more 
closely aligned with Europe. Azerbaijan 
has completed its post-Soviet transition 
into a major oil based economy. Azeri 
gross domestic product (GDP) grew 
41.7% in the first quarter of 2007, possi-
bly the highest of any nation worldwide 
(Caucasian and Central Asian Economic 
Report (CCAER), 2007). The GDP has 
been accelerating every year (Interna-
tional Monetary Fund (IMF), 2009a). 
Azerbaijan has a population of about 8 
million. Although Muslims make up 
94% of Azerbaijan's population 
(Moodys, 2008) and the country is a 
member of the Saudi Arabia-based Is-
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lamic Development Bank (IDB), Islamic 
banking has made virtually no inroads in 
the country. There are no real stand-
alone Islamic banks in Azerbaijan due to 
the legislation that does not allow them 
to exist. Despite of that, according to 
Faig Mammdov, as published in Arab 
News on May, 2009a, there is a huge 
demand for housing finance in particu-
lar. Hence, because they are the easiest 
to introduce under the current legisla-
tion, an Islamic mortgage based on Mu-
rabaha and Ijara are in the process of 
launching. 
 
  Apparently, Islamic banking faces 
obstacles in Azerbaijan such as; the 
absence of any regulatory-legislative 
basis for Islamic banking, the National 
Bank of Azerbaijan's (NBA) hostile 
attitude, the lack of the necessary super-
visory framework, the absence of an 
interest-free financial marketplace and 
lastly, the lack of linkage institutions to 
provide those entering this sector with 
information and support (Aliyev, 2009). 
Nevertheless, there are number of prod-
ucts based on Islamic financial concepts 
are being offered by some banks in the 
country. For instance, IBA (the State-
owned International Bank of Azerbaijan-
that dominates Azerbaijan's financial 
market with a 43% share in terms of 
total assets compared with about 45 
private sector banks that hold a market 
share of only 7% or less (Imeson, 2009)) 
intend to engaged in Islamic banking 
operations which do not conflict with 
banking regulations (International Bank 
of Azerbaijan (IBA) news, 2009).  
 
  However, some progress in Islamic 
financial sector has been made “hidden” 
under conventional forms of banking 
activites (Aliyev, 2009). For instance, 
elements of Islamic finance have been 
introduced into Azerbaijan via the activi-
ties of the "Kauthar bank", which posi-
tions itself as an Islamic bank. "Kauthar 
bank" uses Mudaraba, Musharaka, and 
also the sale of bills of bank comparable 
to Sukuk. It is however remaining un-
clear to how this bank is able to do this 
given existing regulations. This is main-
ly because the bank is still small, not 
open to the public and releases little 
information as well. Historically speak-
ing, Kauthar bank is one of the first 
commercial banks in Azerbaijan. It has 
been working in Azerbaijan's bank sec-
tor since 1988. The previous name of the 
bank was "Universal Bank". The new 
regulation of the bank was affirmed in 
March, 2001. On September 2001, the 
bank was registered under the name of 
Kauthar bank in the Ministry of Justice. 
In 2002, the National bank gave Kauthar 
bank the license for all kinds of activity. 
The bank is considered then as the first 
bank in Azerbaijan and the second bank 
in CIS countries that work according to 
the Islam banking system. The regula-
tion capital of the bank is 10.02 m Mana-
tas. The assets of the bank increased 
from 320 thousand Manats to 18.3 m 
Manats during last 7 years. The bank has 
given up the operation of giving credit to 
the purchasers with the Islam banking 
point of view since 2002. Kauther bank 
as a result of decision to manage its 
operations on an Islamic banking basis 
started to clean its loans and debt portfo-
lio of riba in 2005 hence, it sold its inter-
est bearing loans portfolio to Sevindj-M 
LLC.  
 
  Because Azerbaijan is a country with a 
completely conventional banking sys-
tem, Islamic financial institutions do not 
have a special consideration. Hence, the 
first and the only Shari’ah bank in coun-
try "Kauther bank" is considered to be 
conventional bank according to the 
official documents (Bekkin, 2009).  
 
  Another example of the Islamic finan-
cial institutions that are operating cur-
rently on Azerbaijan is the Baku, Fine-
ko/abc.az. Islamic Corporation for the 
Development of the Private Sector (ICD) 
established this leasing company for the 
purpose to invest islamically in private 
business entities in Islamic countries. 
The company has one of the biggest 
charter capitals among its leasing coun-
terparts in Azerbaijan.  
 
Switzerland 
 
  The Switzerlan is indeed considered as 
the global financial hub and the world’s 
leading center for private banking. Des-
pit of that, it has been seen as a "sleeping 
country" in attracting Islamic finance. 
"Switzerland became one of the latest 
Western countries to join the booming 
Islamic finance system, offering a full 
range of Shari`ah-compliant banking 
products and services" (Qatari daily, 
2009).  
 
  Recently, the country shows some 
involvement in Islamic finance opera-
tions. For example, UBS specialized in 
developing Islamic wealth management 
services. The bank has created a unique 
Islamic finance structure that allows 
their clients in Switzerlan to determine 
the risk return profile that meets their 
investment objectives. In 2002, the UBS 
founded “Noriba” a 100% private wealth 
management subsidiary specialized on 
full product range of Islamic invest-
ments. In 2006, the business unit was 
fully reintegrated into the firm under the 
brand called UBS Islamic Finance (UBS, 
2010). 
  
  In Geneva, the second-most-populous 
city in Switzerland, the major early 
development was the establishment of 
the "Dar Al Mal Al Islami trust" in 1981, 
largely due to an initiative by Prince 
Mohamed Al Faisal. "Dar al mal al 
Islami" is best described as an invest-
ment company rather than a bank, al-
though it continues to own 37 % of the 
capital of Fisal Islamic bank of Egypt as 
well as 41.7 % share holding in Ithmaar 
bank (Wilson, 2007b). In 1982, "Faisal 
Finance" was established in Geneva. 
Since more than twenty years, the com-
pany developed holistically and has built 
a large international and local client 
base. Faisal Finance became a bank on 
October 2006. It has joined the presti-
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gious circle of Swiss banks regulated by 
the Swiss Federal Banking Commission 
(SFBC). Ithmaar Bank B.S.C. of Bahrain 
holds 100% of the bank.   
 
  However, it is expected that the second 
private Islamic bank will be established 
in Switzerland very soon (IslamOnline, 
2008). Moreover, Bank Sarasin & Cie 
AG focuses exclusively on “sustainable 
private banking” and started to offer 
Islamic investment fund and Shari’ah 
compliant financial products.  Eventual-
ly, the Credit Suisse offers Islamic pri-
vate banking services in line with con-
ventional products. It offers capital mar-
ket instruments, asset management and 
private wealth management solutions 
based on the Islamic concepts.  
 
Luxembourg 
  Luxembourg is considered as the centre 
for fund management. It manages more 
than 30 Shari’ah-complaint funds 
(Schoon, 2009). In 1983, Luxembourg 
was the chosen place for the first Sha-
ri’ah compliant insurance"Takaful" 
company in Europe. Moreover, the Lux-
embourg Stock Exchange was the first 
European stock exchange to enter the 
Sukuk market in 2002 (Flatter and Pie-
Pierron, 2009).  In 2008, in addition to 
the 31 Shari’ah compliant investment 
funds and sub-funds that established in 
Luxembourg, 16 Sukuk with a combined 
value of US-$ 5.5 bn or so were listed 
and traded on the Luxembourg Stock 
Exchange (Luxembourg Fund Review, 
2009). "The Luxembourg office of Pri-
cewaterhouseCoopers (PWC) in a report 
on Islamic finance published at the end 
of Oct. 2009, has urged greater involve-
ment and visibility from the Luxem-
bourg government and regulators if it is 
serious about establishing the principali-
ty as a European Islamic finance hub 
especially for Islamic funds and sukuk". 
The report, suggests that Islamic finance 
is an important niche business for Lux-
embourg (Arab News, 2009b). 
 
Spain 
  In 2006, some conventional Spanish 
banks such as Santander and the Spanish 
savings bank “La Caixa” announced 
their intentions of entering in the Islamic 
market (Contreras, 2007). According to 
the World Savings Banks Institute 
(WSBI) (2009), the national Islamic 
authority in Spain, “La Junta Islamica” 
has begun a process for creating an 
Islamic Bank in Spain. The first phase of 
this process consists of creating Islamic 
window facilities in one Spanish bank 
“Bancorreos” to sell Islamic financial 
products.  
 
Ireland 
   Following the introduction of tax neu-
trality laws to facilitate the issuance of 
sukuk by UK, France and Luxembourg, 
Ireland is the latest European Union 
country to join this trend. According to 
the " PricewaterhouseCoopers", the Irish 
Ministry of Finance has introduced 
significant amendments to facilitate 
Islamic finance transactions in Ireland, 
especially the origination and issuance of 
sukuk. Ireland, like other EU countries, 
is welcoming Islamic finance and thus, 
Dublin has emerged as an Islamic in-
vestment fund domicile rival to the 
Channel Islands and Luxembourg. Con-
secuantly, several Shariah-compliant 
funds are registered there including the 
Oasis Crescent Global Equity Fund and 
the recently-launched CIMB Global 
Islamic Equity Fund (Arab News, 2010).  
 
Australia 
 
  Since the beginning of its operations in 
1989, MCCA (Muslim Community 
Cooperative) has rooted its position at 
the forefront of Shari’ah compliant 
finance and investment in Australia. 
"Home ownership" is one of the main 
concerns of MCCA to assist Muslim 
families to realize their goals without 
compromising their Islamic principles. 
 
  Moreover, ICFA Ltd was established in 
1997 to fill the gap existed in Australia 
in fulfilling the desire of growing Mus-
lim community to be able to deal in 
accordance to their religious principles. 
Similarly, "Iskan Finance" is established 
in 2001 as a wholly owned Australian 
business with the core objective to better 
service the home financing needs of the 
Australian Muslim community. In 2002 
also, Iskan Finance commenced business 
with its Murabaha Facilitation Program. 
It has further developed its "Ijara wa 
Iqtina" (“lease to purchase”) facility.  
 
  Eventually, the year 2002 saw the birth 
of "Salic Pty Ltd" as comprehensive 
provider of a Shari’ah Approved Lend-
ing & Investment Corporation. It is 
dedicated to helping its customers 
achieve their financial goals (means 
saving for retirement, a child's educa-
tion, buying a new home, or asset build-
ing) in line with islamically based prin-
ciples.  
 
Kazakhstan, Netherland, Russia, 
and Denmark 
 
  Many Islamic banks and financial 
institutions have been initiated in the rest 
of world such as LARIBA bank in Ka-
zakhstan. The first experience of apply-
ing Islamic finance in Kazakhstan took 
place in 2003, when "Bank TuranA-
lem"(BTA) got the first loan on a Mura-
baha basis, which was fully compliant 
with Shari’ah. In 2006, two other Ka-
zakh banks "CenterCredit" and "Alliance 
Bank" also used the opportunity to re-
ceive Shari‘ah-compliant loans from 
Islamic banks. In Kyrgyzstan, the "Eko-
bank" has provided Islamic financial 
services and products through its "Is-
lamic Window".  
 
  In 2007, the finance minister Wouter 
Bos announced that the Netherlands 
would review its role in the Islamic 
finance industry. Since then, De Neder-
landsche Bank (DNB) has published a 
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study on the potential regulatory issues 
that would have to be addressed when 
introducing Islamic finance (Schoon, 
2009). 
 
  In Russia, “Forte-Bank” starts utilizing 
Islamic financing tools in its operations, 
through “Badr-Bank”, an Islamic unit 
established by “Forte-Bank”. In 2000, 
“Forte-Bank” merged with “Badr-Bank” 
into “Badr-Forte Bank”. In 2005, a con-
sumer society “Menzil” established 
under the auspices of “Badr-Forte Bank” 
to offer Halal residential mortgage pro-
grams for Muslims. However, the license 
of Badr-Forte has been revoked in De-
cember 2006. In 2004, on the basis of 
"Itil" insurance company (Tatarstan 
Republic located in the very heart of 
Russia), Islamic insurance directorate 
was established. The main area of re-
sponsibilities of the directorate was 
working out the concept of takaful in 
Russia. As the company did not have 
enough money to realize the project at its 
own expense, the agreement was reached 
between "Dubai Islamic Insurance and 
Reinsurance Company (Aman)" (the 
UAE) and "Itil" insurance company to 
joint efforts in order to establish the first 
takaful operator in Russia. The manage-
ment of "Itil" planned to convert the 
company into an Islamic insurance com-
pany. In 2005, the first ever Islamic 
insurance project in Russia based on 
"Itil" insurance company ended off.  
  Finally, in 1982, the Islamic Banking 
International Holding, then part of "Dar 
al-Mal al-Islami" established Islamic 
Bank International of Denmark. The 
Danish Banking Supervisory Board did 
not recognize an Islamic character of the 
bank and sometime later the bank was 
converted into an investment company. 
It should however, be noted that this 
happened to most of Islamic banking 
institutions that emerged in Europe 
during the period "1970-1980s" (Bekkin, 
2007).  
USA 
 
  Shari’ah-compliant mutual funds are 
offered by intermediaries such as the 
Amana Mutual Funds Trust, Azzad 
Funds, and the Dow Jones Islamic Fund. 
International financial intermediaries 
also provide Shariah-compliant financ-
ing "SCF" in the US. Islamic investors 
from the Gulf region have sought to 
geographically diversify their financial 
portfolios and to invest their oil wealth 
in US assets (Ilias, 2010). According to 
WSBI (2009), the Bahrain-based Arcapi-
ta bank has structured many Shari’ah 
compliant transactions in private equity 
and real estate in US. US-based compa-
nies have taken advantage of alternative 
funding sources through Islamic-
financing abroad. Loehmann’s Holdings, 
Inc. and East Cameron Gas Company 
have issued rated Shari‘ah-compliant 
bonds. 
 
  However, many investors consider 
"SCF" to be more reliable than conven-
tional financing particulalry during the 
financial crisis (Modi, 2007). As a result, 
some new Islamic financial instutions 
were established in US. US have now 
two Islamic financial institutions i.e., 
American Finance House (LARIBA) and 
the University Islamic Financial Corpo-
ration, Ann Arbor. 
 
Acknowledgment: some of the non-cited 
information that has been mentioned in 
this table was extracted directly from the 
website of the discussed institution. 
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ISLAMIC FINANCE AND THE GLOBAL 
ECONOMIC CRISIS  
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3.1.   Preface  
 
  It is well known that the US has faced the financial crisis and the credit crunch which threaten 
the worldwide economic and exposed fundamental weaknesses in the global financial systems in 
autumn 2007. The whole world has been adversely affected at varying degrees by this crisis. 
Major European economies have been severely influenced by the sharp economic downturn. 
Developing economies have also not been immune from the contagious effects of the crisis 
simply, because they have capitalistic financial markets where large sums of wealth are subject 
to the process of speculation.  
 
  Muslim economists refer to the current global crisis as a result of conventional-interest rate. 
"Huge budgetary imbalances, excessive monetary expansion, large balance of payments deficits, 
insufficient foreign aid and inadequate international cooperation can all be related to flaws in the 
theory of interest, which is also the rote of the crisis" (Iqbal, 2004). The proponents of Islamic 
banking system expect that the crisis could not happen in Islamic economic (banking) system, 
mainly because it operates in accordance with the rules, principle goals and functions of Islamic 
law. The socio-economic justice and the equitable distribution of income are among the most 
important Islamic goals and functions necessary for a stable economic system. Economics in 
Islam seeks also to establish a "broad-based economic well-being" with optimum rate of growth 
and fair and “full” level of employment (Chapra, 2000).  
 
  The aim of this part of the thesis is to focus shortly on the financial crisis of 2007 in the global 
conventional financial market. It will primarily point out the various factors that have 
contributed to this crisis. The Islamic perspective on such factors will be presented to show how 
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Islamic economic system might
Eventually, the real effects of the crisis 
  
3.2.    The roots of the global 
 
  The financial crisis of 2007 is considered to be the worst financial crisis since the Great 
Depression of the 1930s (Lightman, 2009). The crisis contributed to the collapse of large 
financial institutions, the bailout of banks by governments and 
Booz & Company (2011) introduces 
crisis: Misaligned incentive structures, unc
prudency (Exhibit 3.1). The crisis
both housing and credit markets
homeowners to make their mortgage payments, risky mortgage products, high corporate debt 
levels (over-leveraging), and international 
  Exhibit 3.1: The origins of the global financial crisis of 2007
  Source: Booz & Company
 
  Broadly speaking, the falling 
credit conditions (relaxation of lending criteria
and encouraging debt-financed 
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 help to bring stability to the world's economic system
on Islamic finance will be briefly being discussed.
financial crisis of 2007 
the downtu
three major triggers (origins) of the 
ontrolled financial innovations
, however, can be attributed to a number of factors pervasive in 
. The root causes include for example
trade imbalances. 
 
, (2011) based on the Islamic Finance and Global Financial Stability Report (2010)
interest rates and the huge inflows of foreign funds
) prior to the crisis, fueling 
consumption (Das, 2010). As part of the housing and credit 
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booms, the number of complex structures of financial agreements such as: Mortgage-Backed 
Securities (MBS) and Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDO), clearly increased. Low initial rates 
on adjustable rate mortgages (ARM) and low down payment requirements encouraged short-
term speculation with the hopes of selling or refinancing at more favorable terms. The collapse 
of the global housing bubble peaked in US in 2006 caused the values of securities tied to real 
estate pricing to plummet and the high default rates to increase quickly. Home prices start to 
decline as interest rates rose creating a poor refinancing environment. Falling prices resulted also 
in homes to worth less than the mortgage loan, providing an incentive to enter foreclosure. This 
continues to exhaust wealth from consumers and erodes the financial strength of banks. A rapid 
increase in default activity followed as home prices failed to rise and mortgagors were unable to 
refinance upon the expiration of the initial rates. Securities with risk exposure to housing market 
plummeted, causing great damage to financial institutions. Stock markets suffered large drops in 
2008 as questions arose regarding the solvency of major financial institutions and liquidity in the 
credit markets dried up. Worldwide growth slowed with the tightened credit markets and 
declines in international trade. Governments, central banks and international organizations 
implemented different fiscal and monetary expansions plans, in addition to institutional bailouts, 
in attempting to overcome the crisis (Logojan, 2009, Amin, 2009, Eghan, 2009, and 
Bhulipongsanon, 2008). However, a simple explanation of what really happened and how the 
financial crisis of 2007 has started can be found in the appendix.  
 
3.3.     The impact of the global crisis on Islamic finance:  the case of Dubai debt crisis 
  
  In 2009, the financially property development arm of the Dubai government (Nakheel) faced 
default on a USD-$4.1 bn. Nakheel was supposed to pay the last rental coupon of the Islamic 
bonds (Sukuk) and buy back the assets. Unexpectedly, Dubai government asking the creditors to 
reschedule repayment made the financial world panic. The reaction was sharper in Europe as the 
boom in Dubai was immensely financed by foreign funds (Table 3.1) such as: Lloyds, RBS and 
Standard Chartered that have exposure of $5bn or so to Dubai World (Hasan, 2009). 
 
  The financial trouble in Nakheel made the growing popularity of Islamic banking and finance to 
be subject to a solidity and stability test. It might be seen as a typical collapse of Islamic finance 
from the point of view of some analysts. This is because most of Nakheel’s borrowings are in 
Sukuk. Based on the Agence France-Presse (AFP), Sukuk are structured to resemble 
conventional bonds, meaning the risks of ownership are transferred to the issuer rather than 
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shared by the investors. This suggests that much of Dubai's spending has gone on speculative 
construction projects. This is, howev
and services. In another word, i
Shari’ah, they are structured very similar to conventional products. 
Dubai violated one of the main Islamic principles i.e., "
hence, relied "heavily" on debt and leverage in its rush to build a leading business hub in the 
region (AsiaOne news, 2009).
 
Table 3.1 
 Lending from Western banks to the UAE
 
  From another point of view, many analysts believe that the Nakheel crisis is 
systematic weaknesses in Islamic finance per se and that the 
been overstated because of the lack of familiarity with this novel and modern concept of finance. 
Hundley, (2009) illustrates, for example
crisis, not a wholesale collapse
of assets to face such financial crisis. Nakheel
liabilities of just under USD-$20 bn, even after writing down its real estate investments. 
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nstead of coming up with products that reflect
It is, additionally,
Shari’ah anti-excessive leverage
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  By and large, Dubai's trouble reflects the extensive problems associated with the credit crunch of 
2007. The story started with Dubai's booming real-estate market "going bust" at the start of 
2008. The competition created extra supply, property prices crashed, the average fall being 
around 40% of their value in 2009, and profit margins are vanishing. "Dubai was in part a victim 
of the global meltdown and was also overtaken by unguarded optimism and mismanagement" 
(Hasan, 2009). The world's economic crisis led, indeed, to the emirate's steepest property slump, 
with home prices dropping 50% from their peak in 2008 (Property Funds World, 2009). Shostak, 
(2009) suggests that "the key factor behind the crisis in Dubai is the classical boom-bust policies 
of the UAE central bank" and thus, not purely due to the Islamic finance operations. 
 
3.4.   The Islamic solution to the global financial crisis  
 
  Despite of the global financial crisis and the emerging dilemma in Dubai, Islamic financial 
institutions have remained slightly insulated from the global financial downturn. Islamic banks 
outperformed conventional banks in 2008. They continued to experience significant profitability 
performance, robust credit and asset growth, and high external credit ratings (McKinsey & 
Company, 2010)1. This is because Islamic law completely prohibits Islamic banks from handling 
interest-based instruments. Islamic banks didn’t invest in the structured products that based on 
derivatives thus, haven’t suffered from the fall in such instruments’ values (S&P’s, 2009). 
Islamic banks tended to be more conservative in their lending practices. Lending could increase 
the borrower's wealth at the expense of low-income classes. Consequently, lending can not only 
fuel speculation, but it can also cause inflation when it exceeds savings (Mirakhor, 2009). 
Islamic banks avoided credit default swaps and kept a high level of liquidity on their balance 
sheets (Hundley, 2009). Islamic banking prohibits the artificial creation of money by a process 
known as "fractional reserve". In the fractional reserve practice, banks lend more money than 
they have in deposits. This creates, consequently, a financial bubble in the economic system, as 
very little equity can be used as collateral to borrow significant sums of money (Hassan, 2009). 
 
 
 
______________________ 
1 For example, in both Kuwait and Jordan, the Islamic banks' assets grew by 15% in 2008 while the total banking sector grew at 11%. Islamic windows of 
conventional banks have continued also to grow rapidly. Islamic windows of the top five conventional banks in Qatar and the UAE grew by 80% in 2008 
when compared to 2007. The growth in Islamic finance assets has lead to an increase in Islamic banking penetration in key markets. Qatar's Islamic finance 
sector assets have grown from 12.5% in 2003 to 20.3% in 2008 as a proportion of total banking assets. Turkey's Islamic finance sector has grown from 
9.7% in 2003 to 15.7% in 2008 as a proportion of total banking assets (CPI FINANCIAL, 2009b). 
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  Islam also prohibits Islamic banks from selling things not owned which precludes complex 
contracts such as CDO2 and CDS. Islamic financial system distributes risk in different way as 
compared with conventional finance. While the same aggregate business losses may arise, their 
different distribution makes the whole system less likely to result in corporate bankruptcies. 
Islam imposes on its adherents, either Muslims or non-Muslims, a requirement for ethical 
practices. Accordingly, Islamic banks should not lend money to customers if such borrowing is 
not in their best interest. This would, for example, be applied to the provision of Islamic housing 
finance to sub-prime borrowers who could not afford the cost once any low-cost introductory 
period had elapsed (Amin, 2009). Eventually, Islamic banks source more funds from deposits 
than conventional banks. Customer deposits for all Islamic banks in the UAE, Kuwait, Qatar and 
Saudi Arabia in 2008 represented 69% of liabilities, compared with 54% of all liabilities for 
conventional banks in the same region and period (McKinsey & Company, 2010).  
 
 
3.5.    Stability and potential of Islamic finance during the financial crisis 
 
   It is known that each financial crisis call for new regulations, government guarantee of 
deposits, and bank bailouts. Mirakhor (2009) stated that during the great depression in 1929, a 
number of scholars offered a proposal to the government of the US for the reform of the financial 
system. The decisive of the Chicago reform plan corresponds to a large degree to the core of the 
financial system that emerges from Islamic fundamentals. The reform proposed a two-tier 
banking system: i) 100% reserve banking that would preclude money creation and destruction by 
the banking system, which would consequently fully protect deposits and the nation's payments 
system, and ii) a regulated investment banking system without government protection such as a 
deposit guarantee system of insurance. Islamic finance version converts the second tier into an 
equity-based system in which interest is prohibited. Mirakhor further added that the theoretical 
analyses of such a system have demonstrated its inherent stability. This conclusion stems from 
the fact that no maturity mismatching is possible since there is a 100% money reserve system in 
place and because any asset-side price inflation or deflation is mapped one-to-one onto the 
liability side of the balance sheet of the financial institution.   
 
  Based on the above discussion, we could initially argue that if the requirements of Shari’ah 
were properly implemented, the financial crisis of 2007 would not happen. As a matter of fact, at 
the beginning of the crisis, there is a confident that Islamic finance was relatively immune to the 
rapidly spreading influence because it was based on ethical financing to support real activities. In 
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practice, the property bubble has burst in Islamic financial industries just as it has in US. Some 
banks have suffered, in the early stage of the crisis, a higher rate of non-performing loans than 
conventional banks, mainly due to their exposure to falling real estate markets. Revenue, 
profitability and liquidity have been also adversely affected in both 2008 and 2009 (IFSL, 2010). 
Islamic financial institutions were over exposed to property and equity and so, have suffered 
substantially from the collapse in confidence which has reduced sukuk issuance (Fig.3.1) and 
equity funds value. Islamic Finance Information Service (IFIS) has published a report on the 
global Sukuk market for first half of 2009. The report shows that the global Sukuk issuances 
continue to decline standing at USD-$ 9.23 bn at June 2009, 20% less than H1-2008. This 
decline is significant in the GCC-States where most of the Sukuk are dollar denominated and 
local currencies remain pegged to the dollar.  
 
 
                                Fig. 3.1:  Sukuk global issuance by year- US-$bn annual issues 
Sources: Zawya Sukuk Monitor, Islamic Financial Information Service, Moody's (2009 a), IFSL and Ernst and Young IFI, (2009).(*: IFSL estimate, **E & Y, IFIR estimate) 
 
   Although global Sukuk markets were negatively affected by the global recession in 2008, 
Islamic bond issuance rose 40% in the first 10 months of the year 2009. They, therefore, 
offsetting the 55% decline seen in 2008, and anticipated to reach around 50% by the end of 2009 
(Moody's, 2009b). Data from Zawya Sukuk Monitor shows that the value of Sukuk in the third 
quarter of 2009 rose to $6.2 bn, up 82% from US-$ 3.4 bn a year earlier. According to IFSL 
(2010), Sukuk issuance rose from the low point of Q4 2008 to reach $6 bn in each of Q3 & Q4 
2009, resulting in an annual total of $20bn, up by 30% in 2008.  
 
  On a country level, South East Asia dominates the Sukuk market with total issuances reaching 
US-$ 7.8 bn in 2009, representing 88% of total global Sukuk issuances for the H1-09. Only 12% 
of H1-09 issuances came from the GCC-States, with total worth of US-$ 1.1 bn.  As for Malaysia 
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and South East Asia, the recovery of the Sukuk market has started in 2009, with issuance 
increasing by 29% in Malaysia and 93% in Indonesia (Fig.
been largely unaffected by the global 
sukuk in Malaysia is largely ringgit denominated.
trade weighted basket which has appreciated against the US dollar
 
  IFIS suggests that the longer term prospects remain 
little possibility of default with Sukuk in the Gulf as issuers can easily meet their payment 
obligations, given the record oil prices, on the one hand (S&
due to the fact that the Islamic finance market is small at present compared to the conventional 
market, so that its capacity to increase is immense. Furthermore, the innovation that Islamic 
finance has shown in the last years indicates that it is a fast learner and that it is likely to respond 
to the challenges by emerging as a stronger and larger part of the global financial industry 
(Farmida BI, 2008).  
 
                             Fig. 3.2: Global Sukuk 
                           Source: Booz & Company, 
 
  Similarly, equity market has 
value of equity funds numbering around 420 in 2008 fell from
estimated US-$ 12.5 bn end-2008 (IFSL, 2009) (
the average return on Islamic equity
28% in 2008 (Fig.3.4). This was close to the return on the global equity index, up 25% in 2009 
following a fall of 37% in 2008. By and large, Islamic funds have returned an average of 0.1% a 
year since 2000, better than the 
achieved by bonds. 
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3.2). The Malaysian Sukuk market has 
crisis in securities markets. This is because
 The value of the ringgit is determined by a 
 (IIFM, 2009).
strong and look promising as
P, 2009). On the other hand, this is 
market - new issuances (by country) 
(2011) 
also not been immune to the negative effects of the 
 US-$ 17.2 bn at
Fig.3.3). Strikingly, Eurekahedge estimates that 
 funds was 22% in 2009, recovering from an average fall of 
-4% generated by global equities, but well short of
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  Additionally, S&P global benchmark indices of Shari
ground over the first quarter of 2009, declining more than 6% due to the financial
disruptions. Despite the liquidity crunch and s
performance, Islamic equity market showed some positive trends in 2009. For example, the S&P 
Global BMI Shari’ah index, which measures the performance
 
across the world’s largest developed and emerging markets, eased 6.2% 
2009, compared with a 20.8% decline over the 
to the religious restrictions, S&P 500 Shari
than some conventional indexes
 
  Fig. 3.5: S&P 500 Shari’ah Index vs. S
Source: Booz & Company (2010) based on International Monetary Fund; Bloomberg; Booz & Company analysis
 
Fig. 3.3:  Islamic equity funds worldwide 
Sources: Zawya Sukuk Monitor, Islamic Financial Information Service, Moody's 
(2009a), IFSL and Ernst and Young IFI, (2009).(*: IFSL estimate, **E & Y, IFIR 
estimate) 
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’ah-compliant companies lost further 
lowing world economies that hinder market 
 of 4,700 Shari
4th quarter of 2008 (CPI Financial, 2009
’ah Index have also survived the financial crisis better 
 such as S&P 500 Index (Fig 3.5) (Booz & Company, 2010).
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Fig. 3.4. Annual percentage rate 
 Source: IFSL (2009) based on Eurekahedge, Greenwich Alternative 
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  Over the year 2009, the Dow Jones Islamic Stock Market World Index was up 30.26%, slightly 
outperformed by the Dow Jones
same period (Fig. 3.6 and Fig.
which fell a staggering 38.5%, and the Dow Jones Industrial Ind
of 33.8% in 2008, the Dow Jones Islamic Financial Index exhibited a more modest loss of 7% 
for the year (Tayyebi, 2009). 
Jones Islamic Market Titans 100 Index, which measures the performance o
Shari’ah compliant stocks globally, dropped 1.22% month
Global Titans 50 Index, which measures the 50 biggest companies worldwide, posted a loss of 
1.80%. Furthermore, the Dow Jones Islamic Market As
measures the performance of 25 of the leading Shari’ah compliant stocks in the Asia region, 
decreased 1.32% compared with a loss of 6.13% posted by 
Index. In Europe, the Dow Jones Islamic Mark
performance of the 25 of the leading Shari’ah compliant stocks in Europe, posted a loss of 
2.28%, relative to a loss of 1.54% recorded by 
 
  
Fig. 3.6:  Dow Jones Islamic Market World Index
   Source:  Dow Jones Indexes (2); http://www.djindexes.com/islamic/index.cfm?go=overview. 
 
   Overall, Islamic investments in shares are essentially the same as those of conventional equity 
investments. But, the type of stocks is restricted 
gambling, tobacco or those that have excessive debt (greater than 30% of equity) would not be
_________________________________________________________
2
 The Dow Jones Islamic Market World Index (DJIM World
Shari'ah-compliant equities. Since the launch in 1999, the (DJIM World
Shari'ah-compliant securities including indexe
2009, the selection universe for the DJIM Indexes includes the components of more than 65 country
eligibility for the DJIM indexes, the stocks are screened to ensure that each meets the standards set out in the published methodology. A com
must meet Shari'ah requirements for acceptable products, busines
approved by the independent DJIM Index Shari'ah Supervisory Board. However, a detailed explanation of the DJIM World
in the DJIM Rulebook (2009). Available online
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 Total Stock Market World Index which was up 30.56% over the 
 3.7) (NewHorizon, 2010). In comparison to the S&P 500 Index 
ex that showed a record decline
Based on the close of trading on 29 March 2011, the global Dow 
-to-date. In contrast, the Dow Jones 
ia/Pacific Titans 25 Index, which 
The Dow Jones Asian Titans 50 
et Europe Titans 25 Index, which measures the 
the conventional Dow Jones Europe Index.
  
            Fig. 3.7:  Dow Jones Global Total Stock Market Index
 
and thus, investments in companies involved in 
 
SM) was the first benchmark of investment performance for the global universe of 
SM) family has expanded to provide a wide variety benchmarks tracking 
s for specific countries, regions, industries and market capitalization ranges. Effective July 27, 
-level benchmark indexes. To determine their 
s activities, debt levels and interest income and expenses. T
 at: http://www.djindexes.com/islamic/index.cfm?go=methodology
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Shari’ah compliant. Due to the latter restriction in particular, it appears that Shari’ah compliant 
investors have benefited from the screening of financial stocks, while their proportion in non-
Islamic indices is likely to have contributed to their poor performance 
 
  From an empirical point of view, a joint survey has been performed by "HSBC Amanah" and 
"The Banker Magazine" in (2009) in order to examine the effect of the global financial crisis on 
Islamic banking and total assets. The survey showed that Islamic banks continue to boost their 
investments and other assets, while at the same time avoiding mistakes that have bedeviled some 
of the world's biggest conventional banks in the wake of the global financial crisis and thus 
Islamic banks perform slightly better during the financial crisis in comparison with conventional 
banks (HSBC Amanah, 2009). The survey stated also that the assets held by Islamic and conven-
tional banks with Islamic windows rose by 29% in 2009 to US-$ 822 bn, from US-$ 639 bn in 
2008. Surprisingly, at a time when asset growth in conventional banks slumped to 6.8% from 
21.6% in 2008, balance sheet assets of Shari’ah compliant banks rose 28-29% from USD-$622bn 
in 2007 to USD-$800bn in 2008, of which USD-$701bn were in commercial banks and USD-
$99bn in investment banks. The survey said the Islamic finance industry continues to build a 
strong track record and is expected to sustain its growth, with assets forecast to hit US-$ 1.033 
bn in 2010. According to figures compiled by the Asian Banker, in the face of a global recession, 
the top-100 Islamic banks saw their combined assets grow by 66% in 2008 (Zawya, 2009). 
Despite of such a growth, the Islamic aggregate asset total is significantly less than 1% of the top 
1,000 world banks' asset. 
 
  Moreover, the IMF’s latest regional economic outlook-2009 for the Middle East compares the 
performance of Islamic banks in the GCC states with conventional banks during the global 
financial crisis. The results indicate that Islamic banks were less affected during the initial phase 
of the crisis, reflecting a stronger first-round impact on conventional banks through market-to-
market valuations on securities in 2008. Nevertheless, in 2009, data for the first half of the year 
exhibits to some extent larger declines in profitability for Islamic banks, revealing the second-
round effect of the crisis on the real economy, especially real estate. Similarly, Arab News 
(2009) reasserts the superiority of Islamic banks over conventional banks during the global crisis 
of 2007. They revealed, based on a survey carried out by MTI Consulting, that the IFIs have 
been less affected by the global recession. 62% of the respondents cited they had experienced 
little impact from the recent crisis which has devastated banks worldwide. Reflected in the 
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survey was that 72% of the respondents said less exposure to derivative products was one of 
factors driving the demand for Islamic finance during the crisis.  
 
  Based on the above discussion and facts, it could be argued that Islamic finance has largely 
escaped the worst of the financial crisis due to the absence of all conditions that contributed to 
the financial crisis of 2007. Islamic finance did not entrench in many of the economies that have 
been worst affected hence, exhibit a promising indicators of financial performance in the year 
2010. Additionally, the fact that it is a relatively new phenomenon has meant that Islamic finance 
industry has perhaps not reached the same stage as conventional finance in terms of innovation 
and advanced market infrastructure. Thus, IFIs have not been able to participate in the type of 
transactions which their conventional counterparts have been exposed to during the financial 
crisis (Tayyebi, 2009). 
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4.1.   The abstract 
 
   In this chapter we examine the relative efficiency performance of the Islamic Bank of Britain 
(IBB), the first stand-alone full-fledged Islamic bank in Europe, against conventional banks in 
the UK, and also against Islamic banks from Muslim-majority countries. We also apply a two-
stage Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) technique in order to regress the efficiency scores on a 
set of explanatory variables which could potentially influence the efficiency of a bank. In order 
to investigate the association of the DEA-efficiency scores with the traditional accounting ratios, 
we estimate the correlation coefficients between the two variables. The efficiency-profitability 
matrix is further used to evaluate the performance of Islamic banks and also to enable the charac-
terization of the banks' performance profile. Our analysis covers the period from 2005 to 2008. 
 
  Results show that the IBB is technically inefficient. It also has relatively a poor financial per-
formance. The bank’s inefficiencies are mainly technical (managerial) rather than scale (size) in 
nature. IBB exhibits, however, positive trends in both efficiency and profitability, particularly in 
adverse market conditions. Thus, it has a great prospect to increase efficiency and strong poten-
tial for further growth in the UK. Results also shows that the technically more efficient banks are 
necessarily larger, have greater profitability and loans intensity, acquire less debt, and on average 
have a lower market share. IBB is relatively superior in terms of lending intensity and capital 
adequacy. Findings further suggest that the DEA measures can be used separately or concurrent-
ly with standard accounting measures in determining Islamic banks performance.  
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           4.2.    Introduction  
 
  Banking is considered as one of the major components of a financial system, since it has a 
broad impact on the overall financial stability and strength of an economy. It connects economic 
units and participants in the creation of financial markets. Banking plays a major role of financial 
intermediation and helps in creation of wealth through the establishment of a series of economic 
relations. Interest is considered the fundamental source of revenue for banks. As a result, the fi-
nancial markets and institutions are highly sensitive to changes in interest rates due to their criti-
cal role in generating revenues and profits. Any change in the interest rate has an impact on the 
banking and financial sector. Therefore, the banks are actively engaged in interest rate risk man-
agement.  
 
   Islamic banking differs from conventional banking in several important ways. The essential 
feature of Islamic banking is that it is interest-free. Shari’ah-compliant financial institutions do 
not deal with interest.1 In Islam, interest is considered as a form of exploitation because it is 
merely a charge on use of money. Consequently, Islamic banking has its own set of unique risks 
and challenges. This, however, calls for the development of modern mechanisms to allow inter-
est income to be replaced with cash flows from productive sources, such as returns from wealth 
generating investment activities and operations, which include for example, profits from trading in 
(real) assets and cash flows from the transfer of usufruct (the right to use an asset). Modern Is-
lamic financing techniques were developed first in Muslim countries of Asia, notably Malaysia. 
Since the mid-1990s, the boom in the Islamic banking industry and in the widely acceptable and 
reliable techniques has risen significantly in the Gulf region mainly due to the sudden increase in 
oil revenues. 
 
  Nowadays, Islamic finance is emerging as an alternative to the conventional banks in many 
parts of the world. Islamic finance is also attracting conventional investors seeking to get evolved 
into new investment opportunities. For instance, HSBC Amanah, the segregated division of 
HSBC, provides a range of Shari’ah compliant financial services such as the Amanah bank ac-
count and Amanah home services to meet the needs of the UK Muslim community. Barclays 
Capital, the investment banking arm of Barclays bank plc, is considered as a market-leading 
franchise in the Islamic bonds "Sukuk" market. Ahli United Bank (UK) introduced Manzil " the 
home purchase plans" to help clients purchase residential property in accordance with their relig- 
__________________________ 
1 The prohibition of usury (interest) is not specific to Muslims rather its roots are in Christianity and Judaism. 
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ious regulations. The Arab Banking Corporation (ABC), through its London subsidiary ABC In-
ternational Bank plc (ABCIB), brings 'alburaq' to offer Shari’ah-compliant home financing for 
residential (mortgage) properties in the UK. The Citi Islamic Investment Bank E. C. (“CIIB”), 
the fully owned subsidiary of Citicorp Banking Corporation, has been continuingly playing a 
pioneering and innovative role in the industry through Islamic finance windows within Citi. 
Lloyds TSB have developed a suite of Shari’ah approved products. Last but not least, the Royal 
Bank of Scotland (RBS)-"Islamic banking" provides customers with consumption and commer-
cial products based on diminishing Musharaka and Murabaha, etc.2  
 
   Given the differential behavior of the Islamic banks and the conventional banks, there has al-
ways been question about the long run sustainability of Islamic banks which in turn depends 
heavily on their efficiency performance. The efficiency of conventional banks has been widely 
studied in the literature to assess the experience of banks in achieving their objectives. Efficiency 
is defined as a performance measure indicating how prudently a bank is utilizing its resources in 
producing outputs. It implies improved profitability, better prices and service quality for con-
sumers, and greater amounts of funds intermediated (Berger, Hancock, and Humphrey, 1993). 
Determining banking efficiency would enable bank’s management to identify areas of efficiency 
and/or inefficiency in comparison to their competitors. Such recognition indeed helps the banks’ 
management to improve its performance and market position. Efficiency estimate captures also 
the effects of deregulation and financial disruption, institutional failure, problem loans, manage-
ment quality, market concentration, and the mergers and acquisitions. Thus, the enhanced effi-
ciency in banks contributes to a healthier economy. This is because the banking sector output is 
highly correlated with economic growth (Berger and Humphrey, 1997). 
 
  In practice, to measure banks efficiency, different approaches are applied, either to banks with-
in the financial sector (inter-banking comparison) or to branches within a bank (intra-bank com-
parison). By and large, Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) is the widely used efficiency analysis 
method. The literature on the application of DEA frontier analysis comprises a massive amount 
of empirical researches, such as Casu and Molyneux (2003).  
 
___________________________________________________ 
2 In diminishing Musharaka (co-ownership), the financier and the client participate either in joint ownership of a property, or in a 
joint commercial enterprise. The share of the financier is divided into a number of units. The client purchases these units based 
on a redeeming mechanism until he is the sole owner of the property. On the other hand, Murabaha contract (cost-plus financing) 
is frequently appears as a form of trade finance based upon letters of credit. This contract involves the sale of an item on a de-
ferred basis. The item is delivered immediately and the price to be paid for the item includes a mutually agreed margin of profit 
payable to the seller.  
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              From an “academic” point of view, despite the considerable development of Islamic banking 
sector, there are still few studies which explore the efficiency of Islamic banks. Previous studies 
focused primarily on the conceptual issues of Islamic banking. The main purpose of this chapter 
is primarily to bridge this gap in the literature. Our primary contribution to the literature is our 
undertaking of the first empirical analysis of the relative efficiency performance of IBB, which is 
considered as the first stand-alone Islamic commercial bank in the Western world. We basically 
attempt to answer the following two fundamental questions that arise after reviewing a brief lite-
rature on the Islamic banking and efficiency measurement techniques: Does IBB produce supe-
rior efficiency compared to the counterparties-conventional banks in the UK? Does IBB tend to 
outperform Islamic banks in Muslims countries?  
 
   To answer the former questions, we provide evidence on the performance of the Islamic Bank 
of Britain (IBB) over the period 2005-2008. This is based on the overall technical efficiency 
measurement, Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), which also examines the bank’s pure technic-
al efficiency (PTE) and scale efficiency (SE). In order to specify input-output variables, the out-
put oriented-intermediation approach is selected. Furthermore, the DEA efficiency scores ob-
tained from the first-stage are used as dependent variables in the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
regression model to investigate the effect of multiple factors on banks’ performance.  Eventually, 
to further illustrate the relationship between efficiency and profitability we examine, on one 
hand, the correlation between the DEA scores and the main accounting measurements, ROA and 
ROE. On the other hand, we measure the efficiency – profitability matrix which has similarity in 
structure to the product portfolio matrix approach.  
 
  This chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the related studies in 
the literature. Section 3 discusses the methodology and choice of input and output variables for 
the efficiency model. Section 4 reports the empirical findings. Finally, section 5 presents the 
overall concluding remarks. 
 
4.3.    Literature review  
 
 There is a large body of descriptive literature that offers comparisons of the instruments used in 
Islamic banking versus conventional banking. It also discusses the legal principles and regulatory 
challenges related to Islamic banking such as: Jobst (2007), Sundararajan and Errico (2002), and 
Sole (2007). Existing empirical literature on Islamic banking focuses primarily in assessing the 
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performance of Islamic banks based on financial ratios. For example, Metwally (1997) tests the 
primary differences among Islamic and conventional banks in terms of liquidity, leverage, credit 
risk, profitability and efficiency for 30 banks over the period 1992-1994. The statistical evidence 
suggests that the two groups of banks may be differentiated in terms of liquidity, leverage and 
credit risk, but not in terms of profitability and efficiency. Similarly, Samad and Hassan (1999) 
evaluate the inter-temporal and the inter-bank performance of Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad 
(BIMB) in terms of profitability, liquidity, risk and solvency, and community involvement for 
the period 1984-1997. They compare BIMB against 8 conventional banks using the financial ra-
tios. The study finds that BIMB is relatively more liquid, less risky but has low average profit 
compared to conventional banks.  
 
  Rosly and Bakar (2003) evaluate the relative financial performance of the Islamic banking 
scheme (IBS) against the mainstream banks in Malaysia for the period 1996-1999. The study ar-
gues that the IBS higher recorded (ROA) is not due to efficient investment policy but, rather it is 
caused by technical default. It concludes that the mainstream banks perform better than Islamic 
banks due to larger market size and greater experience. Additionally, Samad (2004) examines the 
comparative performance of six Islamic banks in Bahrain against fifteen interest-based conven-
tional commercial banks with respect to profitability, liquidity risk, and credit risk for a period 
from 1991 to 2001. The results indicate that there are no major differences in profitability and 
liquidity between Islamic banks and conventional banks. In terms of volume (average dollar 
business), the performance of Islamic banks is far below the conventional banks in Bahrain. Is-
lamic banks, as newcomers to the financial market, are however performing as well as the con-
ventional banks in a similar age group. In addition, Islamic banks are exposed to less credit risk 
compared to conventional banks. Interestingly, their credit performance is superior to that of 
conventional banks.  
 
  Based on cross-country analysis, Čihák and Hesse (2008) present for the first time a compara-
tive empirical analysis of Islamic banks’ with respect to financial stability. The sample covers 
individual Islamic and conventional banks in 20 banking systems (i.e. Bahrain, Bangladesh, 
Brunei, Egypt, Gambia, Indonesia, Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Malaysia, Mauritania, Pakis-
tan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, West Bank and Gaza, and Ye-
men) over the period 1993 to 2004. They find out that small Islamic banks tend to be financially 
stronger than small conventional banks. On the other hand, large conventional banks tend to be 
financially stronger than large Islamic banks. Meanwhile, small Islamic banks tend to be finan-
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cially stronger than large Islamic banks which may reflect challenges of credit risk management 
in large Islamic banks.  
 
  Despite of the extensive conceptual academic works on Islamic banking and finance, and the 
use of straightforward financial ratio analysis for understanding and predicting the performance 
of Islamic banks, there  are few studies being attempted to empirically measure the efficiency 
performance of Islamic banks either in Muslim’s countries or in Europe. The lack of coherent 
evidence regarding the efficiency of Islamic banks is likely to be a consequence of the industry 
small size and newness.  
 
  Among those who investigate empirically the efficiency of Islamic banks is Yudistira (2004). 
He provides new evidence on the performance of 18 Islamic banks in GCC-States, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Algeria, Cambia, Sudan, Egypt and Jordan, over the period 1997-2000. The research 
work is based on efficiency measurement in which Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) is utilized 
to analyze the technical efficiency (TE) and scale efficiency (SE) of Islamic banks. Findings in-
dicate that the inefficiency across Islamic banks is, by and large, small at just over 10%, which is 
quite low compared with many conventional counterparts. Islamic banks suﬀer slight 
ineﬃciencies during the global crisis of 1998-9, but performed very well after the difficult pe-
riods. Results also suggest that there are diseconomies of scale for small-to-medium Islamic 
banks which suggests that mergers should be encouraged.  
 
   In 2001, Limam uses a stochastic frontier model to examine the technical efficiency of banks 
in Kuwait from 1994 to 1999. He reports that most banks in his sample are scale efficient there-
fore, increasing bank size through mergers and acquisition does not substantially enhance tech-
nical efficiency of the merged banks. Limam provides evidence to suggest that the larger bank 
size, higher share of equity capital in assets and greater profitability are associated with better 
efficiency. 
 
  Most recently, Kamaruddin, Safa, and Mohd (2008) apply DEA technique to present new pers-
pectives on performance of Islamic banking operations in Malaysia during the period 1998-2004. 
They investigate for the first time both cost and profit efficiency of full-fledged Islamic banks 
and Islamic windows operations of domestics and foreign banks. They find that Islamic banking 
operators are relatively more efficient at controlling costs than at generating profits. This means, 
cost efficiency comes from resource management and economies of scale, respectively. 
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  Overall, there is lack of evidence regarding the efficiency performance of Islamic commercial 
banks operating in the European financial system. This chapter intends primarily to put that evi-
dence into practice using the non-parametric deterministic approach, DEA. 
 
4.4.    Methodology 
 
 
  Several approaches have been developed for measuring banks' level of efficiency 3, ranging 
from simple financial ratios to complex econometric models. Complex efficiency estimation 
techniques can be categorized into parametric and non-parametric methods (Berger and Humph-
rey, 1997). There is no consensus in the literature as to which approach is better as both ap-
proaches have advantages and disadvantages. They differ primarily with respect to the assump-
tions imposed on data. The parametric approaches require assumptions about the particular form 
of cost or profit function and the distribution of efficiency (Iqbal, and Molyneux, 2005). The 
non-parametric approaches, on the other hand, require no such specification of the functional 
form. The most commonly used approaches among non-parametric methods are the DEA and the 
Free Disposable Hull (FDH). While the most widely used parametric methods are the Stochastic 
Frontier Approach (SFA), the Thick Frontier Approach (TFA) and the Distribution Free Ap-
proach (DFA). In the next section we will consider the application of the efficiency measurement 
of the DEA approach. 
 
4.4.1.    Technical efficiency measurement using DEA-approach 
 
  DEA is a non-parametric approach that is considered as an alternative method to estimate pro-
ductive efficiency 4 in the financial sector. DEA approach shows how a particular bank operates 
relative to other banks in the same sample. It provides a benchmark for best practice technology 
based on the experience of those banks in the sample. The DEA estimates are based on technolo-
gical efficiency where efficient firms are those for which no other firm (or linear combination of 
firms) produces as much or more of output provided given inputs, or uses as little or less input to 
produce a given output. The efficient frontier is composed of these un-dominated firms and the 
piecewise linear segment that connect the set of input/output combinations of these firms yielding  
_________________________________________________________ 
3 The modern efficiency measurement begins with Farrell (1957). He proposed that the efficiency of a firm consists of two components: technical efficien-
cy (TE), which reflects the ability of a firm to obtain maximal output from a given set of inputs, and allocative efficiency, which reflects the ability of a 
firm to use inputs in optimal proportions given their respective prices. The two measures are then combined to provide a measure of total economic effi-
ciency (Coelli, 1996).  
 
4 The concept of production efficiency originated from Cobb and Douglas (1928). The study is premised on the structural relation between inputs and 
outputs in economic production. Berger and Humphrey (1997) extended the Cobb-Douglas model to the banking sector by focusing mainly on financial 
sector efficiency. 
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a convex production possibility set (Bauer, Berger, Ferrier, and Humphrey, 1998). 
 
  One of the DEA advantages particularly relevant to our study is that it works well with small 
samples requiring the smallest number of observations. Another advantage of the DEA is that it 
enables analysts to identify the sources of inefficiency not apparent from financial results. For 
instance, studies of benchmarking practices utilizing DEA identify numerous sources of ineffi-
ciency in some of the most profitable banks. This is because of the high-profit bank may be quite 
inefficient in processing transactions, which may not be apparent from financial measures 
(Cooper, Seiford, and Tone, 2007). 
 
   DEA method does not impose any assumption on the structural form of banks as it requires no 
pre-specified functional form. Rather, the functional form is generated from the sample of the 
evaluated firms; hence, it reduces the probability of an incorrect functional model (Berger and 
Humphrey, 1997). DEA can estimate technical efficiency 5 under the assumption of Constant-
Returns-to-Scale (CRS) and Variable-Returns-to-Scale (VRS). The CRS assumption is only ap-
propriate when all Decision Making Units (DMUs) are operating at optimal scale. However, fac-
tors like imperfect competition and constraints in finance may cause our sample banks not to op-
erate well at their optimal scale of operations.  
 
  On the basis of the prior arguments, this chapter compares Islamic banks to counterparties-
conventional banks using DEA approach. In order to account for the fact that the sizes of the 
banks in our sample vary greatly, ranging from large active banks to small banks, we estimate 
our DEA-model under the assumption of VRS approach (also known as BCC-model), as sug-
gested by Banker, Charnes, and Cooper (1984) and Cooper et al. (2007). 
 
 The DEA approach measures efficiency based on either an input-oriented model (i.e. in-
put/output) or an output- oriented model (i.e. output/input). In the former model, the DEA aims 
to identify technical inefficiency as a proportional reduction in input usage. Meanwhile, in the 
output-oriented model, technical inefficiency is measured as a proportional increase in output 
production. To date, the literature is uncertain as to the best choice between the two orientation 
models. The choice of orientation will not have a major impact on efficiency estimations since 
both approaches will construct the same frontier, and thus the same efficient DMUs (best perfor- 
____________________________ 
5 The term Overall (total) or also called "Technical Efficiency (TE)" is taken from the literature of economics where it is used to distinguish the "technolo-
gical" aspects of production from other aspects. TE = [Pure Technical Efficiency (PTE)] * [Scale Efficiency (SE)] (Cooper, Seiford, and Tone, 2006). 
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mers) would be identified. However, inefficient DMUs ranking would possibly change (Coelli, 
1996). In this research, we assume an output-oriented approach. Our preference for this measure 
is due to its reliability and a better fit to our situation. Islamic banks operating under competitive 
environment hence, strive to offer the best possible products for their clients. Therefore, they are 
more likely to strength their competitive advantage by increasing outputs production rather than 
reducing the input usage.  
  
4.4.2. Data and variables  
 
  Our methodology differs from literature research papers in various aspects. With respect to 
sample, unlike other studies, we employ 40 banks. The distribution of banks is illustrated in Ta-
ble 4.1 below.6 Moreover, we examine, for the first time, the relative efficiency of the first and 
the only fully-fledged Islamic commercial bank in the UK i.e. (the IBB), against counterparties-
conventional commercial banks in the UK, and also against Islamic banks from Turkey, GCC-
States and Malaysia. Furthermore, the study time span 2005-2008 helps to account for the impact 
of the recent financial crisis on the efficiency of the selected banks. 
 
           Table 4.1 
 Summary statistics of the study population and the selected sample 
* The number of tested banks is significantly reduced due to the exclusion of: I) the new banks (age ≤ 4 years), II) all banks other than the commercial 
banks, III) banks whose financial statements are incorporated with their parent banks, and IV) banks with limited published data 7 ** full list of banks 
being tested are shown in the appendix. 
 
__________________________ 
 
6
 Our sample is larger than 30 banks. This makes it acceptable, appropriate, and compatible with the previous researches. Basically, the advantage of a 
sample size equal to or larger than 30 is the applicability of the central limit theorem. However, the population size of our study is quite similar to other 
studies that employ the DEA technique, such as Darrat, Topuz, and Yousef (2002) and Kamaruddin, Safa, and Mohd (2008). 
 
 
7
 For instance, in Qatar: Alasfa Islamic bank and Masraf al Rayan are new banks. In KSA: Alinma bank is new. In Kuwait: Kuwait international 
bank is new; Jabeer Islamic bank is under foundation. In Bahrain: Alsalam bank Bahrain is new. In UAE: Emirates Global Islamic bank, Noor 
Islamic bank, Alhilal bank, and Ajman bank are new; Dubai bank converted to Islamic operations in 2007. In Malaysia: the excluded banks are 
all new e.g., Affin Islam bank berhat, Alliance Islamic bank Malaysia, Amislamic bank, hongleong Islamic bank, KFH-Malaysia, and standard 
chartered saadiaq. In Turkey: Bank Asia is private Finance house; turkiye Finans is new; Cyprus Islamic bank is an offshore bank. Oman has no 
Islamic banks during our study period (2005-08). According to the FAS as on 30 April, 2009 there are 158 banks incorporated in the UK. This 
number has been shrunk to 19 which is mainly due to the excluded of the: 1) Private Banks such as SG Hambros Bank. 2) Investment banks such 
as Dresdner Kleinwort. 3) Merchant banks like Gulf International Bank (UK). 4) Banks with special functions like Wesleyan Bank. 5) Develop-
ment banks such as Crown Agents Bank. 6) Wholesale banks like CIBC World Markets. 7) New banks such as Europe Arab Bank. 8) All banks 
whose annual report is consolidated with the parent banks such as: ICICI Bank UK Plc, FBN Bank (UK), Reliance Bank Ltd and Ruffler Bank. 
9), Islamic windows, such as Hsbc-Amanah. 
  
   Types of  banks    population        sample*                                                   country Bank Size 
 
  
 Small Large 
I.   Islamic bank 50   21  (GCC)-States, Turkey, Malaysia, and the UK**         12  9 
II. Conventional  bank  158   19   The UK         6  13 
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   Empirical studies generally use the banks’total assets as a proxy of their size. We classify Is-
lamic and conventional banks based on average total assets. Banks worth more than £1.5 bn of 
assets are categorized as large banks, meanwhile, banks worth less are categorized as small.8 We 
extract the panel data set from non-consolidated financial statements and employ the computer 
program (DEAP-version 2.1) which was written by Coelli (1996) to construct DEA-frontiers for 
the calculation of (TE) and (SE) within the selected period. 
 
  In the DEA model, if the number of DMUs is small, then an overestimation of efficiency esti-
mates may result (Alirezaei, Howland and Van de Panne, 1998). This is, however, not an issue in 
our sample because our sample size is large enough. We manage to include all possible banks 
and valuable input and output variables in the analysis. The number of inputs and outputs in the 
DEA model should also be addressed. A DEA model with a higher number of variables will have 
higher efficiency estimates, thus efficient banks on the frontier will be overestimated. If the 
number of DMUs (n) is less than the combined number of output and input (O+I); large portion 
of the DMUs will be identified as efficient. Hence, it is preferred that (n) exceeds (I+O) several 
times. In this chapter, we follow Cooper et al. (2007) and Darrat et al. (2002) who suggest that in 
order to have an appropriate number of inputs and outputs ( to minimize biased estimations) the 
product of inputs times outputs should optimally be less than the sample size (I*O≤ N). Based on 
that, the number of banks (DMUs) in each sample model of our analysis is larger than the prod-
uct of 3 inputs and 2 outputs.  
 
  Moreover, one of the most important assumptions to apply DEA is that the DMUs must be ho-
mogenous units; they should be performing the same tasks and should have similar objective. 
This is actually the case of our sample in which Islamic and conventional banks have the same 
individual final objective to earn profit even if there is differences in how to reach this goal.  
 
4.4.3. Selection of input and output variables  
 
  While the multi-product nature of the banking firms is recognized in the literature, there is still 
no agreement as to the definition and measurement of bank inputs and outputs. The banking liter- 
_____________________________ 
8
 There is no best description of the key characteristics of small and large banks. According to Federal Deposits Insurance Corporation (2008), 
the banks that had assets of less than $1.061 bn, as of December 31 of either of the prior two calendar years, are considered "small". In this chap-
ter, we define the banks which accounts for the top percentile of all banks’aggregate total assets in each banking industry and constitute 85% or 
so of the total, as “large banks” and those below this level as “small banks”. We decide to use £ 1.5 bn of assets as the best cut point for our sam-
ple banks. However, in order to classify banks more accurately, we have also adopted number of other factors. These factors are; the bank’s mar-
ket share (measured by total deposits) and the number of employees in each bank. 
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ature is divided concerning this issue. Researchers take one of two approaches labeled the inter-
mediation and the production approach. The production approach views banks as producers of 
loan and deposit services using the traditional factors of production i.e. capital and labor. In the 
intermediation approach, banks act as financial intermediary to collect deposits and purchased-
funds, and then transform these into loans and other assets. The intermediation approach is pre-
ferable to the production approach to model bank behavior. This is because it does not exclude 
interest expenses, which accounts for a significant level of bank’s total costs. In this chapter, we 
follow Yudistira (2004) who uses the DEA intermediation approach arguing that the basic prin-
ciple of Islamic financial system is the participation in enterprise, employing the funds based on 
the profit and loss sharing (PLS). This, inevitably implies the importance of Islamic bank’s in-
termediary activities. 
 
  Our DEA-model consists of three-inputs and two-output. More specifically, we use "total depo-
sits and short term funding", "total expenses" and "total staff cost or personal expenses” as in-
puts. Earning assets, "total loans" and "total revenues", represent the model outputs (Table 4.2). 
However, total expenses and total revenues are used as inputs and outputs, respectively, because 
interest plus non-interest expenses (total expenses), and interest plus non-interest income (total 
revenues) are considered as the key variables that influence wealth maximization. In our analy-
sis, we replace the interest in conventional banks with income distributed to the depositors in Is-
lamic banks to make the comparison between both types of banks accurate. Table 4.10 (appen-
dix) presents the summary statistics of inputs and outputs. 
 
Table 4.2 
The inputs-outputs used in the DEA models 9 
 
 
 
 
 
  The degree of correlation between inputs and outputs has a significant impact on the robustness 
of the DEA model. Hence, a correlation analysis is imperative to establish appropriate inputs and 
outputs (Chaparro, Jimenez, and Smith, 1999). The correlation between an input (output) variable 
_________________________ 
9
 Total deposits include: current, saving and investment deposits from customers, banks and other financial institutions. Total staff costs include: 
wages, salaries, allowances, bonuses, and other staff related costs. In the context of Islamic banking, on the one hand, total loans (the non inter-
est-bearing loans) include financing to customer's banks and other financial institutions that structured under: Murabaha, Ijarah rental, Mudaraba, 
Istisna, and Musharaka, etc. On the other hand, total revenues include income from investment of depositor’s, shareholder’s funds and others in 
the form of Murabaha, Bei Ajel, Musharaka, income from investment in Sukuk, income from Islamic financing assets and placement, manage-
ment and arrangement fees, income from international Murabaha, commission, fees and foreign exchange, property related income and return to 
unrestricted investment accounts, etc.  
 No.   Inputs Outputs 
1.   I 1 : Total Deposits and short term funding     O 1 : Total loans  
2.           I 2  : Total Expenses     O 2 : Total Revenues  
3.   I 3  : Total Staff Cost   
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with other output (input) variable needs to be strong (high) as the efficiency scores depend on the 
choice of input and output variables (Lønborg, 2005). If an input (output) variable has low corre-
lation with all the output (input) variables, it may indicate that this variable does not fit the mod-
el (Yang, 2009). Results of correlation analysis for each pair of variables are presented in Table 
4.11 in the appendix. As it can be seen, the correlation coefficients between input and output va-
riables and within input variables are high. This means that the bank performance is highly ex-
plained by the predictors variables, which is true in the context of Islamic banking, hence, this is 
a reasonable validation of our DEA models. For instance, the higher comparative performance of 
Islamic banks deposits requires higher interest expenses, which account for a large portion of 
total expenses.  
 
4.4.4. The  DEA model 
 
 To illustrate the applications of DEA, assume we have a set of DMUs where each DMU trans-
forms (n) inputs to (m) outputs. The efficient DMUs will have the highest ratio of the weighted 
sum of outputs to the weighted sum of inputs. For each DMU, efficiency (es) is calculated as fol-
lows (Yudistira, 2004): 
  
 
 e = 	 uy/ 	 vx , for i = 1, … , m and j = 1, … , n,




 
  
 For a particular DMU,  is is the quantity of the ith output produced whereas xjs is the quantity of 
the jth input. !i is the output weight while "j is the input weight. es is then maximized under the 
condition that the ratios for all DMUs are " ≤ 1" as follows: 
 
 	 uy#/ 	 vx# ≤ 1, for r = 1, … , N and u and v ≥ 0,




 
 
 Where Eq.1 ensures that the efficiency ratios are at most one and Eq.2 guarantees that inputs 
and outputs have positive weights. However, there is a problem with the above formulation due 
to the unlimited number of solutions it may produce because of its fractional function. Following 
Charnes, Cooper, and Rhodes (1978), the fractional linear program can be transformed into an 
ordinary linear program: 
 
(1)  
(2)   
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minimize () = 	 uy


 
 
subject to 
 
	 uy − 	 vx# ≤ 0, r = 1, … , N;




 
    
	 vx = 1 and u and v ≥  0


 
Furthermore, the above program can be transformed into the dual problem as follows: 
minimize  ,) 
subject to 
 
	 φ#y#  ≥ y, 
.
#
i = 1, … , m; 
ξ x − 	 φ#y#  ≥ 0, j 
.
#
= 1, … , n; φ# ≥ 0, and 0 ≤ ξ ≤ 1. 
 
  Where (,)) is the overall technical efficiency (TE) scores of the sth DMUs. The unity value of 1 
indicates the DMU is on the frontier "OC" as shown in Fig. 4.1.  Thus, it is considered to be effi-
cient. The DMU that is located to the right of frontier is considered as inefficient which is shown 
as point "S" in Fig. 4.1. The (,)) for "S" is then computed by the ratio of (AQ/AS). This yields 
that the DMU must reduce (1 - ,)) of the input in order to arrive to an efficient DMU at point Q. 
If the linear programming equations (3) and (4) are solved by adding the restriction of φrs =1, 
then there are two further efficiency measurements: the variable return to scale (VRS) which can 
be shown in Fig. 4.1 as VV‘; and the pure technical efficiency (PTE) which is given by "ρs = 
AR/AS".10  This means that the SE, which is defined as the extent to which a DMU can take ad-
vantage of return to scale by altering its size to achieve the optimal scale, is calculated by σs = 
,)/ρs. The fraction of output lost due to scale inefficiency can be measured as (1 - σs) (Yudistira, 
2004). 
 
  SE equals 1 if and only if the technology exhibits CRS (point "B" in Fig.4.1). Scale inefficiency 
may exist due to either increasing (IRS) or decreasing (DRS) return to scale. To obtain these two 
_____________________ 
10
 In order to be economically efficient, a bank must first be TE. TE represents the capacity and willingness of an economic unit to produce the 
maximum attainable output from a given set of inputs and technology. TE is critical to measuring the bank performance, determining the degree 
of innovative technology adoption and the overall production efficiency. Profit maximization requires a bank to produce the maximum output 
given the level of inputs employed (i.e. be technically efficient), use the right mix of inputs in light of the relative price of each input (i.e. be input 
allocative efficient), and produce the right mix of outputs given the set of prices (i.e. be output allocative efficient). 
(4)  
(3)  
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Fig. 4.1. Efficiency measurements using one output and one input 
Source: Yudistira, 2004 
 
possible results, the solution of linear programming problems 3 and 4 must be restricted within 
the sum of the φr from 1 to N is ≤ 1 in which the pictorial solution can be shown as "OBV" in 
Fig. 1. The efficiency measure from this technology for the DMU at point S is θs = AQ/AS which 
also equals ξs. Thus, DRS can be found when σs = θs and IRS when σs ≠ θs. Above all, efficien-
cy appears when σs = θs = ,) = 1 (Yudistira, 2004). 
 
  A DMU is considered efficient if it has a score of 100% and all slacks are zeros in relation to 
others. If efficiency score is 100% (at the optimal solution) and some of the slack variables are 
non-zeros, then there exists a combination of other units which does not dominate the current 
output vector of the reference DMU but rather it uses less resources. These DMUs may be 
termed as weakly efficient (Berger and Humphrey, 1997). In DEA, "slack" can be defined as 
overuse of input or under production of output that exists even there is a proportional change in the 
inputs or the outputs. It represents the improvements needed to convert an inefficient unit to an 
efficient unit. These improvements are in the form of an increase/decrease in inputs or outputs. 
Slack might be considered as the amount of inefficiency exhibited by non-efficient DMUs and 
possibly a consequence of poor performance of inputs, outputs or both. If inputs are being used 
ineffectively, then we have input slack, and conversely we will have output slack. 
 
 As indicated by Coelli, (1996), there are three choices regarding the treatment of slacks: i) One-
stage DEA, to calculate slacks residually, ignoring the need for a second optimization step. ii) 
Two-stage DEA, to move to an efficient frontier by maximizing the sum of slacks required to 
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move from the first-stage projected point to another, and iii) Multi-stage DEA, to conduct a se-
quence of radial linear programs to identify the efficient projected point. In this chapter, we utilize 
the multi-stage DEA as it is computationally more rigorous and demanding. "The benefits of 
multi-stage DEA is that it identifies efficient projected points which have input and output mixes 
that are as similar as possible to those of the inefficient points, and also it is invariant to units of 
measurement" (Coelli, 1996). 
 
  We applied the DEA approach to further examine the input and output "targets" for a bank. 
These targets are the results of respective slack values added on to original outputs, and sub-
tracted from original inputs. Moreover, target for outputs are calculated by multiplying optimal 
efficiency scores by the outputs and then adding the slack values to that value. However, it 
should be noted that some of the efficiency improvement options and the target values may not 
be applicable and cannot be implemented.  
 
4.4.5. Adjustment to the environmental influences: A two-stage DEA-based estimation  
 
  Our sample data considered in this analysis has been adjusted for the differences among sample 
countries by converting into the UK (£) currency using end of year market rates obtained from 
respective central banks. All variables in all models have been also deflated by the Consumer 
Price Index (CPI) of each country in order to account for macro-economic differences across 
countries during the sample period. Furthermore, to test the statistical association of the efficien-
cy estimates with variables that are not inputs and outputs, and to determine their influence on 
the bias-corrected efficiency scores, we perform the second- stage of DEA method as suggested 
by Coelli, Prasada, O'Donnell, and Battese (2005). After solving for DEA in the first-stage, the 
efficiency scores are then regressed upon the environmental variables which could potentially 
influence the efficiency of a bank.  
 
  In DEA, the dependent variable has an upper limit of 100%, and therefore it is a censored vari-
able. If such censoring was the only concern then Tobit regression11 could have been used. But, 
we have to deal with biases caused by inefficiency; therefore, Tobit regression is not valid 
(Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000). McDonald (2009) advocates using (OLS) in the DEA second-
stage because it is considered as a consistent estimator. The following (OLS)-regression model is 
examined in this work: 12 
_________________________ 
11
 The standard Tobit model assumes that the dependent variable is censored with a limiting value 0 and values ranging between 0 and 1. 
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  Where the subscript "j" refers to a bank and the subscript "t" refers to a sample year. The de-
pendent variable "es" represents the bank’s pure technical efficiency (DEAPTE). Detailed descrip-
tion on the independent variables is illustrated in Table 4.12 (appendix). 
 
4.5. Empirical results 
 
  This section describes first the DEA results with respect to the efficiency of Islamic banking 
sector, followed by the results of the second-stage DEA based analysis. It further considers the 
results from the bank’s financial ratio analysis, the correlation analysis of the DEA efficiency 
scores with financial performance and, eventually, the analysis of the efficiency–profitability 
matrix.  
 
4.5.1.   Efficiency of Islamic banking sector  
 
  Table 4.5 illustrates the DEA-efficiency scores of IBB relative to small Islamic banks from 
Muslim countries (SIBs) listed in model-M1. The results appear in the table indicates that the 
IBB has efficiency scores of less than 1 (DEAPTE<1) in each sample year. Hence, it is identified 
as technically inefficient. The bank’s mean PTE, based on all sample years, is only 35.2% (cal-
culated as: (91.9%+30.6%+38.1%+40.1%)/4). Thus, it carries out operations, on average, at a 
significant distance from the efficiency frontier (DEAEF), (Fig. 4.2- appendix).  
 
  The bank’s inefficiency primarily comes from the revenue side, (output slacks (Revenues) > input 
slacks (Costs)). That is, the bank has non-zero slacks in generating revenues but it has very limited 
____________________________ 
12 Under certain assumptions, OLS gives the best result. It is considred as the Best Linear Unbiazed Estimator "BLUE". OLS is quite sensitive to the 
presence of outliers and hence we use "Casewise Diagnostics" in SPSS to test for this issue. As a rule of thumb, outliers are points whose stan-
dardized residual is greater than 3.3 (corresponding to the .001 alpha level). Based on our analysis, results confirmed the absence of outliers in 
our sample.  
 
13
 In this chapter, the efficiency of Islamic banks is analyzed based on binary comparisons. Two regression models (E1 and E2) were basically 
measured. The first model (E1: model-M1 and model-M2) measures the relative efficiency of IBB against small and large Islamic banks from 
Muslim countries (SIBs and LIBs respectively). The second model (E2: model-M3 and model-M4) investigates the relative efficiency perfor-
mance of the IBB against small and large conventional banks in the UK (SCBs and LCBs), respectively. Empirically, in E2, the dum-
my "β12Islam.jt" is added and the variable "β10GDP.jt" is replaced by "β10Diver.jt". The endogenous "DEAPTE" is the pure technical efficiency (PTE) of the 
ith bank in period t, while, "ε", is the error term. The description of the exogenous variables and the "OLS" main statistical issues are shown in 
Table 4.12 and 4.13 in the appendix. 
  E.113: ( es  )    =     α + β BP.; +β< Per.;+β= Liq.;+ β4 Log(A)jt 
      +βC LTA.; +βE Depo.;+βG Ind.;+ βI Age; 
      +β9 Lev.jt +βK GDP;  +β Geo.;+ε 
(5)  
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non-zero slacks in the usage of recourses (excess costs) (Table 4.5.1- model-M1). Consequently, 
IBB is better in utilizing resources and controlling costs than generating optimal outputs. These 
results demonstrate that the IBB has definitely substantial room for improvements in the effi-
ciency by reducing costs further and increasing revenues to sustain competitive edge in the Eu-
ropean banking industry.  
 
   We summarize the findings further by examining the "efficient output-input targets" for IBB. 
In order to catch up with (lies closer to) the frontier over time in model-M1, IBB is required to 
increase its output (total revenues) by £8.604, £9.272, £9.768 and £12.362 bn during 2005 
through 2008, respectively. The bank cannot achieve the efficient target levels by augmenting 
revenues only. The other output (total loans) cannot also be increased because it has zero-slacks. 
Consequently, IBB should then have reduced its total costs by £1.276 and £1.271 bn in 2006 and 
2007 respectively, (Table 4.5.1).  
 
  The results seem to imply that the IBB is not only technically inefficient but also inefficient in 
exploiting the economies of scale given its scale of operations. The inappropriate size (scale) of a 
bank’s operation level (DEASE) 14 (too large or too small) can lead to overall (total) inefficiency. 
In 2005, IBB exhibits an increasing return to scale (DEAIRS), and thus, operates at a scale that is 
too small. The bank could improve efficiency by scaling up its activities by 3.7% (calculated as 
1- 96.3%) reaching the score of unity in 2005. In the following three years (2006, 2007, and 
2008), the bank has decreasing return to scale (DEADRS) with DEASE scores of 93.1%, 96.8%, 
and 99% respectively. This reveals that the bank is operating at scale that is overly large and thus 
should shrink the output endowments and activities.  
 
  By and large, the overall (technical) inefficiency of IBB appears to be mostly due to pure tech-
nical inefficiency (DEAPTE). This is due to the low pure technical efficiency in comparison to 
scale efficiency (DEAPTE < (DEA SE). For instance, the DEASE,2005= 96.3% > 31.9%, and the 
DEASE, 2006= 93.1% > 30.6%, etc. Since the DEAPTE captures the management practices while the 
DEASE indicates whether the bank operates at optimal economies of scale, the above results sug-
gest that inefficiencies are mostly due to inefficient management practices rather than the size of 
the bank’s operation. 
   
___________________________ 
14 scale efficiency (SE) = TE CRS/ TE VRS. (SE) can be interpreted as follows: (i) If SE = 1, then a bank is scale efficient and thus, its combination of inputs 
and outputs is efficient both under CRS and VRS. (ii) If (SE <1) or (SE > 1), then the combination is not scale efficient. 
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  In comparison with small conventional banks (SCBs) in model-M3, the results reveal that IBB 
fails again to appear on the efficiency frontier over the years 2006, 2007, and 2008. IBB is also 
inefficient compared to the peer conventional banks except Turkish bank (UK) Limited (Fig. 4.4-
appendix). The bank’s inefficiency results from the cost (input) side as input slacks is greater 
than output slacks. The bank could decrease its total expenses and staff cost only by, £ 2.71 and 
£ 0.986 bn in 2005, £ 2.211 and £ 1.861 bn in 2006, £ 1.259 and £ 1.443 bn in 2007, respective-
ly, (Table 4.7.1). Based on the results shown in Table 4.7, IBB has a high DEADRS through years 
2006-2008 with DEASE equal 91.6%, 90.8%, and 92.2%, respectively. These results show that 
the bank is scale inefficient. Banks pure technical inefficiency again dominates scale inefficien-
cy. This implies that the main source of banks’ inefficiency is the managerial inadequacy rather 
than non- optimal size of operations.
 
 
 
  In model-M2 and model-M4 we compare the efficiency of the IBB against large Islamic banks 
from Muslim-majority countries and also against the large counterparties-conventional banks in 
the UK (LIBs and LCBs), respectively. IBB is recognized as inefficient in both models. It has 
efficiency scores of less than one each year. By and large, IBB is inefficient compared to peer 
banks. The bank however, has relatively better efficiency performance compared with LIBs but 
it reports worse performance compared with LCBs. Results show that, while the bank has an in-
creasing trend in efficiency scores compared with large Islamic banks, it has unstable efficiency 
performance in comparison with large conventional banks. Bank’s inefficiency primarily results 
from the revenue side in model-M2 but in model-M4 it comes from the cost side. IBB has low 
scale efficiency in both model-M2 and model-M4. PTE scores are consistently higher than the 
scale efficiency scores. This indicates that the bank is scale inefficient (operating at non-optimal 
level of operations) and it could improve its efficiency by increasing outputs substantially 
(Tables 4.6.1 and 4.8.1).  
 
  Considering all results from model-M1 through model-M4, it should be noted that the best effi-
ciency performance of IBB appears first in model-M3 followed directly by model-M2, model-
M4, and model-M1 respectively, (Fig. 4.2 through 4.5-the appendix). In model-M3, the bank is 
only 8.6% (calculated as: 1- (average DEAPTE (2005-2008)) = (1+90.1%+89.8%+85.6%) /4 = 0.914) 
far away from the DEAEF, value of 1. In model-M2, IBB is 19.3% away from the frontier (1-
0.807 = 19.3%). This amount is much less than the amount the bank requires to become efficient 
compared with the (LCBs) in model-M4 (1- 0.618 = 38.2%) and with the (SCBs) in model-M1 
(1- 0.352 = 64.8%).  
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  The information on efficiency results from Islamic banks grouped by regional area and bank 
size provides significant insight into the analysis. It displays that the small Islamic and conven-
tional banks are more efficient than large banks. For instance, (SIBs) from (GCC)-States have 
relatively a higher average mean efficiency score of 90.2% (calculated as: (M(NOPQ =
1R (NS(2005−2008)/P/(R): for a particular bank, (NS is the efficiency scores over the sample pe-
riod, (n) is the number of years, while (N) represents the number of banks), as compared to the 
(LIBs = 81.3%) from the same region. Similarly, (SIBs) from the Malaysian banking industry 
records relatively high average efficiency score of 83.5% compared to a low mean efficiency 
scores of 55.4% attained by (LIBs ). Likewise, (SCBs) from the UK tend to have higher mean 
efficiency scores of 96.7% compared to 81% achieved by (LCBs). This clearly suggests that the 
"bigger is not necessarily better ". That is to say, the larger the bank, the less efficient it is and 
the more it can be affected by the financial instability. 
 
  The results from the 4-DEA models show that the small Islamic banks in Muslim countries and 
the IBB in the UK have initially a declining trend in average DEAPTE over 2005-2007. In spite of 
the adverse market conditions in 2008, small Islamic banks show a sudden increase in efficiency 
performance with a higher rate compared with small and large conventional banks and large Is-
lamic banks (Fig. 4.6). IBB has a small asset-size. It is newly-established bank. It has also a set 
of religious financial constraints. This plays an important role in preventing the bank, as well as 
all other small Islamic banks, from being severely affected by the global economic crisis and 
consequently, producing a positive efficiency trend. 
  
4.5.2. Determinants of bank’s efficiency: The (OLS) - regression analysis 
 
   The second-stage DEA based analysis reveals a different set of results. Similar to Darrat et al. 
(2002) and Miller and Noulas (1996), who report a positive relationship between efficiency and 
bank’s size, our findings also suggest that the size variable is positively related to banks DEAPTE, 
statistically significant at 1% level in model-M2, model-M3, and model-M4, (Table 4.9). Con-
trary to results from the first stage DEA illustrated in section 4.1 (i.e. the largest scale inefficien-
cies come from large size banks), the outcomes of DEA in this stage suggest that large banks are 
relatively more efficient compared to small banks, apparently due to economies of scale effect. A 
bank indeed sustains a competitive advantage when economies of scale effects are present 15, 16 
_________________________________________________ 
15
 "Under ideal conditions, regression and DEA techniques should produce similar results. This is not the case in practice since application of these two techniques on 
the same data set often produces strikingly different results"(Cubbins and Tzanikadis, 1998). 
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  Our results also reveal a significant negative relationship between the large banks pure technic-
al efficiency and leverage in model-M2 and model-M4 at 5% and 0.1% level respectively. 17 Such 
result suggests that the higher performing large banks should acquire less debt. This is because, a 
higher leverage is related to higher agency costs because of the diverging interests between 
shareholders and debt holders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). This moral hazard problem implies 
a higher risk-taking tendency which could result in greater borrowing costs (Casu and Molyneux, 
2003) and low efficiency. Large banks, however, would be subject to systemic risk and possible 
crises if they were highly leveraged. A small drop in the asset value of a highly leveraged bank 
leads to distress and possible insolvency particularly in adverse market conditions. 
 
   Findings, on the other hand, show that the coefficient of the leverage variable is positive and 
significant at 10% level in model-M3. This suggests that the small banks with high levels of le-
verage should be more efficient. This is because leverage, to a reasonable extent, could allow 
small-sized bank to make lots of safer loans and therefore plenty of investment returns than larg-
er banks can do. In contrast to results for large banks, leverage could reduce agency costs for 
small banks and thus have positive effects on efficiency. Leverage may also increase the pressure 
on banks managers to perform better, because it reduces the moral hazard behavior (Jensen, 
1986).  
 
  Our regression results also show that the accounting measurements (ROA and ROE) have sig-
nificant positive effects on banks efficiency almost in all models, (Table 4.9).18 This indicates 
that more profitable banks are also more efficient. It is common that banks having higher profita-
bility are usually preferred by clients. Therefore, they attract the largest share of deposits and the 
best potential creditworthy borrowers as well. This creates favorable conditions for the profitable 
banks to be more efficient. 
 
  The findings obtained from DEA-first stage suggest that the overall IBB performs relatively 
better than some of small and large Islamic banks in Muslim-majority countries, apparently due 
to its shortened learning curve. Second-stage regression analysis results, in contrast, show that the 
____________________________ 
16
 There are two main theories about the relationship between bank characteristics and efficiency. The shakeout theory proposes that smaller banks may not be able to 
obtain management ability and enough capital to successfully operate thus, suggesting a positive relationship between size and performance. Alternatively, "the di-
visibility theory which holds that there will be no such operational advantage accruing to large banks, if the technology is divisible, that is, small-scale banks can 
produce financial services at costs per unit output comparable to those of large banks, suggesting no or possibly negative association between size and performance" 
(Sufian, 2007). 
 
17
 The predictor "Size" is significant in model-M3 (but not model-M1). Although SCBs, IBB, and SIBS have assets of less than £1.5 bn, an examination of banks 
financial statements reveal that SCBs and SIBs are still larger than IBB. So, apparently they enjoy relative scale economies over IBB.  
 
18 Due to the high correlation between ROA and ROE (model-M1, r= 0.795. model-M2, r=0.933, model-M3, r=0.913, model-M4, r=0.821), the later measure was 
dropped from the analysis. 
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relationship between the dummy variable region, (1= if the bank is located in Europe, IBB for 
example), and a bank’s DEAPTE is significantly negative in model-M1 and model-M2 at 10% 
and 0.1% level, respectively. This implies that geographical location is a differentiating factor, 
while assessing the efficiency of banks, which might in part, be due to the unique regulations in 
the country where the bank operates. Such results demonstrate that small Islamic banks in Eu-
rope (IBB in our case) are less efficient than Islamic banks (either small or large) operating in the 
Middle East (GCC-States), Southeastern Asia (Malaysia) and Eurasia (Turkey). This indicates, 
however, that the Islamic banks outside Muslim-majority countries experienced more difficul-
ties, particularly during the global economic crisis, to reach the optimal levels of efficiency 
which could be due to strict conventional regulations. 
 
  The proxy of market share (the total deposits) reveals a statistically significant negative rela-
tionship with the DEAPTE in model-M2, model-M3, and model-M4 at 1%, 0.1% and 5% levels, 
respectively. This suggests that lower market share is associated with the banks which enjoy a 
higher degree of efficiency thus diminishing the market leadership argument.  Such a result im-
plies that banks with small market share can be equally efficient or even more compared to mar-
ket dominant banks. It appears that maintaining or expanding markets share might involve addi-
tional costs and resources that might reduce efficiency. 
 
  Based on our analysis, results indicate that the dummy variable (ISLAM) is negatively statisti-
cally significant predictor of banks’ performance
 
at 1% level in Model-M3 (IBB is the only Is-
lamic bank in this model). The coefficient of this predictor shows a significant smaller DEAPTE 
scores for IBB compared to other banks. Such a result offer evidence that the small conventional 
banks in the UK perform considerably different and relatively better than IBB in terms of effi-
ciency performance. 
 
  We observed that the dependency factor has an insignificant relationship with DEAPTE in the 
context of Islamic banking. Nevertheless, results from the conventional banking industry, in 
model-M3 and model-M4, show a significant inverse relationship between the two variables at 
10% and 5% level, respectively. These findings illustrate that subsidiaries, or conventional banks 
acting as a part of a banking group, have lower efficiency scores compared to the stand alone 
banks.19 
_______________________________________ 
19
 By testing both model-M1 and model-M2 together (i.e. regardless of the size differences) the dependency measure reveals a significant positive relationship with 
the efficiency scores at 5% level. Such result indicates that the Islamic subsidiaries perform better than stand-alone banks. This might be due to the small size of 
subsidiaries since the Islamic product schemes become more complex as the size of Islamic banks increase which negatively affect the bank’s efficiency. 
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  To control the bank-specific lending intensity, we use total loans divided by total assets as a 
proxy. Bank loans are expected to be the main source of revenue thus, are expected to impact 
efficiency positively. In our analysis, the proxy of bank’s loan intensity reveals an insignificant 
positive relationship with all DEAPTE in both, model-M1 and model-M3. Those findings imply 
that small banks with higher loans intensity might have either higher or lower efficiency. In con-
trast, we find a significant positive coefficient in model-M2 and model-M4 at 10% level.20 The 
results indicate that, loans of a large bank seem to be more highly valued than alternative bank 
outputs, i.e. investments and /or securities. This might support the idea that the banks market ca-
pability to offer more competitive loan portfolios might be a resulted from their efficient opera-
tions. This is due to their ability to perform more productively with lower costs (Sufian and 
Zulkhibri, 2007).  
 
  To capture the possible effects of the liquidity and the absence of the international inter-bank 
money markets for Islamic banks on their efficiency, the liquid assets to total deposits and short 
term funding ratio is used as a proxy. We expect that banks with a higher amount of net liquid 
assets will be less efficient. Banks seek to balance the benefits of high levels of liquidity with the 
costs of high liquidity. Such balancing may adversely affect the investment returns. Our empiri-
cal analysis reveals an insignificant relationship between banks liquidity and their performance 
in model-M1, model-M3, and model-M4. Surprisingly, the predictor variable (liquidity) in mod-
el-M2 reveals a negative significant relationship with DEAPTE at 1% level. This indicates that 
large Islamic banks that accumulate a significant amount of liquid resources might operate under 
worst efficiency conditions. This also suggests that the excess liquidity, due to the Islamic law 
restrictions, has to be invested to achieve efficiency gains. However, too little liquidity might 
force the bank to borrow at penal rates from the interbank market and/or central bank. However, 
this is not viable for Islamic banks due to the absence of international inter-bank money market. 
 
  With respect to the relationship between the bank’s age and its DEAPTE, we find an insignificant 
negative association between the two variables in all models. Theoretically speaking, this could 
be due to the fact that older banks are not flexible to make the rapid adjustments to changing cir-
cumstances as opposed to new banks that have a short learning curve, and are considered more 
innovative and entrepreneurial (Kapelko, Prior-Jimènez, Rialp-Criado, 2008). However, one 
stream of research suggests that new banks suffer from liability of newness, not only because of 
______________________ 
20 
"α" is the significance level that the researchers decide to accept. The choice of it is somewhat arbitrary, although in practice values of 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 are com-
mon and generally considered "acceptable". However, at a given level of alpha, the smaller the p- value, the higher the probability of rejecting the null hypothesis. 
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the risk of their loans, but also because depositors and established banks will demand premium if 
they are to invest in these young banks (Gorton and Winton, 1998). 
 
  Our results demonstrate an insignificant relationship between the product diversity and banks 
DEAPTE.21 Similarly, results also failed to produce a conclusive and casual correlation between 
increased investment in skills and increased efficiency. Efficiency of human resource manage-
ment has shown a statistically insignificant relationship with DEAPTE.22 In theory, personal ex-
penses are estimated to impact performance negatively because efficient banks are expected to 
operate at lower cost. Despite of that, the usage of new electronic technology has made the wage 
expenses to fall, therefore, the lower cost ratio may impact performance positively. 
 
   Eventually, Findings failed to find any evidence of an association between the growth rate of 
GDP and the banks DEAPTE. Our results do not support the idea that the favorable economic 
conditions seem to stimulate higher efficiency due to supposedly positive effect on the demand 
and supply for banking services. 
 
4.5.3. An overview on the bank’s "Financial Ratios Based Analysis" -(FRA)  
 
  We extend the study further by examining the determinants (the exogenous variables) of a 
bank’s efficiency. Results reveal that, the small Islamic banks from Muslim-majority countries 
and IBB from the UK demonstrate stronger capital adequacy ratios compared to large conven-
tional banks. Small conventional banks are better run compared to all other banks in the sample 
(Table 4.14-appendix). It is significantly more complex for Islamic banks to adjust their credit 
risk monitoring system as they become bigger. Large Islamic banks tend to engage more in profit 
and loss sharing (PLS) arrangements compared to small ones thus, monitoring (PLS) schemes 
becomes more diverse and difficult to standardize which results in adverse selection and moral 
hazard (Čihák, and Hesse, 2008). However, large Islamic banks from Muslim countries are finan-  
__________________________ 
21 We find a negative insignificant relationship between the predictor "diversification" and the DEAPTE in model-M4. The diversification predictor has been dropped 
from model-M3 to allow for better results and to meet the regression main assumptions. This leaves the question of whether Islamic banking diversification lead to 
efficiency or not. However, the universal set of investment to Islamic banks is limited due to Shari’ah restrictions, thus they enjoy a lower diversification benefit than 
their conventional counterparts. Nevertheless, Islamic banks have recently facing regulations that create incentives to diversify their portfolios. For example, each 
source of financing that a bank earn raise implies a different degree and type of market discipline. Equity-holders care about returns to their equity and might prefer 
riskier portfolio than would debt-holder, etc. This, however indicates that diversification per service has no guarantee for better efficiency. To verify the proposition of 
less diversified Islamic banks, we test the differences in the structure of the bank’s income. Following Laeven and Levine (2007), we calculate the measure of income 
diversity as "income diversity=1-(net interest income-other operating income / total operating income)". This variable captures the degree to which banks diversify 
from traditional lending activities to other activities. For Islamic banks, the net interest income is generally defined as the sum of the positive and negative income 
flows associated with the PLS arrangements. Consequently, the result of our simple calculations of diversification implies that conventional banks in general are much 
diversified than Islamic banks. For example but not limited, the average value of diversity measure during the period 2005-2006 for IBB is 10% whereas it is much 
higher for Bank of Beirut (UK) with about 43%.  
 
22
 The predictor "personal expenses" shows an insignificant relationship with efficiency in all models. Strikingly, when we measure the effect of skills 
utilization on efficiency for all Islamic banks (small & large) which are operating in Muslim countries, analysis reveals a significant positive relationship 
with the efficiency scores ( t=2.868, p<0.01). This indicates that there is a casual correlation between increased investment in labor and banks efficiency. 
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cially outperforming small Islamic banks from (GCC)-States and Malaysia. This could be par-
tially due to the better diversification and/or economies of scale. 
 
  Financial results further illustrate that there is a slight difference in profitability, liquidity and 
leverage between the IBB and other banks in the sample. IBB is relatively superior in terms of 
lending intensity and capital adequacy, which enables the bank to offer more reasonable terms on 
loans, attain higher profitability, and ultimately gain a larger market shares over the inefficient 
banks. Empirical evidence from (ROE) tends to show that IBB has certainly an increasing trend 
in profitability in contrast to some of its conventional peers in same size, thanks to profit and loss 
sharing, making its profitability less volatile. "The main reason for such a difference is that Is-
lamic banks benefit from a market imperfection, i.e. the availability of large amounts of non-
remunerated deposits in their books, which considerably decrease the cost of funding" (Has-
soune, 2001).  
 
4.5.4. Correlation of DEA efficiency scores with financial performance 
   
          
  To examine the relationship between efficiency and profitability, we estimate the correlation 
coefficient between the two variables. We are interested in investigating whether the DEA re-
sults are consistent with the traditional accounting measures commonly used for comparing per-
formance of Islamic banks. We first use ROA and ROE as measures of bank’s profits. We then 
calculate the "Spearman's rho" correlations, between the estimated DEA efficiency scores and 
the bank's profitability ratios, because it is an efficient estimator regardless of the distributions of 
variables. It also minimizes the effect of outliers on correlation coefficients. The null hypothesis 
states that the correlation coeﬃcient between variables is zero. 
 
  It is clear from Table 4.3 below that the correlation coeﬃcients of accounting measures are sta-
tistically and significantly diﬀerent from zero in model-M1 and model-M2 (IBB, and small and 
large Islamic banks from Muslim-majority countries, respectively). This suggests that the effi-
ciency measures are strongly associated with traditional accounting measures of performance in 
relation to the Islamic banking industry, and thus can easily be used by Islamic banks as a substi-
tute of conventional accounting measures of performance. Such findings support Isik and Has-
san, (2002) and Miller and Noulas (1996) who find that the most profitable banks are also the 
most eﬃcient. 
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Table 4.3 
 
The correlation coefficients between DEA PTE scores and accounting measures 
*: Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed), **: Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
  In contrast, the accounting measures are found to be relatively statistically insignificant in mod-
el-M3 and model-M4 (small and large conventional banks in the UK, respectively). This indi-
cates that the information contained in the standard accounting measures are not closely corres-
ponded to that contained in eﬃciency measures in the UK conventional banking system. The 
main argument is that environmental factors could affect the attainment of profitability. 
 
4.5.5. The efficiency – profitability matrix 
  
  In this analysis, we primarily focus on evaluating the performance of small Islamic and conven-
tional banks based on an efficiency-profitability matrix (Table 4.4). The median value is used 
to split the matrix into two halves to create high and low groups of profitability (Luo, 2003), as 
measured by ROA, and efficiency scores as measured by DEA. We further split the matrix into 
four quadrants: stars, question marks, sleepers, and dogs. 
  
Table 4.4 
 The efficiency – profitability matrix 
* "N" represents the number of banks being tested in this matrix in each model (i.e. NM1= 12, NM3= 7) **including IBB *** IBB per se. 
  
  The star quadrant consists of DMUs which exhibit a high level of profitability and efficiency 
and thus, considered as the flagship banks. The banks falling in sleeper category have high prof-
itability but low efficiency which is not a good sign from long-term perspective. These sleeper 
banks are profitable due to primarily more favorable environmental conditions than good man-
agement. The question marks category has low profitability and low efficiency. They have a po-
tential for greater efficiency and possibly greater profits. The dogs have a low profitability but 
high efficiency hence, they are efficient, but are still not profitable. They are efficiently operated 
units but low on profitability due to an unfavorable environment.  
ROE                                       ROA  The model  Correlation matrix  
  0.346*                                          0.366* M1  
    0.546**                                         0.609** M2  DEAPTE (VRS)  
0.215                                         0.154 M3  
0.050                                          0.317* M4  
Profitability (ROA): 
High Sleeper                 M1 :( N*=3 or 25%). M3 :( N=3 or 43%) Star        M1 :( N=3 or 25%).  M3 :( N=2 or 29%) 
Low Question Mark        M1 :( N=4 or 33%) **. M3: (N=1 or 14%) *** Dogs     M1 :( N=2 or 17%).  M3 :( N=1 or 14%) 
DEAPTE   Low High 
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  Our analysis suggests that the IBB falls in the question marks quadrant. This indicates that the 
bank has a low profitability and efficiency. Consequently, the market presence of IBB is week, 
the market growth is low and thus, is considered as under-performing but has the potential to 
maintain the business and to increase its operating efficiency by delivering enough cash. By and 
large, IBB is probably under-resourced and lacks appropriate skills. Thus, with a favorable envi-
ronment and additional resources, it can be expected to enhance its efficiency and profitability 
performance. By increasing efficiency, the bank can possibly move to the “star” quadrant.  
 
4.6. Conclusions 
 
  Results based on the extensive analysis in this chapter show that the IBB is technically ineffi-
cient. It has, on average, a poor and under-performing financial performance. IBB is also ineffi-
cient in exploiting the economies of scale given its scale of operations. It appears that the IBB 
inefficiency is driven, to a large extent, by inadequate management compared with small Islamic 
banks in Muslim-majority countries and small conventional banks from the UK. In comparison 
with large banks, either Islamic or conventional, the IBB relative inefficiency becomes largely 
due to the non-optimal size. 
 
  IBB, however, exhibits, in comparison to other Islamic banks, an increasing trend in efficiency 
performance over sample years due to small size and newness. IBB, as well as all small Islamic 
banks, tend also to have better financial performance than large Islamic banks mainly due to cre-
dit risk monitoring arrangements. Large conventional banks, on average, have an upward trend 
of estimated efficiency, generally with declining increments. Despite the prevailing market con-
ditions being adverse, small Islamic banks (including IBB) and small conventional banks exhibit 
initially, compared to the large Islamic and conventional banks, poor efficiency scores which 
subsequently gradually increase with the passage of time. These results show that, with a favora-
ble environment and additional resources, IBB has a substantial room for improvements to sus-
tain its competitive edge in the banking industry by reducing costs and increasing revenues. 
However, IBB is, on average, better in utilizing its resources and controlling costs than generat-
ing optimal levels of revenues.  
 
  Overall, results suggest that the optimal size for the IBB to achieve better levels of efficiency 
performance is neither large nor small rather medium. The idea of medium-size banking has 
bloomed at the time of the current global crisis. Since then many small banks are becoming ac-
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quisition candidates while large banks are more affected by the financial instability and thus rec-
ognized as a troublesome due to the high leverage and complex risk exposures.  
 
  Empirical findings further illustrate that the DEA-efficiency measures are highly correlated 
with ROA and ROE, and thus can be used separately or concurrently with the standard account-
ing measures of performance in determining the performance of Islamic banks in the UK (IBB) 
and in Muslim-majority countries. Although not widely used, DEA can be adopted along with 
financial ratios to make comparisons of performance more robust. However, there is an absence 
of such argument in the UK conventional banking system at which the information contained in 
the conventional financial measures are not closely corresponded to that contained in efficiency 
measures. 
 
  Eventually, overall results suggest that the banks with higher efficiency levels are larger in total 
assets (size), tend to exhibit higher profitability and loans intensity, on average acquire less le-
vels of debt, and have relatively a smaller market share. IBB, however, is relatively superior in 
terms of lending intensity and capital adequacy.  
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Appendix-Ch.4  
 
Table 4.5 
 Summary of the bank’s DEA-efficiency scores in model (M1). 
Year Country  The bank* crste    vrste    scale  rts 
2005 UK IBB 0.307  0.319  0.963 irs 
2005 Qatar Qatar International Islamic Bank 0.813  1.000  0.813 drs 
2005 Bahrain Khaleeji Commercial Bank 1.000  1.000  1.000 -  
2005 Bahrain Bahrain Islamic Bank 1.000  1.000  1.000 -  
2005 Bahrain Shamil Bank 0.453  0.497  0.912 drs 
2005 Bahrain Abc Islamic Bank 1.000  1.000  1.000 - 
2005 U.A.E Sharjah Islamic Bank 0.975  1.000  0.975 drs 
2005 Kwuait Boubyan Bank 0.893  0.898  0.994 drs 
2005 Malaysia RHB 0.790  0.793  0.995 irs 
2005 Malaysia CIMB 0.055  1.000  0.055 irs 
2005 Turkey** Albaraka Turk 0.621  0.761  0.816 drs 
2005 Turkey Kuveyt Turk 0.626  0.893  0.702 drs 
2006 UK IBB 0.285  0.306  0.931 drs 
2006 Qatar Qatar International Islamic Bank 1.000  1.000  1.000 -  
2006 Bahrain Khaleeji Commercial Bank 0.985  1.000  0.985 irs 
2006 Bahrain Bahrain Islamic Bank 0.596  0.614  0.970 irs 
2006 Bahrain Shamil Bank 0.591  0.625  0.946 drs 
2006 Bahrain Abc Islamic Bank 1.000  1.000  1.000 -  
2006 U.A.E Sharjah Islamic Bank 0.837  0.926  0.904 drs 
2006 Kwuait Boubyan Bank 0.806  0.841  0.959 drs 
2006 Malaysia RHB 0.991  1.000  0.991 drs 
2006 Malaysia CIMB 0.629  0.824  0.764 irs 
2006 Turkey Albaraka Turk 0.657  0.820  0.801 drs 
2006 Turkey Kuveyt Turk 0.691  0.986  0.701 drs 
2007 UK IBB 0.369  0.381  0.968 drs 
2007 Qatar Qatar International Islamic Bank 1.000  1.000  1.000 -  
2007 Bahrain Khaleeji Commercial Bank 1.000  1.000  1.000 - 
2007 Bahrain Bahrain Islamic Bank 0.635  0.671  0.947 drs 
2007 Bahrain Shamil Bank 0.658  0.706  0.932 drs 
2007 Bahrain Abc Islamic Bank 1.000  1.000  1.000 -  
2007 U.A.E Sharjah Islamic Bank 0.761  0.879  0.866 drs 
2007 Kwuait Boubyan Bank 0.721  0.858  0.840 drs 
2007 Malaysia RHB 0.612  0.845  0.724 drs 
2007 Malaysia CIMB 0.246  0.355  0.692 drs 
2007 Turkey Albaraka Turk 0.646  0.934  0.691 drs 
2007 Turkey Kuveyt Turk 0.629  0.948  0.663 drs 
2008 UK IBB 0.397  0.401  0.990 drs 
2008 Qatar Qatar International Islamic Bank 0.871  1.000  0.871 drs 
2008 Bahrain Khaleeji Commercial Bank 0.852  1.000  0.852 drs 
2008 Bahrain Bahrain Islamic Bank 0.522  0.758  0.689 drs 
2008 Bahrain Shamil Bank 0.811  1.000  0.811 drs 
2008 Bahrain Abc Islamic Bank 1.000  1.000  1.000 -   
2008 U.A.E Sharjah Islamic Bank 0.820  1.000  0.820 drs 
2008 Kwuait Boubyan Bank 0.671  0.981  0.684 drs 
2008 Malaysia RHB 0.585  0.863  0.678 drs 
2008 Malaysia CIMB 0.549  1.000  0.549 drs 
2008 Turkey Albaraka Turk 0.675  1.000  0.675 drs 
2008 Turkey Kuveyt Turk 0.626  1.000  0.626 drs 
  Mean 0.709  0.844  0.847 
 
 
 
Table 4.6 
 Summary of the bank’s DEA-efficiency scores in model (M2). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* (Crste) = Overall (total) efficiency scores, (Vrste) =Pure technical efficiency scores (Scale) =Scale efficiency, and (rts) 
=return to scale. 
** All banks that have been chosen in the sample of Islamic banks, whether in GCC-States or in Malaysia, are from the top 
(50) Islamic banks as at 31/12/2007.  
*** Geographically speaking, Turkey belongs to Europe. In recent years some sources consider Turkey to be more closely 
aligned with Europe based on their modern economic and political trends. However, Turkey has become increasingly inte-
grated with the west through membership in organizations such as the Council of Europe, NATO, OECD, OSCE and the G-
20 major economies. 
Year Country The bank crste    vrste   scale   rts 
2005 UK IBB 0.326  1.000  0.326 irs 
2005 Qatar Qatar Islamic Bank 0.969  1.000  0.969 irs 
2005 Kuwait Kuwait Finance House  0.848  0.880  0.963 drs 
2005 Bahrain Albaraka Islamic bank Group 0.512  0.517  0.992 irs 
2005 K.S.A Bank Albilad 0.691  0.801  0.862 irs 
2005 K.S.A Al Rajhi Bank 1.000  1.000  1.000  - 
2005 K.S.A Aljazira 0.715  0.736  0.971 drs 
2005 U.A,E Emirates Islamic Bank 0.771  1.000  0.771 irs 
2005 U.A.E DIB 1.000  1.000  1.000  - 
2005 Malaysia Bank Islam(BIMB) 0.682  0.731  0.933 irs 
2006 UK IBB 0.321  0.658  0.488 irs 
2006 Qatar Qatar Islamic Bank 1.000  1.000  1.000  - 
2006 Kuwait Kuwait Finance House  0.741  0.816  0.908 drs 
2006 Bahrain Albaraka Islamic bank Group 0.590  0.593  0.995 irs 
2006 K.S.A Bank Albilad 0.512  0.536  0.956 irs 
2006 K.S.A Al Rajhi Bank 1.000  1.000  1.000  - 
2006 K.S.A Aljazira 1.000  1.000  1.000  - 
2006 U.A,E Emirates Islamic Bank 0.814  0.960  0.848 irs 
2006 U.A.E DIB 0.882  0.914  0.966 drs 
2006 Malaysia Bank Islam 0.513  0.547  0.938 irs 
2007 UK IBB 0.360  0.700  0.515 irs 
2007 Qatar Qatar Islamic Bank 0.956  1.000  0.956 irs 
2007 Kuwait Kuwait Finance House  0.969  1.000  0.969 drs 
2007 Bahrain Albaraka Islamic bank Group 0.641  0.648  0.989 drs 
2007 K.S.A Bank Albilad 0.469  0.480  0.978 irs 
2007 K.S.A Al Rajhi Bank 1.000  1.000  1.000  - 
2007 K.S.A Aljazira 0.448  0.487  0.920 drs 
2007 U.A,E Emirates Islamic Bank 0.774  0.825  0.939 irs 
2007 U.A.E DIB 0.831  0.854  0.973 drs 
2007 Malaysia Bank Islam 0.468  0.481  0.974 irs 
2008 UK IBB 0.394  0.869  0.453 irs 
2008 Qatar Qatar Islamic Bank 1.000  1.000  1.000  - 
2008 Kuwait Kuwait Finance House  0.834  1.000  0.834 drs 
2008 Bahrain Albaraka Islamic bank Group 0.592  0.618  0.958 drs 
2008 K.S.A Bank Albilad 0.460  0.467  0.984 irs 
2008 K.S.A Al Rajhi Bank 0.918  1.000  0.918 drs 
2008 K.S.A Aljazira 0.400  0.403  0.994 irs 
2008 U.A,E Emirates Islamic Bank 0.824  0.829  0.994 irs 
2008 U.A.E DIB 0.665  0.667  0.996 drs 
2008 Malaysia Bank Islam 0.450  0.456  0.986 irs 
  Mean   0.709  0.787  0.905 
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Table 4.5.1 
 Summary of the DEA- slacks and targets (IBB: model-M1). 
Year   output slacks           Input slacks     output targets                    Input targets 
 
1           2     1            2         3 1              2           1             2              3 
 2005 0.000   8.604  0.000    0.000   0.000 258.762    15.537 8.610       3.250       47.720 
 2006 0.000   9.272  0.000    1.276   0.000 345.925     18.872 11.580       2.874      82.200 
 2007 0.000   9.768  0.000    1.271   0.000 379.177     21.539 11.090       3.639     130.980 
 2008  0.000   12.362  0.000    0.000   0.000 366.840     24.374 10.000       4.460     146.100 
 
Table 4.6.1 
 Summary of the DEA- slacks and targets (IBB: model-M2). 
Year   output slacks       Input slacks     output targets     Input targets 
   1           2   1              2           3     1              2       1                2              3 
  2005  0.000    0.000 0.000    0.000   0.000 82.490      2.210    8.610         3.250     47.720 
  2006  0.000    5.784 1.102     0.000   0.000 161.046    10.254    10.478       4.150      82.200 
  2007  0.000    6.664 0.000    0.000   0.000 206.557    13.076    11.090       4.910     130.980 
  2008  0.000    3.279 0.000    0.000   7.510  169.345    8.824    10.000       4.460     138.590 
 
 
Table 4.7 
 Summary of the  bank’s DEA-efficiency scores  in model  (M3) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.7.1 
 Summary of the DEA slacks and targets (IBB: model-M3) 
 
Year The bank crste     vrste   scale     rts* 
2005 IBB 1.000  1.000  1.000     - 
2005 Turkish Bank (UK) Limited    893  0.916  0.975    irs 
2005 ICBC London Limited 1.000  1.000  1.000     - 
2005 Habib Allied INT. Bank Plc 0.873  0.905  0.966     drs 
2005 Ghana INT. Bnak 1.000  1.000  1.000     - 
2005 Bank of Beirut(UK)Ltd 0.964  1.000  0.964      irs 
2005 Bank Leumi UK 0.896  0.993  0.902     drs 
2006 IBB 0.825  0.901  0.916     drs 
2006 Turkish Bank (UK) Limited 0.860  0.878  0.980     irs 
2006 ICBC London Limited 0.990  1.000  0.990     irs 
2006 Habib Allied INT. Bank Plc 0.906  0.948  0.955     drs 
2006 Ghana INT. Bnak 1.000  1.000  1.000     - 
2006 Bank of Beirut(UK)Ltd 0.670  0.899  0.746     irs 
2006 Bank Leumi UK 0.949  1.000  0.949     drs 
2007 IBB 0.815  0.898  0.908    drs 
2007 Turkish Bank (UK) Limited 0.860  0.860  1.000      - 
2007 ICBC London Limited 1.000  1.000  1.000      - 
2007 Habib Allied INT. Bank Plc 0.938  0.978  0.959     drs 
2007 Ghana INT. Bnak 1.000  1.000  1.000     - 
2007 Bank of Beirut(UK)Ltd 0.774  0.847  0.913     irs 
2007 Bank Leumi UK 0.964  1.000  0.964     drs 
2008 IBB 0.789  0.856  0.922    drs 
2008 Turkish Bank (UK) Limited 0.947  0.997  0.949     irs 
2008 ICBC London Limited 1.000  1.000  1.000     - 
2008 Habib Allied INT. Bank Plc 0.938  0.977  0.960    drs 
2008 Ghana INT. Bnak 0.884  1.000  0.884    drs 
2008 Bank of Beirut(UK)Ltd 1.000  1.000  1.000    - 
2008 Bank Leumi UK 0.973  1.000  0.973    drs 
 Mean 0.918  0.959  0.956 
Year output slacks Input slacks output targets Input targets  
      1      2     1      2  3      1   2    1      2    3 
2005 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 82.490 2.210 8.610 3.25 47.7 
2006 0.000 0.000 2.71 0.986 0.000 117.641 3.265 8.870 3.164 82.2 
2007 0.000 0.000 2.211 1.861 0.000 161.002 4.998 8.879 3.049 131 
2008 0.000 0.000 1.259 1.443 0.000 171.945 5.630 8.741 3.017 146 
Table 4.8 
Summary of the  bank’s DEA-efficiency scores in model (M4)   
 
Year The Bank crste   vrste    scale   rts 
2005 IBB 0.354  1.000  0.354 irs 
2005 The Royal Bank of Scotland  0.476  0.946  0.503 drs 
2005 National Westminster Bank  0.636  0.667  0.953 drs 
2005 Lloyds TSB Bank plc 1.000  1.000  1.000 
2005 Bank of Scotland plc 1.000  1.000  1.000 
2005 HBOS plc 1.000  1.000  1.000 
2005 Standard Chartered 0.445  0.517  0.861 drs 
2005 Northern Rock plc 0.926  0.927  0.998 irs 
2005 HSBC bank Plc 0.436  0.705  0.618 drs 
2005 Abbey National 0.397  0.634  0.626 drs 
2005 Alliance and Leicester 0.591  0.593  0.997 irs 
2005 Barclays PLC 0.442  0.791  0.559 drs 
2005 The Co-operative Bank Plc 0.467  0.474  0.984 irs 
2005 Bradford and Bingley 0.725  0.736  0.986 irs 
2006 IBB 0.269  0.434  0.619 irs 
2006 The Royal Bank of Scotland  0.479  0.954  0.502 drs 
2006 National Westminster Bank  0.625  0.937  0.667 drs 
2006 Lloyds TSB Bank plc 0.907  1.000  0.907 drs 
2006 Bank of Scotland plc 1.000  1.000  1.000 
2006 HBOS plc 1.000  1.000  1.000 
2006 Standard Chartered 0.443  0.511  0.868 drs 
2006 Northern Rock plc 1.000  1.000  1.000 
2006 HSBC bank Plc 0.432  0.737  0.586 drs 
2006 Abbey National 0.456  0.699  0.652 drs 
2006 Alliance and Leicester 0.619  0.620  0.997 irs 
2006 Barclays PLC 0.487  0.807  0.603 drs 
2006 The Co-operative Bank Plc 0.557  0.575  0.969 irs 
2006 Bradford and Bingley 0.734  0.743  0.988 irs 
2007 IBB 0.254  0.413  0.616 irs 
2007 The Royal Bank of Scotland  0.504  1.000  0.504 drs 
2007 National Westminster Bank  0.640  1.000  0.640 drs 
2007 Lloyds TSB Bank plc 0.802  0.965  0.831 drs 
2007 Bank of Scotland plc 0.982  1.000  0.982 drs 
2007 HBOS plc 0.983  1.000  0.983 drs 
2007 Standard Chartered 0.448  0.535  0.838 drs 
2007 Northern Rock plc 1.000  1.000  1.000 
2007 HSBC bank Plc 0.463  0.762  0.608 drs 
2007 Abbey National 0.528  0.781  0.676 drs 
2007 Alliance and Leicester 0.577  0.578  1.000 
2007 Barclays PLC 0.467  0.855  0.547 drs 
2007 The Co-operative Bank Plc 0.404  0.410  0.986 irs 
2007 Bradford and Bingley 0.712  0.721  0.988 irs 
 
 
 
Year The Bank crste   vrste    scale   rts 
2008 IBB 0.255  0.624  0.409 irs 
2008 The Royal Bank of Scotland  0.329  1.000  0.329 drs 
2008 National Westminster Bank  0.602  1.000  0.602 drs 
2008 Lloyds TSB Bank plc 0.347  0.885  0.392 drs 
2008 Bank of Scotland plc 0.912  1.000  0.912 drs 
2008 HBOS plc 0.862  0.986  0.874 drs 
2008 Standard Chartered 0.474  0.598  0.793 drs 
2008 Northern Rock plc 0.738  0.738  1.000 drs 
2008 HSBC bank Plc 0.523  0.809  0.647 drs 
2008 Abbey National 0.623  0.999  0.623 drs 
2008 Alliance and Leicester 0.339  0.502  0.675 drs 
2008 Barclays PLC 0.458  0.964  0.475 drs 
2008 The Co-operative Bank Plc 0.429  0.434  0.987 irs 
2008 Bradford and Bingley 0.989  1.000  0.989 irs 
 
Mean 0.617  0.796  0.780 
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Table 4.8.1 
 Summary of the DEA- slacks and targets (IBB: model-M4) 
   Year output slacks Input slacks output targets Input targets 
   1           2 1           2          3 1           2    1               2              3 
2005 0.000  0.000 0.000   0.000  0.000 82.490    2.210 8.610        3.250       47.720 
2006 0.000  0.000 0.000  0.482  0.000 243.871   6.768 11.580       3.668        82.200 
2007 0.000  0.000 0.000  0.453   0.000 350.341    10.876 11.090        4.457     130.980 
2008 0.000  0.000 0.000  0.478   31.931 236.056   7.730 10.000     3.982        114.169 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.9 
Summary results of the regression analysis. 
 
The Model- Coefficients and t- statistics 
 M1                 M2                  M3       M4 
ISLAM-dummy                              
_ 
         _ B= -.175 
t= -3.583** 
_ 
Bank’s size -Log. 
assets 
                            
_ 
B =  .237 
t = 3.558 *** 
B=1.100 
t = 4.414*** 
B=.621 
t = 4.644*** 
Bank’s leverage                              
_ 
B = -.183 
t= -2.290* 
B=0.076 
t=1.777**** 
B=-.575 
t = - 4.009*** 
Bank’s region B = -.158 
t = -1.708**** 
B = -.473 
t = 3.221*** 
                   _ _ 
Bank’s market share                             
_ 
B = -.276 
t= -3.437** 
B=-1.090 
t = - 4.369*** 
B=-.330 
t = - 2.384* 
Bank’s loans intensity                             
_ 
B = .320 
t = 1.755**** 
                  _ B=.339 
t= 1.842**** 
Dependency/In. Factor                             
_ 
          _ B=-.045 
t=-1.948 **** 
B=-.136 
t=-2.596* 
Bank’s liquidity                            
_ 
B=-.514 
t=-4.267*** 
              _ _ 
Bank’s ROE/ ROA B= 4.685 
t=2.564* 
B=.365 
t=4.484*** 
              _ B=-.154 
t=-3.052** 
 
*: significant at the 0.05 level-p<.05 (2-tailed), **: significant at the 0.01 level-p<.01 (2-tailed), 
  
***: significant at the 0.001 level (2-tailed) p<0.1%, ****: significant at the 0.10 level-p<.10 (2-tailed) 
 
Note: For the sake of parsimony, the table displays only the estimated "Beta" and the "t" values. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Table 4.10  
 Summary statistics of  the variables employed in DEA 
  All numbers are expressed in million £ after deflation. 
 
Outputs-inputs  N Minimum Maximum Mean   Std. Deviation 
M1 
Total Loans 48 0.440 1,567.810 596.770 414.086 
Total Revenues 48 0.580 263.530 69.251 58.834 
Total Expenses 48 3.810 16,768.770 388.629 2,415.026 
Total Staff Cost 48 0.900 698.570 24.998 99.656 
Total Deposits 48 2.700 3,172.440 761.526 598.330 
M2 
Total Loans 40 82.490 22,668.570 4,237.159 5,050.672 
Total Revenues 40 2.210 1823.300 411.548 494.508 
Total Expenses 40 8.61 1005.16 152.464 194.139 
Total Staff Cost 40 3.250 253.120 61.228 57.989 
Total Deposits 40 47.720 19,682.360 4,223.458 4,589.773 
M3 
Total Loans 28 29.400 1,278.720 298.965 354.175 
Total Revenues 28 2.211 38.110 10.927 10.700 
Total Expenses 28 1.510 19.600 7.089 5.446 
Total Staff Cost 28 0.850 10.710 3.494 2.722 
Total Deposits 28 47.720 1,214.390 323.312 348.269 
M4 
Total Loans 56 105.940 644,732.470 20,3774.686 1.730 
Total Revenues 56 2.940 53,775.550 12,522.143 14,615.558 
Total Expenses 56 10.000 39,902.580 7,919.875 10,505.427 
Total Staff Cost 56 4.150 8,027.700 2,109.719 2,234.654 
Total Deposits 56 82.200 585,895.760 175,343.687 1.571 
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   Table 4.11 
   Correlation matrix between inputs and outputs. 
 
  Table 4.12 
  Summary of the exogenous variables used in DEA- 2 stage. 
 
* (+) indicates a positive 
effect, (-), negative effect, 
while (0) (No) effect. 
 ** The market share of a 
bank is measured by divid-
ing the amount of its depo-
sits by the total amount of 
all sample bank’s deposits in 
a local market. The sample 
banks represent the majority 
of major banks deposits in a 
banking industry.  
*** The term dependency 
means: a) Islamic banks 
managed by conventional 
banks. b) Banks operate as 
subsidiary or a member 
(part) of a banking group. 
While independent banks are 
those "stand alone banks". 
**** We introduced (5) 
dummies to avoid the 
dummy trap in order to get 
away from the perfect multi 
co-linearity. However, the 
number of dummy variables 
is not important, what matter 
is whether the sum of any of 
the dummies is the same for 
all observations. 
 
The model     Revenue    T. Expenses                 T. staff Cost T. Deposits 
M1     
T. Loans 0.767 0.631 0.524 0.799 
T. Revenues 1.000 0.813 0.726 0.753 
T. Expenses  1.000 0.502 0.776 
T. Staff Cost   1.000 0.545 
M2     
T. Loans 0.896 0.928 0.934 0.854 
T. Revenues 1.000 0.890 0.900 0.798 
T. Expenses  1.000 0.939 0.833 
T. Staff Cost   1.000 0.827 
M3     
T. Loans 0.799 0.638 0.651 0.845 
T. Revenues 1.000 0.546 0.587 0.971 
T. Expenses  1.000 0.937 0.497 
T. Staff Cost   1.000 0.533 
M4     
T. Loans 0.920 0.937 0.874 0.959 
T. Revenues 1.000 0.966 0.839 0.881 
T. Expenses 1.000 0.853 0.912 
T. Staff Cost   1.000 0.933 
Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
 The measurement and the expected effect on efficiency Exogenous  variables 
Profitability= net income to total assets. (+)* β1BPjt        (E1,E2) 
Personal expenses as a proxy of skills utilization measured by total amount of 
wages and salaries to total assets. (-): efficient banks are expected to have lower 
cost because of IT. 
β 2Perjt      (E1,E2) 
Liquid assets to total deposits and short term funding as a proxy of liquid asset 
ratio. (+ or -) 
β 3Liqjt     (E1,E2) 
The logarithm of total assets as a proxy of size. (+) β 4 Log(A) jt   (E1,E2) 
The proxy of lending intensity= total Loans to total asset. (+): loans are the main 
source of revenue. 
β 5LTAjt  (E1,E2) 
Total deposits as a proxy of banks market share. (+): deposits are considered the 
main source of banks progress. 
β 6 Depojt (E1,E2)** 
The effect of independency. Dummy variable; (1) if a bank is managed by parents 
(subsidiary), (0) if it is stand alone bank. (+ or -) 
β 7 Indjt      (E1,E2)*** 
The effect of age and experience. Dummy variable; (1) if <10 years, (0) other-
wise. (+) 
β8 Agejt  ( E1,E2)**** 
Financial leverage= total assets to equity. (- ) β 9Levjt     (E1,E2) 
The percentage change in gross domestic production per capita (favorable eco-
nomic condition will affect positively on demand and supply of banking servic-
es). (+ or -) 
β10GDPjt      (E1) 
Diversification effect. Dummy variable; (1) if high diversified, (0) otherwise. (+): 
Unless it leads to higher risk. 
β 10Diverjt     (E2) 
Geographical location effect. Dummy variable; (1) if the bank is located in Eu-
rope; = (0) otherwise. (+): Islamic banks in Muslim countries are more Efficient. 
β11Geojt       (E1) 
Dummy variable; (1) if an Islamic bank; = (0) otherwise. (+ or -) β12Islamjt    (E2) 
 Table 4.13 
  Results from testing the "OLS"  main assumptions 
 
The results of our analysis  The test    The assumption 
T >0.20 - Tolerance Non-Multicolinearity 
VIF≤ 4   - Variance –Inflation Factor 
D-W ≈ 2 ( P >0.05*)  - Durbin-Watson 
Skew is within the range (+1 to -
1) 
  Skewness Normality** 
Certainly been met   Scatter-Plots  Linearity 
 
Model results 
 
1.  R2 > 56% (M1=56.7%; M2=67.5%; M3=73.9%; and M4=62.8%), this illustrate a strong correlation 
between the observed value of the response variable and the values predicted by the model. 
 
M1, F12,35=3.825, P<.01; M2, F11, 28 = 5.297, P<.001; M3, F11, 
16=4.128,  
P<.001;  M4, F10,45=7.608, P<.001 
 
2. ANOVA*** 
* The p-value tests for serial correlation. Since the p-value is greater than 0.05, then there is no serial correla-
tion and the data are fine. 
 
** Despite the fact that the multiple regression procedures are not greatly affect by minor deviations from the 
assumptions of linearity and normality of data, and to produce more accurate results, we use the nonlinear 
transformation to meet the foregoing assumptions. 
 
***we clearly reject the null hypothesis and conclude that at least one of the predictors is related to the 
efficiency scores. This means that the models that have been estimated are theoretically construct and statisti-
cally significant. 
 
Additional notes: 
 
I. In order to get rid the negative values for variables in the regression analysis, we add a constant to move the 
minimum value of the distribution above 0.  Hence, we use log+4 in our analysis to transfer the logarithms 
results to a positive numbers. Furthermore, for the original data values include negative number, it is not 
possible to apply many nonlinear transformations, in this situation we add a constant to all data values that 
make them positive, as a rule of thumb, we add the smallest constant that will convert the largest negative 
data value to a value greater than1. 
 
II. It is worth noting that the DEA model requires the input and output data to be non-negative and preferably 
strictly positive (no zero value), therefore, it is necessary to transfer the negative data into positive one. One 
of the more common methods for eliminating this problem has been through the addition of a sufficiently 
large positive constant to the values of the input or output that has the negative number (Ali and Seiford, 
1990). 
 
III. Formally, DEA is a methodology directed to frontiers rather than central tendencies. In contrast to regres-
sion methods, DEA focuses on individual observations and optimizes the performance measure of each unit. 
A prior knowledge of weights or prices for inputs and outputs is not required in DEA. 
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Table 4.14 
 Summary statistics for the "Mean" values of the independent variables used in the regression analysis (2005
* Only from Muslim countries. **this amount means
assets were to fall, then common stockholders are wiped out. This means the need of more (£) in tangible common equity to abs
essentially an over-leveraged financial system. 
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5.1. The abstract 
 
  In this chapter we examine the efficiency performance of Islamic Bank of Britain (IBB) in the 
UK and Bosna Bank International (BBI) in Bosnia-Herzegovina, relative to small conventional 
banks in each country and also against Islamic banks from Muslim-majority countries. We also 
estimate the productivity changes of both banks relative to small Islamic banks, within and 
outside Europe, and also relative to small conventional banks in the UK and Bosnia respectively. 
We eventually conduct the two-stage DEA analysis to check the robustness of the results 
obtained from DEA and also to determine the impact of internal and external factors on bank's 
efficiency. Our analysis covers the 4-year period from 2005 to 2008. 
  
  Our findings suggest that the IBB and BBI are technically inefficient. The bank’s inefficiency 
stems from both scale (size) and management issues. As compared to Islamic banks from 
Muslim countries, BBI yields higher pure technical efficiency than IBB, but IBB records higher 
positive growth in efficiency performance. IBB and BBI yield positive growth (progress) in total 
factor productivity and technical efficiency but record negative growth (regress) in technology 
innovations. Findings also suggest that the IBB and BBI lag far behind their conventional 
counterparty banks in terms of both efficiency and productivity performance. BBI shows much 
better efficiency performance relative to conventional banks than IBB. Overall, results show that 
a bank that is more efficient is found to be larger, more profitable, acquire less debt, invest more 
in skills, and operate in countries with a higher GDP-per capita. 
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5.2.   Introduction 
 
    The efficiency and productivity of banks have been widely studied in the literature. For banks, 
efficiency implies improved profitability, large deposits (funds), better prices, quality services 
and greater safety in terms of improved capital buffer in absorbing risk (Berger, Hunter, and 
Timme, 1993). Hence, the information obtained from the evaluation of the bank's performance 
may be used to improve its efficiency as well as to increase productivity. Overall, the analysis of 
banks’ performance is important for European banking where Islamic banks are operating in 
parallel with conventional banks. Measuring the efficiency and/or productivity of Islamic banks 
in Europe provides evidence on the performance of Islamic banks as compared to European 
counterparties-conventional banks. It further contributes towards examining the validity, stability 
and viability of Islamic banking in a system that is driven by conventional regulations. This 
could also make European banks perceive Islamic banking as a profitable opportunity to generate 
new business rather than as a threat to existing business taking into consideration the 
uncomfortable opinion of some non-Muslims on Islamic values and principles. 
 
  Islamic banking is a worldwide phenomenon involving a variety of instruments. Previously, 
Islamic transactions and institutions made up a small part of the total banking industry. Recently, 
Islamic banks have significantly expanded their network and have been able to mobilize large 
amount of funds and upgrade many economic ventures. Given the differential behavior of the 
Islamic banks and the conventional banks1, there has been a question about the long run 
sustainability of Islamic banks, which in turn depends heavily on their economic efficiency. A 
bank is considered to be economically efficient if it exhibits technical efficiency. A bank is 
technically efficient if it produces the maximum output from a given set of inputs (Yotopoulos 
and Lau 1973).2  
  Despite the considerable development of the Islamic banking sector, there are still few studies 
that focus on the efficiency and productivity growth of Islamic banks, particularly in Europe. 
Past studies concentrated primarily on conceptual issues. In this chapter, our primary 
contribution is to offer a comprehensive analysis of the efficiency and productivity changes of Isl-  
_______________________ 
1 Islamic banking is a form of banking based on Islamic principles. Basically, Islamic banking does not allow the paying and/or receiving of 
interest. It is based on profit and loss sharing.  Islamic banks must avoid heavy debt, excessive uncertainty, speculation, and socially and ethically 
detrimental activities. In Islamic banking, money itself has no intrinsic value; it is simply a medium of exchange.  Each financial transaction in 
Islamic banks must also be tied to a tangible underlying asset.  
2 
‘When two banks produce the same amount of output but bank (A) uses less inputs than bank (B), bank (A) is said to be more efficient, from the 
technical efficiency point of view. Alternatively, if (A) and (B) use the same amount of inputs but (A) manages to produce more output, then, too, 
it is more technically efficient‘ (La Forgia and Couttolenc, 2008). 
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amic banking in Europe. We intend to identify financial and policy indicators that impact 
performance of Islamic banks. Due to the short history of Islamic banking in Europe and 
consequently lack of sufficient data, we utilize a sample period of 4-years, 2005 (2 years pre-
crisis of 2007) through 2008, to examine the relative efficiency performance of the first and only 
Islamic commercial banks in Europe i.e. Bosna Bank International (BBI) in Bosnia – Herzegovina 
(BiH), and Islamic Bank of Britain (IBB) in the UK. More specifically, we compare their 
efficiency performance with small conventional banks in each country, on the one hand, and 
with small and large Islamic commercial banks from Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)-States 
(i.e. Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Oman), Malaysia, Turkey 
and Azerbaijan, on the other hand. We further aim to measure the productivity changes of IBB 
and BBI in relation to small Islamic banks, within and outside the Muslim-majority countries, 
and also relative to small conventional banks in the UK and BiH, respectively. 
  We first employ the non-parametric (DEA) technique to estimate the relative efficiency scores 
for Islamic and conventional banks over the sample period 2005-2008. Second, in order to 
measure the changes in productivity, we apply the Malmquist-DEA method to calculate the 
Malmquist Total Factor Productivity (TFP) indices. Third, the DEA-efficiency scores obtained 
from the first stage are used as dependent variables in the Ordinary Least-Squares (OLS) 
regression analysis in order to examine the effects of the environmental factors (variables that 
are neither considered inputs nor outputs such as: the bank’s size and region, etc.) on each banks’ 
performance. OLS is also utilized to check the robustness of the overall results obtained from 
DEA scores. Such an analysis is important both from operational as well as academic 
viewpoints. It displays the expansion potential for Islamic banks in a hybrid banking system, as 
well as showing guidelines implications for Islamic banks on how to improve efficiency and 
productivity growth. 
 
  The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the literature. Section 3 
discusses the methodology and calculations of DEA first stage of analysis as well as calculations 
for the Malmquist index. It further considers the DEA-second stage analysis. Section 4 presents 
the empirical results. Finally, section 5 contains the concluding remarks.  
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5.3.   Literature review  
 
  The literature on the comparative efficiency and productivity, particularly in the area of 
conventional banking, comprises a large number of papers. Likewise, the literature on Islamic 
finance has grown recently, reflecting the increased role of Islamic banking particularly in 
Muslim countries. The bulk of the academic work in the area of Islamic banking is related to 
comparisons of the instruments used by Islamic and conventional banks and the regulatory and 
supervisory challenges related to Islamic banking, e.g. Omar, Abdul Rahman, Yusof, Abd. Majid 
and Rasid (2006), Sole (2007), and Abdul-Majid, Saal and Battisti (2008).  
   Empirically speaking, Hussein (2003) examines the cost efficiency of Islamic banks in Sudan 
between 1990 and 2000. Using the stochastic cost frontier approach, Hussein estimates cost 
efficiency for a sample of 17 banks. The results show large variations in the cost efficiency of 
Sudanese banks, with state owned banks the most cost inefficient, while the smaller banks are 
more efficient than their larger counterparts, and the foreign owned banks are the most efficient.  
 
  Hassan (2005) evaluates the relative cost, profit, x-efficiency, and productivity of 43 Islamic 
banks in 21 countries. The study covers the period of 1993-2001. He uses both the Stochastic 
Frontier Approach (SFA) and the (DEA) technique as tools to examine the efficiency. He 
calculates five efficiency measures: cost, allocative, technical, pure technical, and scale 
efficiency. He also correlates the efficiency scores with the conventional accounting measures of 
performance. The results indicate that the Islamic banking industry is relatively less efficient 
compared to its conventional counterparts. The overall inefficiency is, by and large, output 
related, with the main source of inefficiency being allocative rather than technical in nature. 
Findings also suggest that the Islamic banks are more profit-efficient. The results eventually 
show that the efficiency measures can be used concurrently with conventional accounting ratios 
in determining the performance of Islamic banks.  
 
  Sufian (2006) examines the efficiency of the Malaysian Islamic banks during 2001-2004 by 
using the DEA method. Findings suggest that the banks scale inefficiency outweighs pure 
technical inefficiency. This implies that Malaysian Islamic banks have been operating at a non-
optimal level (scale) of operations. Results also show that the domestic Islamic banks have 
exhibited a higher technical efficiency compared to their foreign Islamic banks peers.  
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  In 2007, Sufian extended his empirical work by directly examining the antecedents of the 
Malaysian Islamic banking sector’s productivity changes over 2001-2005. The study employs 
the (MPI) to measure efficiency and technological changes. Findings suggest that the Malaysian 
Islamic banking sector has exhibited decline in productivity, largely due to the decline in 
technological advancement. Foreign Islamic banks have exhibited lower productivity levels 
compared to their domestic peers, and the domestic Islamic banks have exhibited higher 
productivity levels compared to their foreign peers, attributed to higher technological progress 
and efficiency levels.  
   
   There is a small body of empirical literature that offers comparisons of the financial and 
efficiency performance of Islamic and conventional banking, e.g. Rosly and Bakar (2003), 
Samad (2004), Yudistira (2004) and Limam (2001). More recently, Johnes, Izzeldin and Pappas 
(2007) examined the efficiency for Islamic and conventional banks in the GCC-region during 
2004-2007. They used financial ratio analysis (FRA) and the (DEA) method. Based on the FRA, 
Islamic banks were found to be less cost efficient but more efficient than conventional banks in 
revenue and profit. Results from the DEA reveal that the average efficiency in Islamic banks is 
lower than conventional peers.  
 
    Despite the above discussed literature, empirical researches on the efficiency and productivity 
of Islamic banks are still in their infancy in Muslim countries and rare in Europe. This is due to 
the lack of sufficient data and the short presence of Islamic banks.  Thus, the main purpose of 
this chapter is to bridge this gap in the cross-country literature. 
 
5.4.    Methodology 
 
  The next sub-sections present the application of the DEA approach for efficiency analysis, the 
DEA-based Malmquist productivity index (MPI) method, and the second-stage of DEA analysis.  
 
5.4.1.   Data description and variables 
 
    We utilize the DEA-technique to calculate the efficiency scores of the sample banks. We then 
adopt the MPI technique to measure the contributions of technology in promoting efficiency 
(technical change). Such a technique is considered to be evidence of innovation and 
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improvement in efficiency. We estimate DEA efficiency scores and Malmquist indexes using 
DEAP version 2.1, a program developed by Coelli (1996). There are a number of desirable 
features of the DEA model for our particular study. DEA looks directly for a best-practice 
frontier within the data (Omar et al. 2006). The advantage of DEA is that it neither requires input 
nor output prices in the construction of the efficient frontier. This makes the method particularly 
useful in the case where prices are not available publicly or do not exist. Furthermore, DEA also 
does not require a behavioral assumption in situations where the producer's objectives differ or 
are unknown or unachieved. Moreover, DEA takes into account all inputs and outputs 
simultaneously as well as differences in technology and capacity. It then compares a decision 
making unit (DMU), each of the banks in our study, with the best-practice frontier peers. 
 
  There are two main approaches that have been widely used in banking literature to define inputs 
and outputs: the production approach and the intermediation approach. Under the production 
approach, banks use various labor and capital resources to provide different products and services 
to customers such as loans and deposits. Under the intermediation approach, banks are viewed as 
financial intermediaries that collect deposits and other loanable funds and then lend them as 
loans or other assets for profit. 
 
   In this chapter, we adopt the intermediation approach because the main characteristic of 
Islamic banks is that they follow the principle of interest-free and profit-and-loss-sharing (PLS) 
in performing their business as intermediaries (Ariff, 1988). Islamic banks employ the concept of 
participation in projects utilizing the funds at risk on a PLS basis. This certainly implies the 
importance of intermediary activities that Islamic banks perform (Yudistira, 2004). We model 
Islamic banks as multi-product firms, employing three-inputs and producing two-outputs. The 
input vectors include: (1) total deposits and short term funding, (2) total expenses, and (3) total 
staff costs. On the other hand, the output vectors comprise: (1) total (non) interest-bearing loans 
and (2) total revenues. Table 5.4 in the appendix reports descriptive statistics of outputs and 
inputs of the commercial banks during the sample period.   
 
  Using DEA, we can estimate efficiency under the assumption of constant returns-to-scale 
(CRS) in the CCR-model, which was proposed by Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes in (1978), and 
variable returns-to-scale (VRS) in the BCC-model which was initially developed by Banker, 
Charnes, and Cooper (1984).3 The CRS assumption is only appropriate when all DMUs are 
operating at optimal scale. Factors like imperfect competition and constraints in Islamic finance 
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may cause our sample banks not to operate well at their optimal scale of operations. On the basis 
of the prior arguments and to account for the fact that the sizes of the banks in our sample vary 
greatly, ranging from large active banks to small banks, we estimate our model under the 
assumption of the BCC-model as suggested by Cooper, Seiford, and Tone, (2007). Results 
obtained from this model are commonly called ‘pure technical efficiency (PTE) scores‘. This is 
because they are obtained from the model that allows variable returns to scale (VRS). 
Consequently, we'll be focusing in this chapter on the PTE scores to examine the comparative 
performance of the selected banks. 
 
  Basically, when measuring efficiency using the DEA approach, there are two typical 
assumptions with regard to a bank’s behavior: an input-oriented model, which is used to identify 
technical inefficiency as a proportional reduction in input usage, and an output-oriented model, 
where the technical inefficiency is measured as a proportional increase in output production. In 
this chapter, we assume an output-oriented approach. Our preference for this measure is due to 
its reliability and as a better fit to our situation. Islamic banks operating under a competitive 
environment strive to offer the best possible products for their clients. Therefore, they are more 
likely to sustain their competitive advantage by increasing their outputs production rather than 
reducing the input usage.  
 
  DEA efficiency estimates, however, can be biased. Alirezaee, Howland, and van de Panne, 
(1998) argue that the smaller the number of DMUs is, the higher the probability the units will be 
overestimated. However, this is not an issue in our research design because our sample size is 
large enough. We follow Cooper, Seiford, and Tone, (2007) and Darrat Topuz, and Yousef, 
(2002) who suggest the product of inputs times outputs should optimally be less than the sample 
size  (I*O<n). 
 
   Additionally, one of the assumptions to apply DEA is that the DMUs must be homogenous 
units; they should be performing the same tasks and should have similar objectives. This fits well 
with our sample because the operation of Islamic banking is the same as that of conventional 
banking except that Islamic banking operates in accordance with the rules of Shari'ah. However, 
____________________________ 
3
 
 The value of SE is less than or equal to one. If DMU has a value equal to one, then it is operating at a constant returns-to-scale size (CRS). If 
SE is less than one, then DMU is scale inefficient (operating at a variable returns-to-scale (VRS)). The scale inefficient DMU will either 
experience increasing returns-to-scale (IRS) due to being at less than optimum size, or decreasing returns-to-scale (DRS) due to being at more 
than the optimum size.  
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both Islamic and conventional banks operate with the same essential goals of earning a profit and 
benefitting society, even if there are some differences in how they reach these goals. 
 
   In our analysis, we use cross-country bank-level panel data compiled from non-consolidated 
income statements and balance sheets of 23 Islamic banks in 10 countries. We also derive data 
from 12 small conventional commercial banks in BiH and the UK, six from each country (Table 
5.1). Our study differs from others in a few key aspects. We first compare the efficiency 
performance of IBB, the first British stand-alone full-fledged commercial Islamic bank in the 
west, and BBI, the first Islamic commercial bank in Bosnia and Herzegovina, against 12 small 
and 9 large Islamic commercial banks from Muslim-majority countries. We then employ the 
inter-bank comparison approach to compare the efficiency performance and productivity change 
of IBB against 6 small conventional banks in the UK, and BBI 4 against 6 small conventional ba-  
  
  Table 5.1 
  Summary statistics of the population and the selected sample 
* Model-M1 measures the efficiency performance of IBB & BBI relative to small Islamic banks in Muslim countries. Model-M2 measures the efficiency performance of IBB & 
BBI relative to large Islamic banks in Muslim countries. Model-M3 measures the efficiency performance of BBI relative small conventional banks in BiH. Model-M4 measures 
the efficiency performance of IBB relative small conventional banks in the UK. However, utilizing data from Model-M1 in the DEA, we measure the relative Malmquist indices of 
productivity change of IBB and BBI compared with small Islamic banks from Muslim countries. We further make use of Model-M3 and M4 to measure the relative productivity 
growth of BBI and IBB relative to small conventional banks in both BiH and the UK respectively. ** The column represents the number of the banks in each model. 
 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
4
 BBI claims to be the first Islamic bank in Europe, as it was established on 19 Sep. 2000, 4-years before the IBB was granted a license. However, oldest 
bank is not necessarily the oldest in history, but the well-developed, the fastest-growing, and the leader in pioneering new and a wide range of financial 
products and services. Thus, it is generally accepted that the IBB is considered as the first stand-alone full-fledged Islamic commercial bank in the western 
world. Also, the UK is considered to be the hub of Islamic banking and has the most active and developed Islamic banking sector in Europe which helps 
the IBB to become more mature compared with BBI. In Bosnia-Herzegovina there is no stock market, and thus BBI cannot emulate the IBB in seeking 
additional equity finance through having a listing on a local Alternative Investment Market. 
 
5
 The number of banks is reduced mainly due to the exclusion  of:  i) the new banks that are not older than 5 years , ii) all banks other than the commercial 
Islamic banks, and iii) Islamic banks whose financial statements were consolidated with their parent banks.  
 
Region- country                                                         No. of  Islamic commercial banks -per country          selected sample banks  5 
 
2 
 
4 
Middle East,(GCC) 
Qatar 
3 5 Saudi  Arabia 
2 4 Kuwait 
5 6 Bahrain 
3 9 U.A.E 
  M1*: Banks with AvTA of ≤1.5 bn £.         (7)**   
  M2:   Banks with AvTA of >1.5 bn £.         (8)    
  Southeast Asia 
3 16 Malaysia 
  M1: Banks with AvTA of   ≤1.5 bn £.         (2)    
  M2: Banks with AvTa of   >1.5  bn £.         (1)    
  Eurasia 
2 5 M1:Turkey                                                   (2)            
1   1 M1: Azerbaijan                                             (1)                                         
  
All banks have AvTA of ≤1.5 bn £.      
  
Europe 
                   1   1 M1+ M2: UK                                              (1) 
1   1 M1+ M2: BiH                                              (1) 
                     52   23 (out of  52) SUM 
 Country                                                                                                                                        Small conventional  banks  in BiH & the UK  
 BiH 
                                                                                          
              6 
 M3: Relative efficiency of BBI compared with small conventional banks in BiH.                    
 UK  
 M4: Relative efficiency of IBB compared with small conventional banks in the UK.                                                                        6 
 SUM                                                                                                12 
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nks from BiH respectively. We eventually estimate the cross-country productivity changes of 
small Islamic commercial banks, both within and outside Europe. 
 
  For the purpose of analysis and to analyze the size-efficiency relationship, Islamic banks across 
the sample are grouped by total assets. Banks with more than 1.5 £ (KM) bn of average total 
assets (AvTA2005-2008) are categorized as large size, and banks below this level are categorized as 
small-to-medium size. The time interval 2005-2008 is used to measure the effects of the current 
global financial crisis on banks efficiency. 
 
5.4.2. The empirical specifications 
5.4.2.1.  The DEA-Model 
 
  DEA is defined as a linear programming technique that compares multiple outputs and inputs 
used by firms (DMUs) and generate relative efficiency scores. DMUs with an efficiency score of 
unity are considered relatively efficient and make up the frontier, while those with a score below 
unity are relatively inefficient (Berger and Humphrey, 1997). To measure the efficiency of a 
given DMU, Charnes, et al. (1978) propose the use of the maximum of the ratio of weighted 
outputs (y) to weighted inputs (x), subject to the condition that similar ratios for all other DMUs 
be ≤ 1. For each DMU, efficiency is calculated as follows (Ataullah, Cockerill, and Le, 2004): 
 
 =        max   wy/

	

 vx

	

 
 
Subject to: 
 uy/

	

 vx

	

≤ 1;      n = 1, … . , N  vu  ≥ 0;     = 1, 2 …  I;      j = 1, 2 …  J 
  
 
  Where, y and x are positive known outputs and inputs of the nth DMU, respectively. The 
variables v and u are the variable weights to be determined by solving linear problem 1. The 
DMU being measured is indicated by the index ‘o’. The optimization is defined for every DMU 
in the sample such that if the eﬃciency score eo= 1, the DMUo is 100% eﬃcient within the 
sample. Charnes, Cooper, and Rhodes (1978) transform the above formula into the following 
linear programming problem (Ataullah, Cockerill, and Le, 2004): 
 
max h0 =  uy

	
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Subject to: 
 
  Where ‘$‘ is an arbitrary small positive number introduced to ensure that all of the known inputs 
and outputs will have positive weights. When ho = 1, then the DMUo is eﬃcient; otherwise it is 
inefficient. However, if inputs are being used ineffectively, then we will have input slack (input-
excess), and conversely we will have output slack (output-shortfall). Slack represents the 
improvements needed to make an inefficient unit become efficient and thus, all input slack and 
output slack must be equal to zero. These improvements are in the form of an increase/decrease 
in inputs or outputs. In our analysis, we utilize the multi-stage (MS)-DEA methodology (Coelli, 
1996), where the outputs from one process can be used as the inputs for the next process, 
allowing a sequence of radial linear programs in order to identify the efficient projected point for 
the treatment of slacks. This method is computationally rigorous and more demanding than the 
one and two-stage methods (Coelli, 1998).  
 
5.4.2.2.  The DEA -Malmquist Productivity Index -MPI 
 
  There are several different methods that could be used to measure the distance function which 
make up the Malmquist index.6 Färe, Grosskopf, Lindgren, and Roos, (1992) construct the DEA-
based Malmquist productivity index as the geometric mean of two Malmquist productivity 
indexes of Caves, Christensen and Diewert, 1982. An important feature of the DEA-Malmquist 
productivity index is that it can be decomposed into two components: one measuring change in 
relative technical efficiency (TEch) (how the units being examined have managed to catch-up to 
the frontier) and the other one measuring change in technology innovation (TECch). 
 
  The Malmquist productivity index can be used to identify productivity differences between two 
firms or one firm over two-time periods (Caves, Cristensen, and Diewert, 1982). Malmquist 
index numbers can be defined using either the output or the input-oriented approach. This study 
adopts the output-oriented Malmquist index to measure the contributions from the progress in 
technology and efficiency change to the growth of productivity in Islamic commercial banks. 
The output-oriented productivity measures focus on the maximum level of outputs that could be  
_______________________________ 
6 The Malmquist productivity index (MPI) is often seen as the real driver of growth within an economy. It is used to measure firms' 
productivity growth. MPI does not require the profit maximization or cost minimization assumption, and information on the input and 
output prices. 
 vx
%
&	

= 1    uy −  v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n=1,…, N; v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produced using a given input vector and a given production technology relative to the observed 
level of outputs. This can be achieved using the output distance functions. Caves et al. (1982) 
show how distance function can be used to define Malmquist indices of productivity change. 
Färe, Grosskopf, Lindgren, and Roos (1989) show that the output-based Malmquist productivity 
index between time periods (t) and (t + 1) can be defined as follows (Omar et al. 2006): 
 
)(*+ , ,+, *+-
, ,+-
) = ./0
1 23145, 61457
/01 831, 619
∗  /0145 23145, 61457/0145 831, 619 ;

 <⁄
 
 
  Where the notation ‘>+ 8*+-
, ,+-
9‘ represents the distance from the period (t+1) observation 
to the period (t) technology, while (x) and (y) indicate the input and the output, respectively. It 
measures productivity change from period (t) to period (t+1) using period (t) technology as a 
benchmark. The second ratio is the period (t+1) Malmquist index and it measures the 
productivity change from period (t) to period (t+1) using period (t+1) technology as a benchmark. 
Having a value of (M) greater than one denotes productivity growth (progress or improvement), 
a value less than one indicates productivity decline (regress or deterioration),while a value of 
unity corresponds to stagnation (no change). Färe, Shawna, Mary, and Zhongyang (1994) show 
that the MPI can be decomposed into two components as follows: 
 
)(*+ , ,+, *+-
, ,+-
) =    /0
145 83145,   61459
/01 831, 619
 * . /01 23145 , 61457/0145 83145,   61459 ∗  
/01 231,   617
/0145 831 , 619
;

 <⁄
 
 
  The first ratio of Eq. 6 measures the relative technical efficiency changes (TEch) (i.e. 
movement toward the frontier) from years (t) to (t+1). The second term inside the squared 
brackets (geometric mean of the two ratios) captures the shift in technology or technological 
changes (TECch) (i.e. shifts in the frontier itself) between the two periods evaluated at (xt) and 
(xt+1). Färe et al. (1994) further decompose the technical efficiency change (TEch) component 
into a pure technical efficiency component and a scale efficiency component as follows:  
 
Pure Technical Efficiency Ch. (PTEch)   = /0
1 831, 61 9
/0145 8 3145, 61459 
 
 
Scale Efficiency Ch. (SEch) = ./?@
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/0145831, 619
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/?@1  831, 619
/018 31, 61 9
 ∗  /0 1  83145, 61459/?@1 83145, 61459;

 <⁄
 
 
    
(5)  
(6)  
(8)   
(7)   
      CHAPTER 5. COMPARISON OF EFFICIENCY AND PRODUCTIVITY CHANGES OF ISLAMIC 
AND CONVENTIONAL BANKS:EVIDENCE FROM EUROPE AND MUSLIM-
MAJORITY COUNTRIES  
 
132 
 
   Where PTEch*SEch = change in technical efficiency (TEch). PTEch measures the relative 
ability of the DMUs to convert inputs into outputs. It is defined as the ratio of the own-period 
distance functions in each period under VRS. SEch, on the other hand, captures changes in the 
deviation between the VRS and CRS technology. It measures to what extent the DMUs can take 
advantage of returns to scale by altering its size towards optimal scale (Färe et al. 1994). 
However, changes in SE may be caused by: I) changes in the shape of technology, II) changes in 
the location of the bank in the input/output space between (t1) and (t2), or a combination of (I) 
and (II). While any change in the PTE is caused by a movement of the bank relative to the 
existing technology (Hassan, 2005). 
 
5.4.2.3.   The DEA- second-stage analysis : OLS-regression approach  
 
  In order to account for the macroeconomic effects on banking efficiency, we adjust the sample 
data for differences among countries by deflating all variables using the Consumer Price Index 
(CPI). We also perform the two-stage method to test the statistical association of the efficiency 
estimates, obtained from DEA model-1 to model-4, with variables that are neither considered 
inputs nor outputs and also to determine their influence on the bias-corrected efficiency scores. 
Thus, after solving for DEA, the efficiency scores are regressed upon the environmental 
variables which could influence the efficiency of a bank (Sufian and Zulkhibri, 2008).  
 
  Due to the fact that the dependent variable in DEA analysis has an upper limit of 100% 
(censored variable) and because we have to deal with biases caused by inefficiency, Tobit 
regression is not valid to be applied in this stage of analysis (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000). 
McDonald (2009) advocates using (OLS) in the DEA 2-stage arguing that it is considered a 
consistent estimator. In this chapter, we examine the following econometric regression model: 
 
 
 
 
 
  Where the subscript (j) refers to a bank, and the subscript (t) refers to a sample year. The 
dependent variable 8Bs) is the bank’s pure technical efficiency (DEAPTE) which is regressed on a 
set of common explanatory variables (Table 5.7- appendix). In this chapter, the efficiency of 
Islamic banks based on binary comparisons is analyzed. Consequently, two regression models 
  E.1: 8 ξs9 =  α +  G
BP.J+G< PER.J+GM LIQ.J+ GP LOG. 8AS9J 
          +GU LTA.J +GW DEPO.J+GY IND.J+ GZ AGEJ 
             +G[ LEV.J +G
 GDPJ  +G

GEO.J+ε 
(9)   
      CHAPTER 5. COMPARISON OF EFFICIENCY AND PRODUCTIVITY CHANGES OF ISLAMIC 
AND CONVENTIONAL BANKS:EVIDENCE FROM EUROPE AND MUSLIM-
MAJORITY COUNTRIES  
 
133 
 
(E1 and E2) were basically measured. The first model (E1: model-M1 and model-M2) measures 
the relative efficiency of IBB and BBI against small and large Islamic banks from Muslim 
countries, respectively. The second model (E2: model-M3 and model-M4) investigates the 
relative efficiency performance of the IBB and BBI against small conventional banks in the UK 
and Bosnia respectively. Empirically, in E2, we replaced the predictor variable (G

 GEO.J 9 by 
the predictor variable (β11DIVERjt). This is basically in order to test if Islamic banks generally 
enjoy a lower diversification benefit than their conventional counterparts. 
 
 
5.5.     Empirical results 
 
  In this section, we first introduce the results pertaining to the efficiency scores (mainly DEAPTE 
scores because we originally estimate our model under the assumption of DEA-VRS) of IBB and 
BBI relative to the small and large Islamic banks in Muslim countries and also relative to the 
small conventional banks in the UK and BiH, respectively (Table 5.2.1-5.2.4). This is followed 
directly by the presentation of the results obtained from the comparative analysis of the 
productivity growth of IBB and BBI relative to small Islamic banks from Muslim-majority 
countries (Table 5.3.1-5.3.4). We then discus the progress in productivity of BBI and IBB 
relative to a carefully selected sample of conventional banks in BiH (Table 5.5.1-5.5.4) and in 
the UK (Table 5.6.1- 5.6.4). Finally, we present the results of the DEA-second stage analysis of 
efficiency performance. 
 
5.5.1. Cross-country analysis of banks efficiency performance: DEA-based analysis 
 
    Table 5.2.1 illustrates the DEA-efficiency scores: overall efficiency (Crste), pure technical 
efficiency (DEAPTE) and scale efficiency (DEASE)) of IBB and BBI relative to small Islamic 
banks from Muslim-majority countries (model-M1). Results show that both banks have pure 
technical efficiency scores of less than 1 (DEAPTE<1) in each sample year, and thus, are identified 
as relatively technically inefficient compared to other Islamic banks in model-M1. Results also 
suggest that, despite being technically inefficient, both, IBB and BBI, exhibit an upward trend in 
DEAPTE scores. Therefore, they have substantial room for improvements to sustain a competitive 
edge in Europe. Overall, it is clear that BBI seems to perform slightly better (closer to the best-
practice frontier) than IBB in terms of the average (DEAPTE) (Fig. 5.1-appendix).  
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  Scale efficiency scores for individual banks-(DEASE) in model-M1 (Table 5.2.1) show that the 
IBB experiences a decreasing returns-to-scale (DEADRS) (so-called diseconomies of scale). This 
implies that the bank is too large (and has supra-optimum scale size) to take full advantage of 
scale, and so it should simply shrink certain outputs (i.e. total non-interest bearing loans and total 
revenues), because we primarily assume an output-oriented model. In contrast, BBI has an 
increasing return-to-scale (DEAIRS) implying that the bank is too small for its scale of operations 
and thus operates at sub-optimum scale size. BBI is scale inefficient due to its potential to 
achieve much higher levels of outputs in BiH. BBI could, however, improve its efficiency by 
scaling up operations and activities. Results also show that the DEASE of BBI and IBB is higher 
than the banks’ DEAPTE in all years (e.g.  DEASE (BBI-2005) = 99.1% > DEAPTE (BBI-2005) = 24.3%, 
DEASE (BBI-2006) = 99.4% > DEAPTE (BBI-2006) = 34.5%, etc.)7. This demonstrates that the overall 
technical inefficiency appears to be largely due to pure technical
 
inefficiency rather than scale 
inefficiency. Based on these results, and due to the fact that the DEAPTE captures the 
management practices while the DEASE reveals whether or not the bank operates under optimal 
size, it seems that the banks inefficiencies are mostly due to poor management. 
 
 
  In comparison with large Islamic banks in model-M2 (Table 5.2.2), BBI shows efficient 
performance in the first two years (DEAPTE (2005-2006) =1) despite its small size. The bank’s 
efficiency scores gradually decreased over time until it became inefficient throughout 2007-2008 
(DEAPTE (2007-2008) < 1). Surprisingly, BBI is slightly better able to operate closer to its efficient 
frontier than IBB (Fig. 5.2- appendix). However, unlike BBI, IBB shows an overall upward trend 
of DEAPTE scores over the sample period (e.g. DEAPTE (2006) =65.8%, DEA PTE (2007) =70%, and 
DEAPTE (2008) =86.9%). By and large, both banks report a low DEASE compared to DEAPTE and 
consistently achieve a DEAIRS over the sample period. Such results imply that they suffer most 
from the non-optimal level (size) of operations. 
 
  We measure the comparative efficiency scores of BBI versus small conventional banks in BiH 
banking industry in model-M3 (Table 5.2.3 and Fig. 5.3- appendix). Results confirm the 
previous findings and show that the bank is, by and large, inefficient and its mean performance is  
____________________________ 
7 Secondarily, in order to further extend the explanation of results concerning the efficiency performance of Islamic banks in Europe, results from 
Table 5.2.1 also illustrates that the Islamic banks from Turkey (geographically speaking, Turkey belongs to Europe) achieve efficiency scores of 
less than 1 over the first 3-years. In contrast, in 2008, they become increasingly more efficient. The DEAPTE for these banks is, on average, higher 
than DEASE consequently, bank’s inefficiency was attributed largely to scale inefficiency and to a lesser extent to the pure technical inefficiency. 
However, our analysis shows that the Turkish Islamic banks are more efficient than BBI and IBB. For example in 2005, the DEAPTE for IBB and 
BBI is 30.7% and 24.3% compared to 76.1% and 89.3% for Albaraka Turk bank and Kuveyt Turk bank, respectively. Turkish Islamic banks 
record a DEADRS over the sample years. This indicates that they could improve their own efficiency by scaling down activities because they are 
too large for the volume of operations they conduct. 
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at the lower end of the spectrum of small banks. BBI operates at increasing returns to scale 
(DEAIRS), suggesting that the bank is relatively small compared to its counterparties-
conventional banks. Meanwhile, the bank’s DEAPTE is higher than DEASE and thus, its overall 
inefficiency appears to be mostly due to scale (size of banks operation) rather than pure technical 
inefficiency (management practices).  
   
  Similarly, we measure the comparative efficiency scores of IBB against small conventional 
banks in the UK in model-M4 (Table 5.2.4 and Fig. 5.4-appendix). Results reveal that IBB fails 
again to appear on the efficiency frontier over the years 2006-08, and hence is identified as 
inefficient. In contrast to BBI, IBB operates at a DEADRS (diseconomies of scale-too high scale 
of operation) throughout the sample period. Meanwhile, pure technical (in)efficiency dominates 
scale (in)efficiency (SE05-08>PTE05-08). Based on that, IBB is said to be technically inefficient 
largely due to ‘bad‘ management and to some extent because of the non-optimal size of 
operations.  
 
  Overall, results from model-M1, M2, M3, and M4 show that the DEAPTE of large Islamic banks 
from Muslim-majority countries is, on average, on a declining trend from 2005 to 2008. On 
contrary, IBB  experiences a trend of increasing efficiency relative to other Islamic banks (small 
and large) over the period 2006-2008 but records a negative trend of efficiency performance 
levels as compared to conventional banks in the UK. Meanwhile, BBI suffers a decline in 
estimated efficiency during 2007 and 2008, strikingly though, at a low rate compared with most 
of its conventional-counterparts in BiH, and Islamic banks (particularly the large banks) in 
Muslim countries. This, however, reflects a smaller impact of the global financial crisis of 2007-
2008 on small Islamic banks, either from Muslim countries or from Europe. This also suggests 
that they can provide certain services better and more efficiently than their counterparties-
conventional banks and the large Islamic banks from GCC-States, Malaysia, and Turkey.8 
 
5.5.2. Cross-country analysis of banks productivity growth: DEA-based MPI analysis   
  
   In this section, we focus on productivity changes with respect to the 14 small Islamic banks 
operating within and outside Europe (model-M1). Tables 5.3.1 to 5.3.3 report the estimated 
_______________________________________ 
8 
 Our analysis shows that Kauther bank is a special case. It is efficient because it receives unit efficiency scores over the sample years in model-
M1. But because the bank has the smallest inputs and outputs, it has no peers to which it can be compared, and thus, it is considered as efficient 
‘by default’. All other banks in our sample have comparable units except Kauther bank. The bank is self-identified as 100% efficient not because 
it dominates other banks but because there are no other banks with which it is comparable. This, however, indicates that Kauther bank is not truly 
(should not be regarded) efficient relative to other banks in the sample.  
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values of the Malmquist-based total factor productivity (TFP) index, along with its two 
subcomponents: changes in technical efficiency (TEch) and changes in technological efficiency 
(TECch). Subtracting 1 from the reported results yields an average percentage increase or 
decrease per annum. 
 
  Table 5.3.1 shows that the Islamic banking sector, within and outside Europe, exhibits a 
decreasing trend in the relative TFP growth over the sample period, with a mean TFP of 106.3% 
in 2005-06, 96.5% in 2006-07, and 95.1% in 2007-08. In contrast, both IBB and BBI yield 
positive growth until 2006-07, but the trend reverses in 2007-08. Overall, results illustrate an 
inefficient performance of the entire Islamic banking sector, with a mean TFPch of 99.3% 
(indicating 0.7% decline in TFP). By specifically analyzing the efficiency performance of ‘old‘ 
versus ‘new‘ banks, 9 findings suggest that some old (large) banks from Muslim countries, such 
as Albaraka Turk, Kuveyet Turk, and QIIB, have been able to achieve a positive productivity 
growth TFPch of 4%, 1.4%, and 7.7%, respectively. Strikingly, some of the newer banks, 
particularly from Europe, achieved a much higher TFP growth. For example, BBI exhibits an 
average increase (growth) of 24.8% in TFP2005-08 mainly due to high average growth rate 
(progress) of 2.9% (Table 5.3.2) in technological efficiency (TECch). This suggests that the 
desirable increase in TFP of the BBI should be primarily based on technology innovation rather 
than the improvement in technical efficiency. However, IBB, in contrast, produces an average 
decline (negative growth) of TFP2005-08 = -3.6% (calculated as 1 – 96.4%) driven mostly by the 
significant regress of 29.8% (calculated as 1 – 70.2%) in the bank’s TECch (Table 5.3.2).  
   
 
   Table 5.3.2 presents the index values of technological progress/regress as measured by average 
shifts in the best-practice frontier from period (t) to (t+1). Results show an overall downward 
trend in the Islamic banking sector’s technological (innovation) efficiency (TECch) throughout 
the sample years (i.e. 15% in 2005-06,-6.8% in 2006-07, and -10.5% in 2007-08). The sector 
suffers, however, an average regress of -0.8% (calculated as 1-99.2%) in TEC over sample years. 
Large portion of the productivity regression in 2007-08 was caused by Islamic banks from 
Muslim countries. Islamic banks from the UK, BiH and Turkey accounted for a relatively small 
amount of the aggregate technological inefficiency. For example, while many banks show a 
negative TECch growth in 2007-08, BBI and IBB show an upward trend in TECch, proving their 
___________________ 
  
9
 
 The bank’s age is calculated from the date of incorporation until the 1st of 2010. For the purpose of our study, banks that are not older than 10 
years (Age ≤10 years) are considered new.  Otherwise, they are considered as old banks. 
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ability to get closer to the productivity frontier with high TECch scores of 95.4% and 92.8% 
respectively.  
 
  Table 5.3.3 displays changes in the relative technical efficiency (TEch) for each individual 
bank. Results show a considerable variation across banks and years. On average, BBI is 
relatively technically efficient with mean score of 1. Kauther bank records the highest efficiency 
change of 16.7%, followed directly by IBB with average efficiency scores of 15.3%. Such results 
illustrate that the Islamic banks from Europe perform relatively better than some of those 
operating in Muslim-majority countries despite the legal obstacles and economic restrictions, 
such as the conventional banking regulations and the lack of uniform standards of credit analysis, 
which may put these banks in a challenging situation. This could be due to the fact that the 
Islamic banks from Muslim countries, either small or large, are relatively larger (in terms of total 
asset) than Islamic banks that are operating in Europe. Therefore, they tend to engage in more 
complex Islamic-compatible products and services, which could negatively affect the banks’ 
relative efficiency levels. Overall, findings show that the Islamic banking sector has been in a 
downward trend in technical efficiency from 2005-07 but, surprisingly, shows a quick recovery 
in 2007-08 despite the global financial and economic crisis which commenced in 2007. 
 
  Table 5.3.4 presents the decomposition of the technical efficiency change into two 
subcomponents namely: pure technical efficiency change (PTEch) and scale efficiency change 
(SEch). The table clearly shows that the PTEch is higher than the SEch in 2005-06 and 2006-07. 
This implies that the technical inefficiency change for the Islamic banking sector is primarily 
driven by scale inefficiency (non-optimal size of operations). In contrast, SEch is higher than 
PTEch in 2007-08, which suggests that the technical inefficiency in Islamic banks, as they 
become mature, is more than likely due to the managerial factors, such as shortage of Islamic 
finance expertise versed in Shari’ah law. Overall, it seems that the growth in TFP for Islamic 
banking sector is largely contributed by PTEch rather than SEch (average SEch=99.1% < 
average PTEch=106.3%). This indicates that the size of the bank does matter in affecting 
productivity changes and implies that the banks future growth in TFP could be based on the size 
of the bank's operations.  
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5.5.3.     Inter-bank analysis of banks productivity growth: DEA-based MPI analysis 
5.5.3.1.  The banking industry in Bosnia and Herzegovina  
  
  The results in Table 5.5.1 show that the BBI records the highest value in total factor 
productivity growth (TFPch) for 2005-06 relative to all counterparties-conventional banks. But it 
gradually loses its superiority over other banks and is unable to maintain its number one position 
in subsequent years. Overall, the bank still retains the highest mean TFPch over sample years.   
 
  Concerning the analysis of banks TECch (Table 5.5.2), findings suggest that all conventional 
banks in BiH experience both technology progress and regress. Surprisingly, BBI consistently 
exhibits a technology progress during the sample period. More specifically, BBI records a 
positive growth of 5.2% in 2005-06, 22.3% in 2006-07 and 7.4% in 2007-08. BBI records also 
an average growth rate of 11.6% (1.116 -1) compared with an average TECch of 8.1% 
(calculated as: (1+1.1+1.307+1.022+1.128+0.927)/6) attained by (all) counterparties-
conventional banks.  These results, however, suggest that the high factor productivity growth 
achieved by average banks in Bosnia's banking sector, including the BBI, as observed in (Table 
5.5.1) is largely attributed to the technological efficiency rather than technical efficiency. 
 
   Table 5.5.3 reports the changes in banks’ relative technical efficiency (TEch) while Table 5.5.4   
reports the changes in the components of technical efficiency (PTEch and SEch). Results in 
Table 5.5.3 show that the overall Bosnia's banking industry, as well as BBI, suffers a clear 
declining trend in estimated TEch from 2005 to 2008 (i.e. TEchsector 05-06=109% > TEchsector 06-
07= 101.6% > TEchsector 07-08= 98.5% meanwhile, TEchBBI 05-06=120.6% > TEchBBI 06-07= 102.3% 
> TEchBBI 07-08= 94.3%). As far as the full sample period is concerned, BBI records, on average, 
the third-highest mean TEch of 5.7% as compared to counterparties-conventional banks. This 
suggests that BBI has made relatively better technical progress than some of conventional banks 
having the same economic circumstances and similar size. 
 
  Results in Table 5.5.4 show that the mean PTEch of banks in BiH is less than the mean SEch 
throughout 2005-2007. In 2007-2008 the mean PTEch becomes higher than the mean SEch. 
Similarly, at the individual bank level, the PTEch
 
for
 
BBI trends up over the years 2005-2008 
and eventually outperforms SEch in 2007-08 (SEch07-08 =94.3 < PTEch07-08 =1). These results 
indicate that the PTEch (improvements in management practices) appears to be a less important 
source of future growth of technical efficiency as compared to the optimal size component.  
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   Overall, findings show that the highest growth in mean TFP, TECch, and TEch was achieved 
by banks other than the BBI. This growth was driven by banks' optimal scale of operations. The 
relative superiority of (some) conventional banks over BBI may re-emphasize the important role 
of the conventional economic restrictions and the lack of legal support and effective prudential 
regulations on affecting the efficiency performance of Islamic banks in BiH. 
 
5.5.3.2.   The banking industry in the UK 
 
  Table 5.6.1 shows that the IBB records an upward trend in TFP over the sample years (i.e. 
78.4% in 2005-06, 90.6% in 2006-07, and 93.4% in 2007-08). Despite this positive trend, the 
bank suffers the highest average TFP deterioration of -12.5% (calculated as 1 - 87.5%) over 
2005-2008 relative to counterparties banks. In contrast, the average counterparties-conventional 
banks produce positive growth of 4.2% (calculated as: 1- (1.009+1.058+1.009+0.998+1.162+1.01 
4) /6) for the same time interval.  
 
  In terms of the relative technological change (TECch), results in Table 5.6.2 show an increasing 
growth rate in technological innovations for average conventional banks over the period 2005-
2007 (i.e. from 118.2% in 2005-2006 to 128.1% in 2006-2007, calculations do not include IBB) 
but reveal also a sudden decrease in TEC growth rates during the adverse economic conditions in 
2007-08 with a TECch =126.3%. In contrast, IBB individually exhibits a strong and consistent 
upward trend in the average TECch over the sample years (i.e. TECch
-05-06 =78.4% and TECch06-
07 =90.6%) and also, surprisingly, it becomes technologically efficient with a TECch= 100.8% in 
2007-2008. Such results confirm that the Islamic banking in the UK has a strong long-term 
potential for further growth in technology innovation in spite of the economic downturns.  
  
  Table 5.6.3 presents the findings related to banks relative technical efficiency (TEch). Overall, 
results illustrate that the entire UK banking sector (Islamic and conventional) experiences a 
gradual decrease in technical efficiency (i.e. from 102.2% in 2005-06 to 101.03% and 97.4% in 
2006-07 and 2007-08 respectively). More specifically, IBB suffers a sharp decline of 7.3% 
(calculated as: 1- 92.7%) in the technical efficiency performance in 2007-08 after two years of 
good and consistent performance. By and large, results clearly illustrate that the IBB is still 
nascent and lagging behind its counterparties-conventional banks in the UK financial system 
with an overall mean TEch of -2.4% (calculated as: 1- 97.6%).   
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  Table 5.6.4 summarizes the changes in the two components of bank‘s technical efficiency in the 
UK. The UK conventional banks, on average, have a low SEch relative to its PTEch (i.e. 
PTEch05-08 =100.9% > SEch05-08 =99.9%, IBB is excluded from calculation), indicating that the 
sector’s technical inefficiency is largely scale in nature rather than managerial. In contrast, IBB 
records the highest deterioration of – 6.9% (1- 93.1%) in PTE in 2007 and 2008. It also records a 
low deterioration rate of -0.5% (1- 99.5%) in SE for the same period. This suggests that the size 
of IBB operations appears to be less important source to further technical efficiency growth as 
compared to the PTEch, which is primary driver of the IBB inefficient performance.  
 
  Overall, results suggest that the average growth of 1.8% in TFPch (Table 5.6.1), 1.6% in 
TECch (Table 5.6.2), and 0.30% in TEch (Table 5.6.3) in the UK banking sector (conventional 
and Islamic) is more likely due to management efforts rather than the scale component. More 
specifically, on average, IBB records the lowest average growth of –12.5% in TFPch, which is 
driven mainly by the bank’s average technological (TECch) regress of –10.1%. However, the 
TEch contribution to the bank’s low growth in TFPch is relatively minor. 
 
5.5.4.    Adjustment to the environmental differences: OLS-regression results 
  
    The second-stage DEA analysis reveals a different set of findings. In contrast to the DEA-
efficiency results, which suggest that the bank size has no significant predictable effect on its 
efficiency, the second- stage DEA  analysis shows  that the bank size  has  a significant positive 
relationship with DEAPTE efficiency scores, in model-M2, (t = 2.743, p = 0.05).10, 11 This 
indicates that the larger Islamic banks have inevitably higher DEAPTE. The large size promotes 
technical efficiency by inducing economies of scale to reduce average total costs. Large size is 
also anticipated to enable banks to be more diversified in an uncertain macroeconomic 
environment, to mobilize more funds and hence generate high returns to its depositors, and to 
finance a large number of profitable investment opportunities. 
 
  In testing the relationship between leverage and efficiency performance, we find a significant 
positive relationship in model-M3 (small conventional banks) with (t= 1.856, p<0.10). This illus-  
 
______________________________________________ 
10
 As stated previously in chapter 4, in practice, the application of both regression and DEA on the same data set often produces strikingly 
different efficiency results, particularly in the small samples which are prevalent in regulated industries (Cubbins, and Tzanikadis, 1998). 
 
11
 If α = 0.05 and If p ≤ 0.05, we reject the null hypothesis and accept the alternative hypothesis. 
 
      CHAPTER 5. COMPARISON OF EFFICIENCY AND PRODUCTIVITY CHANGES OF ISLAMIC 
AND CONVENTIONAL BANKS:EVIDENCE FROM EUROPE AND MUSLIM-
MAJORITY COUNTRIES  
 
141 
 
trates that small conventional banks with high levels of leverage are more efficient. A high 
leverage or a low capital adequacy reduces the agency cost and increases a bank’s efficiency. 
Thus, the high performing banks acquire more debt (Ross, 1977). The leverage also allows small 
banks to make a lot of safer loans and therefore plenty of investment returns.  
 
  Another important finding is the regression coefficient between the obtained DEA scores and 
the financial ratios (ROA and ROE). Interestingly, the analysis reveals a statistically significant 12 
relationship between the variables in model-M1 (t = 2.243, p < 0.05), in model-M2 (t = 2.437, p 
< 0.05), and in model-M3 (t = 2.089, p < 0.10). Findings illustrate that the more profitable 
Islamic (small and large) and conventional banks are more efficient. Such results suggest that the 
various measures of efficiency are strongly associated with the traditional accounting measures 
of performance, which are always considered as useful tool for comparing one bank against 
another, and hence are robust and not ‘valueless’ artifacts of our advanced techniques.  
 
   To assess the effects of the skills utilization on the bank’s efficiency, we use the human         
management as proxy. Results show a statistically significant relationship between efficiency 
scores and staff utilization variables in model-M2 (t = 7.939, p<0.001). The results suggest a 
strong link between increased investment in skills and the positive efficiency trends in the large 
Islamic banks. In contrast, the same explanatory variable does not have a significant influence on 
promoting efficiency for conventional banks. 
 
  The proxy for economic conditions (GDP) displays a positive and significant relationship with 
DEAPTE in model-M1 (t = 2.257, p < 0.05), and in model-M2 (t = 2.239, p < 0.05). Such a result 
indicates that the favorable macroeconomic conditions seem to stimulate higher efficiency. This 
is due to the fact that the excessive demand for Islamic financial services tends to grow as 
economies expand.   
 
  
 To control for the effects of the geographical region on banks’ efficiency, the predictor (GEO.) 
is used. Results suggest that small Islamic banks from Europe exhibit a much better performance   
compared with large Islamic banks operating in Muslim countries (t = 2.138, p<0.05-model-M2) 
in spite of the restrictions and conventional regulations in the UK banking industry. It is 
significantly more complex for Islamic banks to adjust their credit risk monitoring system as 
they become bigger. Large banks tend to engage in more PLS arrangements compared to small b- 
_____________________________________________________ 
12
 Because of the high correlation between ROA and ROE (M1: r= 0.795, M2: r=0.933, and M3: r=0.837), the later measure was dropped from the analysis 
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anks and thus, monitoring schemes becomes more diverse, which could consequently reduce 
banks efficiency (Čihák and Hesse, 2008). 
 
  To capture the effects of liquidity and the absence of an international inter-bank money market 
for Islamic banks on their overall efficiency, the independent variable (liquidity) is used. Results 
reveal a significant negative relationship between the liquidity predictor and the DEAPTE in the 
context of conventional banking system in model-M3 (t=-1.891, p<0.10). This indicates that 
conventional banks that accumulate a significant amount of liquid resources have inefficient 
performance. In the context of Islamic banks, the analysis fails to find significant relationship 
between liquidity and DEAPTE in model-M1 and model-M2.  
 
  Results regarding the effects of banks' diversification on the DEAPTE scores reveal insignificant 
inverse relationship. It appears that there is no significant difference between Islamic and 
conventional banks in term of product diversity. This finding, nevertheless, does not support the 
prevailing belief that Islamic banks generally enjoy a lower diversification benefit than their 
conventional counterparts because they enjoy limited set of investments opportunities due to the        
Shari’ah restrictions.  
 
  Additionally, with regard to the impact of the age of a bank on efficiency, results show 
insignificant negative coefficients in all models. This suggests that new banks can be as efficient 
as old banks. However, the negative direction in the relationship between the two variables 
suggests that older banks are not necessarily flexible enough to make the rapid adjustments to 
changing circumstances as opposed to new banks which are considered more entrepreneurial.  
 
  In order to estimate the effects of the bank's market share on efficiency, we use the bank’s de-
posits as a proxy. Results reveal a statistically insignificant negative relationship between the 
two variables. The insignificant correlation between the two variables, theoretically, suggests 
that the more efficient banks may have either a lower or higher market share, implying that 
banks with small market share can be at least as efficient as the market prominent banks are.  
 
  The proxy of bank’s loans intensity shows a statistically insignificant positive relationship with 
DEAPTE. This illustrates that small banks with higher loans-to-assets ratios might have either 
higher or lower efficiency scores. As a result, small banks' loans seem not to be valued more than 
alternative banks outputs. Eventually, the estimation of the lack of independency factor that is 
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used to capture the impact of a bank’s dependency on its efficiency reveals an insignificant 
relationship with DEAPTE. This indicates that there is no evidence that a bank’s independence is 
related to high efficiency.  
 
5.6.     Conclusions 
 
  Based on DEA-efficiency scores, our findings suggest that the Islamic Bank of Britain (IBB) 
and Bosna Bank International (BBI) are technically inefficient compared to small and large 
Islamic banks in Muslim countries and small conventional banks in the UK and Bosnia (BiH) 
respectively. Banks’ inefficiency, by and large, stems from inefficient management compared 
with small Islamic banks. In comparison with large Islamic banks, the relative inefficiency of 
IBB and BBI becomes rather scale in nature. In comparison with small conventional banks, the 
non-optimal size of operations becomes more significant to explain the relative inefficiency of 
BBI, but in case of IBB the poor management plays more considerable impact on its 
inefficiency. 
 
  Our findings indicate that the BBI displays, despite its inefficiency, higher average efficiency 
scores than IBB, and thus is better able to operate closer to the efficient frontier. IBB, in contrast 
to BBI, exhibits not only lower efficiency scores, but also unstable trends in its overall 
performance. Specifically, while the bank provides a strong growth potential by recording a 
sustained upward trend in estimated efficiency as compared with other Islamic banks, it 
strikingly, shows a negative trend in efficiency levels over the sample period as compared with 
conventional banks. 
 
  Results pertaining to the Malmquist Productivity Index indicate that the BBI yields a positive 
growth in total factor productivity, mainly due to the progress in technical efficiency. The bank 
also achieves an impressive technological-(innovation) progress. This trend subsequently 
reverses, apparently because of the adverse market conditions. In contrast, IBB, as well as 
Islamic banking sector, suffers a negative growth in total factor productivity, driven, to a large 
extent, by the regress in banks’ innovation. Findings further reveal that, in contrast to the entire 
Islamic banking sector, both, IBB and BBI, experience a remarkable growth in technical 
efficiency prior to the 2007 crisis, but they are exposed to a significant decline after the 
emergence of the crisis, primarily due to a lack of management skills. Nevertheless, on average, 
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IBB and BBI produce overall better substantial growth in technical efficiency compared to some 
other Islamic banks. 
 
  In comparison with conventional banks in the BiH banking sector, BBI gradually loses its 
superiority in both total factor productivity and technical efficiency, but still retains a high mean 
growth rate in both indices over the years. Overall, the improvements in management practices 
appear to be a less important source for further growth in the BBI’s technical efficiency as 
compared to the optimal size component. Moreover, compared to conventional banks in the UK, 
IBB records higher average deterioration in total factor productivity growth driven by the bank’s 
average (mean values at the end of 4-sample years) innovation regress. However, a continuing 
upward trend is found in the IBB’s innovation over time. In terms of technical efficiency 
changes, IBB is lagging behind its counterparties banks, mainly due to inferior management.  
 
  In terms of the DEA-second stage analysis, findings illustrate that the more efficient Islamic 
banks are larger in size, have greater profit potential, acquire lower levels of debt and have 
increased investment in required skills. Furthermore, a more efficient use of banks resources is 
highly associated with a higher GDP-per capita.  
 
      CHAPTER 5. COMPARISON OF EFFICIENCY AND PRODUCTIVITY CHANGES OF ISLAMIC 
AND CONVENTIONAL BANKS:EVIDENCE FROM EUROPE AND MUSLIM-
MAJORITY COUNTRIES  
 
145 
 
           
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5.2.2   
DEA-Efficiency scores: IBB & BBI in comparison with large Islamic banks 
from Muslim countries (Model-M2). 
Year   Country The Bank crste   vrste    scale rts 
2005 BiH BBI 0.329  1.000  0.329 irs 
2005 U.K IBB 0.326  1.000  0.326 irs 
2005 Qatar Qatar Islamic Bank 0.969  0.982  0.986 irs 
2005 Kuwait Kuwait Finance House 0.848  0.880  0.963 drs 
2005 Bahrain Albaraka Islamic bank 0.512  0.514  0.998 irs 
2005 K.S.A Bank Albilad 0.691  0.717  0.963 irs 
2005 K.S.A Al Rajhi Bank 1.000  1.000  1.000  - 
2005 K.S.A Aljazira 0.715  0.736  0.971 drs 
2005 U.A,E Emirates Islamic Bank 0.771  0.822  0.937 irs 
2005 U.A.E DIB 1.000  1.000  1.000  - 
2005 Malaysia Bank Islam 0.682  0.691  0.987 irs 
2006 BiH BBI 0.379  1.000  0.379 irs 
2006 U.K IBB 0.321  0.658  0.488 irs 
2006 Qatar Qatar Islamic Bank 1.000  1.000  1.000  - 
2006 Kuwait Kuwait Finance House 0.741  0.816  0.908 drs 
2006 Bahrain Albaraka Islamic bank 0.590  0.591  0.998 irs 
2006 K.S.A Bank Albilad 0.512  0.518  0.989 irs 
2006 K.S.A Al Rajhi Bank 1.000  1.000  1.000  - 
2006 K.S.A Aljazira 1.000  1.000  1.000  - 
2006 U.A,E Emirates Islamic Bank 0.814  0.837  0.973 irs 
2006 U.A.E DIB 0.882  0.914  0.966 drs 
2006 Malaysia Bank Islam 0.513  0.520  0.988 irs 
2007 BiH BBI 0.471  0.854  0.552 irs 
2007 U.K IBB 0.360  0.700  0.515 irs 
2007 Qatar Qatar Islamic Bank 0.956  0.966  0.989 irs 
2007 Kuwait Kuwait Finance House 0.969  1.000  0.969 drs 
2007 Bahrain Albaraka Islamic bank 0.641  0.648  0.989 drs 
2007 K.S.A Bank Albilad 0.469  0.472  0.994 irs 
2007 K.S.A Al Rajhi Bank 1.000  1.000  1.000  - 
2007 K.S.A Aljazira 0.448  0.487  0.920 drs 
2007 U.A,E Emirates Islamic Bank 0.774  0.787  0.984 irs 
2007 U.A.E DIB 0.831  0.854  0.973 drs 
2007 Malaysia Bank Islam 0.468  0.472  0.992 irs 
2008 BiH BBI 0.475  0.646  0.736 irs 
2008 U.K IBB 0.394  0.869  0.453 irs 
2008 Qatar Qatar Islamic Bank 1.000  1.000  1.000  - 
2008 Kuwait Kuwait Finance House 0.834  1.000  0.834 drs 
2008 Bahrain Albaraka Islamic bank 0.592  0.618  0.958 drs 
2008 K.S.A Bank Albilad 0.460  0.461  0.996 irs 
2008 K.S.A Al Rajhi Bank 0.918  1.000  0.918 drs 
2008 K.S.A Aljazira 0.400  0.401  0.998 irs 
2008 U.A,E Emirates Islamic Bank 0.824  0.826  0.998 irs 
2008 U.A.E DIB 0.665  0.667  0.996 drs 
 2008 Malaysia     Bank Islam 0.450  0.452  0.996 irs 
 
 
 
Table 5.2.3 
DEA efficiency scores:-(BBI) relative to small conventional banks in BiH ( Model-M3)      
Year The bank    crste  vrste  scale  rts 
2005 BBI 0.559  0.776  0.719 irs 
2005 VAKUFSKA BANKA 0.647  0.780  0.829 irs 
2005 ABS BANKA DD SARAJEVO 0.619  0.737  0.840 drs 
2005 Investiciono-komercijalna 0.501  1.000  0.501 irs 
2005 ProCredit Bank 0.818  1.000  0.818 drs 
2005 Balkan Investment bank 0.993  1.000  0.993 irs 
2005 Turkish Ziraat Bank Bosnia d.d. 1.000  1.000  1.000  - 
2006 BBI 0.705  1.000  0.705 irs 
2006 VAKUFSKA BANKA 0.565  0.645  0.875 irs 
2006 ABS BANKA DD SARAJEVO 0.678  0.809  0.838 drs 
2006 Investiciono-komercijalna 0.612  1.000  0.612 irs 
2006 ProCredit Bank 0.768  1.000  0.768 drs 
2006 Balkan Investment bank 0.823  0.963  0.854 irs 
2006 Turkish Ziraat Bank Bosnia d.d. 1.000  1.000  1.000  - 
2007 BBI 0.886  1.000  0.886 irs 
2007 VAKUFSKA BANKA 0.653  0.716  0.912 irs 
2007 ABS BANKA DD SARAJEVO 0.879  1.000  0.879 drs 
2007 Investiciono-komercijalna 0.782  1.000  0.782 irs 
2007 ProCredit Bank 0.699  1.000  0.699 drs 
2007 Balkan Investment bank 1.000  1.000  1.000  - 
2007 Turkish Ziraat Bank Bosnia d.d. 0.667  0.700  0.952 drs 
2008 BBI 0.908  0.976  0.930 irs 
2008 VAKUFSKA BANKA 0.841  0.894  0.941 irs 
2008 ABS BANKA DD SARAJEVO 1.000  1.000  1.000  - 
2008 Investiciono-komercijalna 1.000  1.000  1.000  - 
2008 ProCredit Bank 0.623  1.000  0.623 drs 
2008 Balkan Investment bank 1.000  1.000  1.000  - 
2008 Turkish Ziraat Bank Bosnia d.d. 0.984  0.984  1.000  - 
 
             Appendix-Ch.5: 
                
Table 5.2.1-5.2.4: DEA-efficiency scores: IBB & BBI relative to Islamic 
banks in Muslim countries and conventional banks in the UK & BiH. 
                
 Table 5.2.1   
 DEA-Efficiency scores: IBB & BBI in comparison with small Islamic 
 banks from Muslim countries (Model-M1). 
Year Country   The Bank    crste   vrste     scale    rts 
2005 B iH BBI 0.241  0.243  0.991 irs 
2005 U.K IBB 0.307  0.307  0.999  - 
2005 Azerbaijan Kauther bank 0.347  1.000  0.347 irs 
2005 Qatar Qatar International Islamic Bank 0.695  1.000  0.695 drs 
2005 Bahrain Khaleeji Commercial Bank 1.000  1.000  1.000  - 
2005 Bahrain Bahrain Islamic Bank 1.000  1.000  1.000  - 
2005 Bahrain Shamil Bank 0.453  0.497  0.912 drs 
2005 Bahrain Abc Islamic Bank 1.000  1.000  1.000  - 
2005 U.A.E Sharjah Islamic Bank 0.975  1.000  0.975 drs 
2005 Malaysia RHB 0.790  0.790  1.000  - 
2005 Malaysia CIMB 0.055  0.055  0.998  - 
2005 Turkey Albaraka Turk 0.621  0.761  0.816 drs 
2005 Turkey Kuveyt Turk 0.626  0.893  0.702 drs 
2005 Kwuait Boubyan Bank 0.893  0.898  0.994 drs 
2006 BiH BBI 0.343  0.345  0.994 irs 
2006 U.K IBB 0.285  0.306  0.931 drs 
2006 Azerbaijan Kauther bank 0.645  1.000  0.645 irs 
2006 Qatar Qatar International Islamic Bank 1.000  1.000  1.000  - 
2006 Bahrain Khaleeji Commercial Bank 0.985  0.986  0.999 irs 
2006 Bahrain Bahrain Islamic Bank 0.596  0.596  0.999  - 
2006 Bahrain Shamil Bank 0.591  0.625  0.946 drs 
2006 Bahrain Abc Islamic Bank 1.000  1.000  1.000  - 
2006 U.A.E Sharjah Islamic Bank 0.837  0.926  0.904 drs 
2006 Malaysia RHB 0.889  1.000  0.889 drs 
2006 Malaysia CIMB 0.629  0.632  0.996 irs 
2006 Turkey Albaraka Turk 0.657  0.820  0.801 drs 
2006 Turkey Kuveyt Turk 0.691  0.986  0.701 drs 
2006 Kwuait Boubyan Bank 0.806  0.841  0.959 drs 
2007 BiH BBI 0.483  0.485  0.996 irs 
2007 U.K IBB 0.369  0.381  0.968 drs 
2007 Azerbaijan Kauther bank 1.000  1.000  1.000  - 
2007 Qatar Qatar International Islamic Bank 1.000  1.000  1.000  - 
2007 Bahrain Khaleeji Commercial Bank 1.000  1.000  1.000  - 
2007 Bahrain Bahrain Islamic Bank 0.635  0.671  0.947 drs 
2007 Bahrain Shamil Bank 0.658  0.706  0.932 drs 
2007 Bahrain Abc Islamic Bank 1.000  1.000  1.000  - 
2007 U.A.E Sharjah Islamic Bank 0.761  0.879  0.866 drs 
2007 Malaysia RHB 0.612  0.845  0.724 drs 
2007 Malaysia CIMB 0.246  0.355  0.692 drs 
2007 Turkey Albaraka Turk 0.646  0.934  0.691 drs 
2007 Turkey Kuveyt Turk 0.629  0.948  0.663 drs 
2007 Kwuait Boubyan Bank 0.721  0.858  0.840 drs 
2008 BiH BBI 0.438  0.439  0.998 irs 
2008 U.K IBB 0.397  0.401  0.990 drs 
2008 Azerbaijan Kauther bank 0.918  1.000  0.918 irs 
2008 Qatar Qatar International Islamic Bank 0.871  1.000  0.871 drs 
2008 Bahrain Khaleeji Commercial Bank 0.852  1.000  0.852 drs 
2008 Bahrain Bahrain Islamic Bank 0.522  0.758  0.689 drs 
2008 Bahrain Shamil Bank 0.811  1.000  0.811 drs 
2008 Bahrain Abc Islamic Bank 1.000  1.000  1.000  - 
2008 U.A.E Sharjah Islamic Bank 0.820  1.000  0.820 drs 
2008 Malaysia RHB 0.585  0.863  0.678 drs 
2008 Malaysia CIMB 0.549  1.000  0.549 drs 
2008 Turkey Albaraka Turk 0.675  1.000  0.675 drs 
2008 Turkey Kuveyt Turk 0.626  1.000  0.626 drs 
2008 Kwuait Boubyan Bank 0.671  0.981  0.684 drs 
 
Year The bank crste     vrste   scale    rts 
2005 IBB 1.000  1.000  1.000   - 
2005 Turkish Bank (UK) 0.893  0.916  0.975     irs 
2005 ICBC London Limited 1.000  1.000  1.000   - 
2005 Habib Allied INT. Bank 0.873  0.905  0.966     drs 
2005 Ghana INT. Bnak 1.000  1.000  1.000   - 
2005 Bank of Beirut(UK)Ltd 0.964  1.000  0.964      irs 
2005 Bank Leumi UK 0.896  0.993  0.902     drs 
2006 IBB 0.825  0.901  0.916   drs 
2006 Turkish Bank (UK) 0.860  0.878  0.980     irs 
2006 ICBC London Limited 0.990  1.000  0.990     irs 
2006 Habib    Allied INT. 0.906  0.948  0.955    drs 
2006 Ghana INT. Bnak 1.000  1.000  1.000   - 
2006 Bank of Beirut(UK)Ltd 0.670  0.899  0.746     irs 
2006 Bank Leumi UK 0.949  1.000  0.949     drs 
2007 IBB 0.815  0.898  0.908   drs 
2007 Turkish Bank (UK) 0.860  0.860  1.000    - 
2007 ICBC London Limited 1.000  1.000  1.000    - 
2007 Habib Allied INT. Bank 0.938  0.978  0.959     drs 
2007 Ghana INT. Bnak 1.000  1.000  1.000   - 
2007 Bank of Beirut(UK)Ltd 0.774  0.847  0.913     irs 
2007 Bank Leumi UK 0.964  1.000  0.964    drs 
2008 IBB 0.789  0.856  0.922    drs 
2008 Turkish Bank (UK) 0.947  0.997  0.949     irs 
2008 ICBC London Limited 1.000  1.000  1.000   - 
2008 Habib Allied INT. Bank 0.938  0.977  0.960    drs 
2008 Ghana INT. Bnak 0.884  1.000  0.884    drs 
2008 Bank of Beirut(UK)Ltd 1.000  1.000  1.000  - 
2008 Bank Leumi UK 0.973  1.000  0.973    drs 
                         Table 5.2.4   
                     DEA efficiency scores: (IBB) relative to small conventional banks in UK ( Model-M4)      
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            Table 5.3.1- 5.3.4 :  
           MPI-Productivity growth: IBB & BBI in comparison to small Islamic banks in Muslim countries and in Europe.* 
 
Table 5.3.2  
Banks technological efficiency  change (TECch) ) between 2005-2008 
MEAN  07-08  06-07 05-06 Banks  Country 
1.029 0.954 0.721 1.412 BBI  BiH 
0.702  0.928 0.495  0.683 IBB UK 
1.383 0.803  1.839 1.508 Kauther bank Azerbaijan 
1.066  0.932 0.845  1.420 Albaraka Turk Turkey 
1.024  0.919 0.851 1.303 Kuveyet Turk Turkey 
1.077 0.812 1.034 1.385 QIIB Qatar 
0.934 0.799 1.077 0.925 KHCB Bahrain 
0.929 0.800 0.966 1.022 BisB  Bahrain 
1.132 0.853 1.066 1.476 Shamil bank Bahrain 
0.662 0.987 0.288 0.711 ABC Islamic Bahrain 
0.956 0.997 0.913 0.958 SIB Bahrain 
0.984 0.810 1.017 1.126 Boabyan   Kuwait 
0.873 0.974 0.594 1.050 RHB Malaysia 
1.141 0.961 1.341 1.122 CIMB Malaysia 
0.992 0.895 0.932 1.150  MEAN 
 
                 Table 5.3.1  
               Banks Total Factor productivity  change (TFPch) between 2005–08 
 
 
MEAN 07-08 06-07 05-06 Age*** Banks Country** 
1.248 0.873 1.447 1.423 9 BBI BiH 
0.964 0.925 1.050 0.917 6 IBB UK 
1.301 0.803 1.839 1.262 7**** Kauther bank Azerbaijan 
1.040 1.046 1.037 1.037 26 Albaraka Turk Turkey 
1.014 1.010 0.932 1.101 22 Kuveyet Turk Turkey 
1.077 0.812 1.034 1.385 20 QIIB Qatar 
0.934 0.799 1.077 0.925 6 KHCB Bahrain 
0.867 0.846 1.092 0.664 32 BisB Bahrain 
1.201 1.173 1.169 1.261 29 Shamil bank Bahrain 
0.662 0.987 0.288 0.711 24 ABC Islamic Bahrain 
0.959 1.073 0.877 0.926 35 SIB Bahrain 
0.924 0.921 0.854 0.998 7 Boabyan bank Kuwait 
0.800 0.944 0.406 1.050 6 RHB Malaysia 
0.913 1.107 0.413 1.219 8 CIMB Malaysia 
0.993 0.951 0.965 1.063 
  MEAN 
 
 *TFPch = Total Factor Productivity Change; TEch = Technical 
Efficiency Change; TECch = Technological Efficiency Change; PTEch 
= Pure Technical Efficiency Change; and SEch = Scale Efficiency 
Change.  
 
** Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) is a European country located on the 
Balkan Peninsula. Muslims in BiH constitute 45% or so of the 
population.  Azerbaijan is the largest country in the South Caucasus 
region of Eurasia. According to a 2009 Pew Research Center report, 
99.2% of the population is Muslim. Turkey is a Eurasian country. Islam 
is the dominant religion in Turkey. Nearly 97% of the people are 
Muslims.  
 
*** Age has been calculated from the date of incorporation until the 1st 
of 2010. 
 
****The bank has been working in Azerbaijan's banking sector 
since 1988.The previous name of the bank was ‘Universal Bank‘.  
It began to apply Islamic banking method on October 2002. 
 
 
                 Table 5.3.3  
             Banks technical efficiency  change (TEch) ) between 2005-2008 
 
MEAN 07-08  06-07 05-06 Banks  Country    
1.000 0.915 1.078 1.007 BBI BiH 
1.153 0.997 1.343 1.119 IBB UK 
1.167 1.000  1.000 1.500 Kauther bank Azerbaijan 
1.026 1.122 1.226 0.730  Albaraka Turk Turkey 
1.013 1.100 1.095 0.845 Kuveyet Turk Turkey 
1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 QIIB Qatar 
1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 KHCB Bahrain 
0.946 1.058 1.131 0.650 BisB  Bahrain 
1.109 1.375 1.097 0.855 Shamil bank Bahrain 
1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 ABC Islamic Bahrain 
1.001 1.076 0.961 0.967 SIB Bahrain 
0.955 1.137 0.840 0.887 Boabyan bank Kuwait 
0.884 0.969 0.683 1.000 RHB Malaysia 
1.121 1.193 0.308 1.861 CIMB Malaysia 
1.027 1.067 0.983 1.030 MEAN 
 
                
                 Table 5.3.4  
             Changes in technical efficiency  components between 2005-2008 
 
MEAN MEAN 
                07-08               06-07                        05-06 Banks Country 
SEch PTEch SEch PTEch SEch PTEch SEch PTEch 
 
 
1.025 1.302  1.081 0.899 1.016 1.976 0.977 1.032 BBI BiH 
0.999 1.415 0.999 0.998 1.002 1.901 0.997 1.347 IBB UK 
1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 Kauther Azerbaijan 
1.009 1.007 1.122 1.000 1.062 1.155 0.844 0.866 Albaraka.T Turkey 
1.013 1.000 1.100 1.000 1.095 1.000 0.845 1.000 KuveyetT Turkey 
1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 QIIB Qatar 
1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 KHCB Bahrain 
1.000 0.946 1.011 1.047 0.991 1.141 0.998 0.651 BisB Bahrain 
1.021 1.085 1.021 1.347 1.034 1.061 1.008 0.847 Shamil Bahrain 
1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 ABC Bahrain 
1.001 1.000 1.076 1.000 0.961 1.000 0.967 1.000 SIB Bahrain 
0.962 0.997 1.110 1.024 0.783 1.073 0.992 0.894 Boabyan Kuwait 
0.932 0.953 1.095 0.885 0.700 0.975 1.000 1.000 RHB Malaysia 
0.905 1.169 1.028 1.251 0.683 0.451 1.005 1.804 CIMB Malaysia 
0.991 1.063 1.046 1.032  0.952 1.124    0.974 1.032   MEAN 
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                  Table 5.4 & 5.5.1-5.5.4: 
 
                   Table 5.4. 
                   Summary statistics of variables employed in the DEA analysis 
  
    
 
Factor* Min.** Max. Mean 
 
 
St. Dev. 
 
 
M1: Total Loans 0.003 15,67.810 513.343 434.834 
M1:Total Revenues 0.110 263.530 59.558 59.432 
M1: Total Expenses 0.100 16,768.770 33.305 2,236.673 
M1:Total Staff Cost 0.016 698.570 21.476 92.534 
M1: Total Deposits 0.580 3,172.440 655.458 612.139 
M2:  Total Loans 13.580 22,668.570 4,227.15 5,058.656 
M2: Total Revenues 1.140 1823.300 411.448 494.593 
M2:  Total Expenses 1.760 1005.160 151.686 194.736 
M2:Total Staff Cost 0.450 253.120 60.228 58.353 
M2:  Total Deposits 25.420 19,682.360 4,216.93 4,595.808 
M3:  Total Loans 31.430 290.090 100.91 71.045 
M3: Total Revenues 3.240 38.460 14.422 9.243 
M3:  Total Expenses 4.680 39.040 11.297 8.564 
M3:Total Staff Cost 0.190 16.580 4.460 4.188 
M3:  Total Deposits 0.890 289.300 104.16 63.304 
M4:Total Loans 29.400 1,278.720 298.965 354.175 
M4:Total Revenues 2.211 38.110 10.927 10.700 
M4:Total Expenses 1.510 19.600 7.089 5.446 
M4:Total Staff Cost 0.850 10.710 3.494 2.722 
M4:Total Deposits 47.720 1,214.390 323.312 348.269 
  
 
Table 5.5.1-5.5.4:  
MPI-Productivity growth: BBI in comparison with small conventional 
banks in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) 
  
 
Table 5. 5.1  
Banks Total Factor productivity  change (TFPch) between 2005–08  
 
Table 5.5.2 
Banks technological efficiency  change (TECch) ) between 2005-2008 
 
 
Table 5.5.3  
Banks technical efficiency change (TEch) between 2005-2008 
 
 
Bank 
 
 2005-  
2006 
2006-
2007 
2007- 
2008 
             MEAN 
BBI 
VAKUFSKA 
ABS 
Investiciono 
Pro Credit 
Balkan Inv. 
Turkish Zira. 
MEAN 
 
1.268 1.251 1.013 1.177 
0.859 1.109 1.141 1.036 
1.136 1.204 1.150 1.163 
1.243 1.180 1.968 1.464 
0.867 0.938 0.908 0.904 
0.504 1.938 0.888 1.110 
1.124 0.576 1.080 0.927 
1 1.171 1.164 1.112 
Bank 
 
2005- 
2006 
2006- 
2007 
2007- 
2008 
 MEAN 
BBI 
VAKUFSKA 
ABS 
Investiciono 
Pro Credit 
Balkan Inv. 
Turkish Zira. 
MEAN 
1.052 1.223 1.074      1.116 
0.949 1.033 1.018      1 
0.947 1.204 1.150      1.100 
0.942 1.012 1.968      1.307 
0.867 1.102 1.097      1.022 
0.504 1.993 0.888      1.128 
1.124 0.576 1.080      0.927 
0.912 1.163 1.182 1.086 
Bank 
 
2005 
2006 
2006- 
2007 
2007- 
2008 
MEAN 
BBI 
VAKUFSKA 
ABS 
Investiciono 
Pro Credit 
Balkan Inv. 
Turkish Zira 
MEAN 
1.206 1.023 0.943 1.057 
0.905 1.074 1.121 1.033  
1.200 1.000 1.000 1.067 
1.320 1.166 1.000 1.162 
1.000 0.851 0.828 0.893 
1.000 1.000 1.000 1 
1.000 1.000 1.000 1 
1.090  1.016 0.985 1.030 
 
                   Table 5.5.4  
                     Changes in technical efficiency components between 2005-2008 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*All numbers in are in Million £ after deflation. 
 
** Kauther bank in Azerbaijan, BBI and IBB in Bosnia - Herzegovina ‘BiH‘ and the UK respectively, are found to have the lowest value of  
outputs and inputs. This is simply due to the fact that these banks are newly established in Europe.  
  
  
  
Bank            2005- 2006                                   2006- 2007                                     2007-  2008                      MEAN                     MEAN 
 
BBI 
VAKUFSKA 
ABS 
Investiciono 
Pro Credit 
Balkan Inv. 
Turkish Zira 
MEAN 
PTEch  SEch  PTEch SEch PTEch SEch  PTEch SEch  
1.000 1.206 1.000 1.023 1.000 0.943 1.000 1.057 
0.937 0.965 1.042 1.030 1.116 1.005 1.032 1.000 
1.031 1.164  1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.010 1.055 
1.000 1.320 1.000 1.166 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.162 
1.000 1.000 1.000 0.851 1.000 0.828 1.000 0.893 
1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
0.995 1.093 1.006  1.010 1.017 0.968 1.006 1.024 
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Table 5.7    
Summary statistics of the exogenous variables in the DEA- second stage/ the (OLS)-regression* 
 
* i) One of the important assumptions underlying the OLS regression method is that the explanatory 
variables are (linearly independent).  As a rule of thumb if r≥0.70 between variables they should not 
both appear in the equation. To test for Autocorrelation (except for dummies), we use: Tolerance, VIF 
and Durbin-Watson statistics. As a result of the test using (SPSS-17) it is clear that the Tolerance is 
>0.20, VIF <5, and the D-W is around (very close) to (2) which indicates the absence of 
Autocorrelation, and thus ,the Multi-co linearity does not appear to be a serious problem. 
 
ii) We apply the Scatter plots and Skewness statistics to test for both linearity and normality.  As a 
rule of thumb, |s| > 1 indicates potentially serious non-normality. We find that these assumptions have 
almost certainly been met. However, when nonlinear relationships are thought to be present, 
investigators typically seek to model them in a manner that permits them to be transformed into linear 
relationships.  
 
iii) Despite the fact that the multiple regression procedures are not greatly affected by minor 
deviations from the assumptions of linearity and normality (normal distribution contains only linear 
relationships between variables) of data, we use non-linear transformation (Logarithm Transformation 
for all variables, except dummies) to meet the previous main assumptions and to produce more 
accurate results.  
 
iv) In order to get rid the negative values for a variable, we added a constant to move the minimum 
value of the distribution above 0, preferably to 1.00. Hence, we use log+4 in our analysis to transfer 
the logarithms results to positive numbers.  
 
vi) For the original data values that include negative numbers, it is not possible to apply many 
nonlinear transformations (the log of a negative number is undefined). In this situation we added a 
constant to all data values that make them positive.  As a rule of thumb, we add the smallest constant 
that will convert the largest negative data value to a value greater than 1. 
 
v) Our OLS-regression analysis shows a strong correlation between the observed values of the 
response variables and the values predicted by the model (all models) (R2 > 60%). Eventually, using 
the ANOVA Tables, we clearly reject the null hypothesis and conclude that at least one of the 
predictors is related to the efficiency scores. This means that the models have been estimated are not 
only theoretically construct but exists and statistically significant (i.e. M1,   F13, 42=3.419, P<.001, M2, 
F11, 32 = 1.572, P<.001, in M3, F10, 17=1.505, P<0.10, and in M4,  F11, 16=4.128,  P<.001).   
 
** (+) indicates a positive effect, (-) indicates a negative effect, (0) indicates (No) effect. 
Measurement and expected effect on efficiency Exogenous  variables 
Profitability=net income to total assets. (+)** β1 PBjt(ROA)(E1,E2) 
Personal expenses as a proxy of skills utilization 
measured by total amount of wages and salaries 
to total assets. (-): efficient banks are expected to 
have lower cost because of IT. 
β2 PERjt      (E1,E2) 
Liquid assets to total deposits and short term 
funding as a proxy of liquid asset ratio. (+ or -) 
β3 LIQjt     (E1,E2) 
(Log.)Total assets as a proxy of bank’s size. (+) β4  lOG(AS)jt   (E1,E2) 
The proxy of lending intensity= total loans to 
total asset. (+): loans are the main source of 
revenue. 
β5 LTAjt   (E1,E2) 
Total deposits the proxy of market share. (+): 
they are considered the main source of progress. 
β6  DEPOjt (E1,E2) 
The effect of independency. Dummy variable; (1) 
if a bank is  managed by a parents(subsidiary), 
(0) if it is stand alone bank. (+ or -) 
β7 INDjt      (E1,E2) 
The effect of age and experience. Dummy 
variable; (1) if <10 years, (0) otherwise. (+) 
β8  AGEjt  ( E1,E2) 
Leverage= total assets to equity. (- ) β
 9 LEVjt     (E1,E2) 
The percentage change in gross domestic 
production per capita (favorable economic 
condition will affect positively  on demand and 
supply of banking services).(+ or -) 
β10 GDPjt      (E1) 
Geographical location effect. Dummy variable; (1) 
if the bank is located in Europe; = (0) otherwise. 
(+): Islamic banks in Muslim countries are more 
Efficient. 
β11 GEOjt       (E1) 
Diversification effect. Dummy variable; (1) if high 
diversified, (0) otherwise (+): unless it leads to 
higher risk. 
β11DIVERjt     (E2) 
         
 
                       Table 5.6.1- 5.6.4 & 5.7: 
 
                        Table 5.6.1-5.6.4 : 
  
                            MPI-Productivity growth: IBB in comparison with small 
                            conventional banks in the UK. 
 
                        Table 5.6.1.  
                            Banks Total Factor productivity  change (TFPch) between 2005–08  
Bank 2005- 
2006 
2006- 
2007 
2007- 
2008 
MEAN  
IBB 0.784 0.906 0.934 0.875 
Turkish Bank 0.966 1.012 1.050 1.009 
ICBC London LT 1.029 1.291 0.854 1.058 
Habib Allied 1.004 1.030 0.993 1.009 
Ghana INT 1.009 1.013 0.971 0.998 
Bank of Beirut (UK)  1.021 1.141 1.323 1.162 
Bank leumi UK 1.028 1.008 1.006 1.014 
MEAN 0.977 1.057 1.019 1.018 
            
                        Table 5.6.3.  
               Banks technical efficiency change (TEch) between 2005-2008 
Bank 2005- 
2006  
2006- 
2007 
2007- 
2008  
MEAN 
 IBB   1.000 1.000  0.927 0.976 
 Turkish Bank 1.068 1.043 1.005 1.039 
 ICBC London LT 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
 Habib Allied 1.095 1.045 1.000 1.047 
 Ghana INT 1.000 1.000 0.887 0.962 
 Bank of Beirut (UK)  1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
 Bank leumi UK 0.997 1.003 1.000 1.000 
 MEAN 1.022 1.013 0.974 1.003 
     
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5.6.2.  
Banks technological efficiency  change (TECch) ) between 2005-2008 
Bank 2005-
2006 
2006-
2007 
2007-
2008 
MEAN 
IBB 0.784 0.906 1.008 0.899 
Turkish Bank 0.904 0.971 1.045 0.973 
ICBC London LT 1.029 1.291 0.854 1.058 
Habib Allied 0.917 0.985 0.993 0.965 
Ghana INT 1.009 1.013 1.095 1.039 
Bank of Beirut (UK)  1.021 1.141 1.323 1.162 
Bank leumi UK 1.031 1.004 1.006 1.014 
MEAN 0.956 1.044 1.046 1.016 
 
                         Table 5.6.4 
                            Changes in technical efficiency components between 2005-2008 
Bank                                      05-06                               06-07                      07-08  MEAN MEAN 
 
PTEch 
 
SEch PTEch SEch PTEch SEch PTEch SEch 
 IBB 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.931 0.995 0.977 0.998 
Turkish B. 1.092 0.978 1.000 1.043 1.000 1.005 1.031 1.009 
 ICBC London  1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
 Habib Allied 1.028 1.065 1.041 1.004 1.000 1.000 1.023 1.023 
 Ghana INT 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.887 1.000 0.962 
 Bank of Beirut 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
 Bank leumi  1.000 0.997 1.000 1.003 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
 MEAN                  1.017 1.006 1.006 1.007 0.990 0.984 1.009 0.999 
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: model-M1, M2, M3, and M4.
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EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS: PART-3/ Jointly with Burghof, H-P. & Khan, W. 
 
 
X-EFFICIENCY AND FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE 
OF ISLAMIC VERSUS CONVENTIONAL BANKS: 
EVIDENCE FROM EUROPE 
ــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــ 
 
 
6.1.   The abstract 
 
  In this chapter we employ data envelopment analysis (DEA) to examine the relative efficiency 
of Islamic and conventional banks in the UK and Switzerland during 2008-2009, accounting ra-
tio analysis to measure the financial performance of the European Islamic Investment Bank 
(EIIB) during 2005-2008, and a matched-pairs t-test to determine the differences in the EIIB per-
formance in the pre-versus post financial crisis periods, respectively.  
 
  Results suggest that the Islamic banks in Europe experience lower cost efficiency, higher alloc-
ative inefficiency and poor, but relatively better, technical efficiency compared to conventional 
banks. The inefficiency of the banks is caused largely by the choices of inputs price mix and ap-
pears to be mostly due to their non-optimal size of operations. Findings further show that the 
EIIB exhibits a clear paradox between its high operating efficiency and low profitability. EIIB 
gradually became illiquid but still remains solvent. The bank's Murabaha products (Mark-up 
loans) appear to be the most dominant among other modes of finance. A comparison of the 
bank’s performance in the periods before and after the crisis does not show statistically signifi-
cant differences. 
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6.2.     Introduction 
 
  Before the evolution of Islamic finance, Muslim countries had been utilizing only conventional 
financial institutions to fulfill financial needs. The growing awareness of Islamic finance in the 
late 1960's ignited the need for a financial system that allows Muslims to transact in line with 
their religious beliefs and in compliance to Islamic law that is totally distinct itself from the con-
ventional banking system in terms of interest prohibitions. This led to the establishment of a 
number of Islamic banks concentrated in the Muslims countries, especially in the Gulf Coopera-
tion Council (GCC)-States and Malaysia. To keep pace with the growing demand for Islamic fi-
nancial products many Islamic countries issued licenses to foreign banks, allowing them to offer 
Islamic services and products. Recently, the Islamic financial system has broadened its reach 
from Muslim financial markets to European countries. 
 
  The emergence of a fast-paced business environment in the financial services sector has hig-
hlighted the significance of competition and efficiency among Islamic and conventional banks. 
Regardless of a bank’s underlying principles (Islamic or conventional), its long-term sustaina-
bility depends on its efficiency performance. A bank is said to be economically efficient if it is 
technically and price efficient (Richard and Villanueva, 1980). It is, however, possible for a bank 
to be technically efficient but not price efficient. Given the quantity and price of outputs and in-
puts, (cost) X-efficiency can be estimated. X-efficiency describes the resulting differences be-
tween actual and minimum cost (Leibenstein, 1966). In a competitive environment, a bank is 
considered as X-efficient if it systematically incurs lower cost relative to other banks. X-
inefficiency is usually defined as deviations from an efficient frontier response surface that is at-
tributable to a misallocation of resources or the lack of effective utilization of current resources 
(Anderson, Fok, Zumpano, and Elder, 1998). The study of X-efficiency is believed to be impor-
tant as Berger, Hunter and Timme (1993) find that X-inefficiencies account for 20% or more of 
banking costs. Consequently, the analysis of X-efficiency of Islamic banks becomes vital not on-
ly in Muslim financial markets but also in Europe as there appears to be no study in the literature 
on the X-efficiency of Islamic banks. 
 
  In this chapter, our primary empirical strategy is to measure the X-efficiency of Islamic invest-
ment, wholesale and private banks which are currently operating in Europe. The chapter also of-
fers a preliminary empirical assessment of the financial performance of Islamic investment 
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banks. To this end, a two-part analysis was applied. In the first part, we undertake a comparative 
study of the X-efficiency levels of four Islamic investment, wholesale and private banks from 
UK and Switzerland relative to conventional banks. We utilize the DEA-approach to calculate 
X-efficiency measures: allocative efficiency (AE), technical efficiency (TE), pure technical effi-
ciency (PTE), scale efficiency (SE), and cost efficiency (CE) over the period 2008-2009. In the 
second part, we examine the financial performance of the first independent Islamic investment 
bank in Europe, the European Islamic Investment Bank (EIIB). This particular analysis covers 
the period from 2005 to 2008. In evaluating the bank’s performance, we empirically apply vari-
ous well-known financial ratios: profitability, liquidity, risk and solvency, and efficiency. To de-
termine the difference of the bank’s performance in the period before and after the financial cri-
sis commencing in 2007, we employ inter-temporal analysis using the difference-of-means tests 
(t-test).  
 
  The importance of our study comes from different operating points of view. First, it demon-
strates the expansion potentials and the ability of Islamic banks to achieve their optimum effi-
ciency and profitability level in a mixed banking system in Europe. Second, it will have policy 
implications for Islamic banks on improving cost efficiency and performance. The rest of this 
chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 is a review of literature. Section 3 discusses methodol-
ogy. Section 4 offers the results. Finally, section 5 presents the conclusions.   
 
6.3.     Literature review  
 
  Numerous empirical studies have been undertaken on conventional banking efficiency. Al-
though efficiency is highly recognized in Islam, the available studies on Islamic banking focus 
on conceptual studies rather than empirical issues. This is due to the small number of Islamic fi-
nancial institutions relative to the conventional peers, the small size of existing Islamic banks, 
and the novelty of the concept of Islamic banking in practice. With the tremendous growth of 
Islamic banking around the world, and due to the fact that Islamic banks differ from convention-
al banks in their cost, profit and revenue structures, empirical studies on the X-efficiency and 
financial performance of Islamic banking operations are necessary. 
 
  There are currently few parametric and non-parametric studies that have addressed the perfor-
mance of Islamic banking. Hassan and Hossein (2003) investigate the relative efficiency of the 
CHAPTER 6 X-EFFICIENCY AND FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE IN SHARI‘AH-COMPLIANT BANKS: APPLIED STUDY FROM THE EUROPEAN FINANCIAL SYSTEM 
 
  
156 
 
banking industry in Sudan employing a panel of 17 banks for the years from 1992 to 2000. They 
utilize cost and profit efficiency methods and DEA techniques to examine five efficiency meas-
ures: cost, allocative, technical, pure technical and scale efficiency scores. They suggest that Su-
danese banks should improve their X-efficiency by best managing and allocating their inputs. 
They also argue that the bank management must be appointed based on competence and exper-
tise and not on political or personal biases. Moreover, the labor force in the banking sector must 
be, in their opinion, well trained to deal with the nature of Islamic banking practices. 
 
  Most recently, Hassan, (2006) investigates the relative efficiency of 43 Islamic banks in 21 
countries by analyzing a panel of banks during the period of 1995-2001. Five DEA efficiency 
measures namely: cost, allocative, technical, pure technical and scale efficiency scores are calcu-
lated and further correlated with conventional accounting measures of performance. The results 
indicate that, on average, the Islamic banking industry is relatively less efficient compared to 
conventional counterparts in other parts of the world. The main source of inefficiency is alloca-
tive rather than technical in nature. Although Islamic banks are relatively less efficient in con-
taining cost, findings show that they are relatively efficient in generating profit. The results also 
show that these efficiency measures are highly correlated with ROA and ROE, suggesting that 
the efficiency measures can be used concurrently with conventional accounting ratios in deter-
mining Islamic banks performance. 
 
  One additional comparison is worth considering, the comparison of Islamic banks efficiency 
with conventional banks. For example, Bader, Mohamad, Ariff, and Hassan, (2008) measure and 
compare the cost, revenue and profit efficiency of 43 Islamic and 37 conventional banks, using 
DEA, in 21 member countries of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC)  countries 
over 1990-2005. They assess the average efficiency of those banks based on their size, age, and 
region using static and dynamic panels. The findings suggest that there are no significant differ-
ences between the overall efficiency results of conventional versus Islamic banks.  
 
  Some researchers prefer to focus on financial ratios to examine the financial performance of 
Islamic banks. For instance, Arief (1989) examines the financial performance of Bank Islam Ma-
laysia Berhad (BIMB). He finds that during the first six years of its establishment, BIMB exhi-
bited impressive progress. Sarker (1999) analyzes the efficiency of Islamic banks in Bangladesh. 
Results reveal that the Islamic banks could not operate at full efficiency level if operated under a 
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conventional framework. He argues that Islamic products had different risk characteristic, so that 
different prudential regulation should be established.  
 
  From a comparative perspective, Samad (1999) utilizes the weighted ratio approach in order to 
evaluate the relative efficiency position of Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad (BIMB) and conven-
tional banks in Malaysia during 1992-1996. The result indicates that BIMB had relatively higher 
managerial efficiency than conventional banks. In a further study, Samad and Hassan (1999) ex-
amine the financial performance of BIMB over the period 1984-1997 and compare that with the 
performance of conventional banks. They employ inter-temporal and inter-bank approach. Find-
ings show that the financial performance of BIMB was different from conventional banks with 
respect to liquidity and risk management.  
 
  Rosly and Bakar (2003) examine the financial performance of an Islamic banking in Malaysia 
relative to the performance of the main stream banks. Results suggest that mainstream banks are 
more efficient than Islamic banks. Findings also show that the profitability, measured by return 
on assets (ROA), was statistically higher for Malaysian Islamic banks than for mainstream 
banks. Samad (2004) examines comparative financial performance of Islamic banks and the con-
ventional banks during 1991-2001. The results indicate that there was no significant difference 
between Islamic banks and conventional banks with respect to profitability and liquidity. 
 
  Review of literature, as discussed above, shows that the empirical research on X-efficiency of 
Islamic banks is still in its infancy in Muslim countries while it is, to our best of knowledge, non-
existent in Europe. This is due to the lack of sufficient data and the brief presence of Islamic 
banks in that region. Thus, the main purpose of this chapter is to bridge this gap in the literature. 
 
6.4.     Methodology 
  Sections 6.4.1 and 6.4.2 discuss the measurement of X-efficiency and cost-efficiency as well as 
our proposed approach to measure financial performance of the EIIB based on financial ratios.  
6.4.1.   Cost X-efficiency of Islamic banks: DEA-approach 
6.4.1.1. Data description and variables 
 
   We measure the relative X-efficiency of Islamic banks as compared with conventional banks. 
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The X-efficiency concept is suited to our sample due to its small size. The sample banks are se-
lected from two European countries: the UK and Switzerland. The study covers the period 2008-
2009 and consists of observations obtained from 4 Islamic banks (Table 6.1) along with 4 careful-
ly selected investment and private conventional banks namely: Rothschild bank, Arbuthnot La-
tham, Standard Chartered in the UK, and Hyposwiss Private Bank in Swiss. Due to the recent 
development of Islamic investment, wholesale, and private banking in Europe, our analysis is li-
mited to the selected banks and the very short time period.1 
 
Table 6.1  
Brief description of the tested banks 
 
  We obtained the data from the un-consolidated financial statements of each bank under consid-
eration. The sample data have been adjusted for currency differences by converting into UK £-
currency using the end of year market rate obtained from central banks of the respective coun-
tries. All variables have also been deflated by consumer price index (CPI) of each country in or-
der to account for macro-economic differences across countries during our sample time period.  
 
  There are two main efficiency concepts that are widely used in the literature when analyzing the 
performance of production units: cost-efficiency and profit-efficiency. The first concept is de-
fined as a measure of how far a bank’s cost is from the cost of the best practice bank if they were 
to produce the same output under the same environmental conditions. On the other hand, 
___________________ 
 
1
 The European Finance House is excluded from our analysis due to the unavailability of data. The bank has been provided the license to operate 
in the UK by (FSA) at the beginning of 2008. It signals QIB’s entry into the European market, in general, and into the French and German mar-
kets, in particular. The bank manages a wide range of investments in key sectors such as real estate and appropriation of assets. 
 The bank Brief description of each bank 
 European Islamic Investment Bank "EIIB" The first independent Shari’ah compliant Islamic investment bank that offers 
Shari’ah-compliant investment banking products and services. The bank was 
established in London in January 2005 and received authorization to operate 
from the FSA in March 2006. 
 Bank of London and Middle East "BLME" The bank was first incorporated in London on 7th August 2006.  It was for-
merly known as House of London and The Middle East. BLME is an indepen-
dent wholesale investment Shari’ah compliant UK bank based in the City of 
London. The bank received authorization by the "FSA" in July 2007 as the 
largest Islamic bank in Europe. 
 Gatehouse Bank The bank was established in the UK in May 2007 and received authorization 
from (FSA) in April 2008. Gatehouse Bank is a wholesale investment bank 
based in London, combining international financial market expertise with ex-
cellence in Shari’ah principle. 
 Faisal Private Bank "FPB" In 1982, Faisal Finance was born in Geneva. Faisal Finance became a bank in 
October 2006. FPB is considered the first Swiss private bank exclusively dedi-
cated to innovative wealth, institutional investment, and asset management in 
accordance with the principles of Islamic finance. 
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profit-efficiency is based on the economic goal of profit maximization. It requires the same 
amount of managerial attention to raise managerial revenues as to reduce managerial costs. It 
further evaluates the profit efficiency measures in terms of how close a bank is to generating 
maximum profits given its output levels rather than output prices. 
 
  Cost efficiency (CE) consists of two elements: the Technical Efficiency (TE) and the Allocative 
Efficiency (AE). TE refers to the ability of a bank to produce relatively larger output as the given 
input use would permit. It is also defined as the maximum possible reduction in the input use that 
would allow continual production of the same output as before. TE focuses on optimal use of 
given resources. It has therefore, an output maximization orientation. TE takes a value between 
0-1. A firm having a score equal to one is technically efficient, but one with a lower score is inef-
ficient (Hasan, 2005). The second element, Allocative (price) Efficiency (AE), measures the 
proportional decline in cost if the bank chooses the right mix of inputs with the price considera-
tion (the least expensive combination of the given inputs to produce technically efficient output). 
AE measures the ability of a Decision-Making Unit (DMU) to avoid waste by producing a level 
of output at the minimal possible cost (Nunamaker, 1985). However, price takes on an important 
role in determining bank efficiency as it relates to economic of scale. Given quantity and price 
availability, overall cost efficiency can be computed. This is also referred to as X-efficiency.  
 
6.4.1.2.   DEA approach for measuring bank’s X-efficiency 
  
  There are various approaches in evaluating efficiency in financial institutions in literature. But 
there is no consensus on the preferred method for determining the best practice frontier. Specifi-
cally, the cost efficiency of a bank can be obtained by employing either a nonparametric or pa-
rametric approach. Nonparametric cost efficiency is calculated by employing linear mathemati-
cal programming techniques. Whereas, parametric cost efficiency is derived from a cost function 
in which variable costs depend on the input prices, quantities of variable outputs, random error, 
and inefficiency (Isik and Hassan, 2002). 
 
  The most commonly used technique to measure banks cost efficiency is the non-parametric 
DEA approach. DEA evaluates the performance of each bank by relating its input and output 
combinations to a common efficient frontier. DEA has the advantage of being able to handle 
multiple inputs and outputs stated in different measurement units. It additionally focuses on the 
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best-practice frontier rather than population central tendencies and also does not require precise 
specification of the form of the underlying production function relationship (Charnes, Cooper, 
Lewin and Seiford, 1995). Due to its advantages, DEA has been utilized extensively in the em-
pirical banking efficiency studies. In this paper, the distribution of technical, allocative and cost 
efficiency across banks is examined using DEA approach. This is mainly because DEA is partic-
ularly suited for small samples (Evanoff and Israilevich, 1991). 
 
  A number of different approaches can be used for modeling the banks’ processes. The most dis-
tinct concepts commonly used in efficiency measurement of financial institutions are the inter-
mediation approach and the production approach. Intermediation approach considers banks as 
financial intermediaries that collect funds (deposits and purchased funds) using labor and capital 
to transform these funds into loans and securities (investments). Under the production approach, 
banks produce loans and deposits accounts using labor and capital as inputs (Iqbal and Moly-
neux, 2005). By and large, both approaches have their disadvantages. They, for example, fail to 
incorporate the management of risk, information processing, and the solution of agency prob-
lems arising due to the differences between loans and deposits and the separation between man-
agement and ownership (Bikker and Bos, 2008). However, Berger and Humphrey (1997) in their 
international study on banking efficiency conclude that the intermediation approach is more re-
levant to measure bank’s efficiency. Yudistira (2004) uses the DEA intermediation approach, 
arguing that the basic principle of the Islamic financial system (the joint-stock institutions) is the 
participation in enterprise, employing the funds based on the profit and loss sharing (PLS). This, 
inevitably implies the importance of Islamic bank’s intermediary activities. Therefore, our selec-
tion of input-output variables (Table 6.2 and 6.3) in this chapter is based on the intermediation 
approach. 
 
Table 6.2 
 
A brief definition of the input / output factors 
Input / Output Matrix The factor Definition 
Inputs   
I1 Labor Total expenditure on employees (personnel expenses) 
I2 Fixed assets The sum of physical capital and premises 
I3 Total funds Total deposits and  total borrowed funds 
Outputs 
O1 Total loans* Total of short-term and long-term loans 
O2 Other earning assets The sum of securities and investments  
*The loans for Islamic banks represent the short-term cost-plus "Murabaha" financings.  
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Table 6.3  
 
A brief definition of the input prices and output prices*  
Input / Output Matrix The factor Definition 
 Input prices   
 P.I1 Price of labor The ratio of personnel expenses to total funds 
 P.I2 Price of fixed assets (FA) The ratio of other non-interest expenses to "FA" 
 P.I3 Price of funds The ratio of total costs to total funds 
Output prices 
 P.O1 Price of loans The ratio of Interest income to total loans 
 P.O2 Price of other earning assets The ratio of other operating income to other earning assets 
* The definitions of inputs, outputs and their prices are standard in the literature. 
 
 
6.4.1.3.   Mathematical formulation 
 
  Given a certain level of technology, if a given bank has specific price information and is willing 
to consider cost minimization function or profit maximization function, then it is possible to 
measure the main components of X-efficiency (i.e. the technical efficiency and the allocative ef-
ficiency) utilizing DEA technique. In DEA, the constant return to scale (CRS) assumption is on-
ly valid when all (DMUs) are operating at an optimal scale. Factors like imperfect competition 
and constraints in finance may cause our sample banks not to operate at their optimal scale of 
operations (Coelli, 1996). Therefore, we adopt the variable returns to scale (VRS) DEA model in 
this paper, as the European Islamic banking markets are not fully developed, and thus perfect 
competition is unlikely. As suggested by Banker et al. (1984), the common CRS linear pro-
gramming problem can be modified to account for a VRS situation by adding the convexity con-
straint (N1´ λ = 1) to provide:  
 
 
	 Ѳ,  θ, 
st.       –     +  Yλ  ≥ 0, 
              θ   –  Xλ  ≥ 0, 
              N1´ λ = 1, 
               λ ≥ 0, 
 
 Where "θ" represents the efficiency score for each DMU. "λ" is a (N×1) vector of constants. "Y" 
represents all input and output data for "N" firms. "xi" refers to the individual inputs. "yi" defines 
(1)  
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the outputs for the "ith" firm. N1´λ=1 "ensures that an inefficient firm is only benchmarked 
against firms of similar size".  
 
  For VRS cost minimization, the subject of our attention in this paper, the technical efficiency 
(TE) score of 'n' DMUs is obtained by running the DEA model shown in (Eq.2). Following Coel-
li, (1996), we estimate the cost efficiency by solving the following cost minimization DEA: 
 
min,x*
´ 
∗
 , 
 
st.       - yi   +  Yλ  ≥ 0, 
             
∗
 –  Xλ  ≥ 0, 
             N1´λ = 1, 
             λ ≥ 0, 
 
  
Where "wi" refers to a vector of input prices for the "ith" DMU and "xi*" denotes the cost-
minimizing vector of input quantities for the "ith" DMU, given the input prices and the output le-
vels "yi". The total cost (economic) efficiency (CE) for the "ith" DMU would be calculated as: CE 
= 
´Xi* /´Xi, where the "CE" is the ratio of minimum cost to the observed cost, then the alloca-
tive efficiency (AE) can be residually calculated as: AE = CE / TE (Coelli, 1996). This proce-
dure, however, includes any slacks (the inappropriate input mix) into the allocative efficiency 
measure. The revenue maximization and the allocative inefficiency in output mix selection can 
be considered in a similar manner (Ferrier and Lovell, 1990).  
 
6.4.2.   The financial performance of EIIB: Accounting ratios-based approach 
 
  The assessment of efficiency and financial performance of investment banks is important be-
cause it directs the bank managers to improve deposits and/or loan services. It also helps invest-
ment banks to minimize costs and/or maximize profits. Based on that, we assess the financial 
performance of the first Islamic investment bank in the UK, the EIIB, due to the increasing role 
and importance of Islamic investment banks on the European economy. However, few years 
have passed since the unique presence of EIIB in the UK and thus, very little data was available 
from which to assess the bank’s financial performance. Our analysis, therefore, is limited to the 
period from 2005 to 2008. 
 
(2)  
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  We examine the relationship between the bank’s efficiency scores and its financial perfor-
mance. We further aim to test the following three assumptions: i) the first Islamic investment 
bank in Europe is effectively in position to make its profitability, efficiency, and solvency high 
and less volatile. ii) The liquidity ratios of Islamic banks in Europe are expected to be higher in 
earlier years of operation than later years due to the learning curve. iii) As Islamic banking 
makes its inroad in the Europe, the volume of the Islamic financial mode of lending (Murabaha) 
is expected to grow larger in later years of its operation. 
 
  We extract the data from the bank’s financial statements and also from the LSE data base. 
Bank’s performance can be evaluated based on several financial ratios. We use 14 ratios for 
bank's performance (Table 6.6- appendix). These ratios are grouped under 5 broad categories: 1) 
efficiency, 2) profitability, 3) liquidity, 4) risk and solvency, and 5) commitment to the economy 
and Muslim community (Samad and Hassan, 1999).  
 
  We employ the inter-temporal analysis in order to examine the differences in a bank’s perform-
ance before and after the global financial crisis of 2007. The crisis started in 2007 (reached the 
peak in August 2007), producing a slowdown in Islamic capital market issuance in the second 
half of the year. We consider the year 2007 as the “event” year and use the time window of two 
years before the crisis (2005 - 2006) and also two after the emergence of the crisis (2007-2008). 
We use the equality of means test (independent samples) at a 5% level of significance.  
6.5.    Empirical results 
 
 We first describe the results from examining X-efficiency of Islamic investment, wholesale, and 
private banks in the UK and Switzerland, followed directly by the findings from the analysis of 
the EIIB financial performance. 
6.5.1. Bank’s efficiency based on DEA- approach  
 
  Table 6.4 presents the efficiency scores of the selected Islamic and conventional banks in the 
UK and Switzerland. Findings show that the average cost-efficiency (CE) performance of conven-
tional banks (CE score =69.7%) outperforms that of the Islamic banks (CE score = 49.3%). The 
bank’s CE is supplied mainly by technical efficiency (TE) rather than allocative efficiency (AE) 
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Table 6.4 
Bank’s CRSte, VRSte, SE, TE, CE, and AE: 2005-2008 
Country Year Type Name of the bank CRSte VRSte Scale RTS TE CE AE 
UK 2008  IS-In EIIB 1.000 1.000 1.000 ـــ 1.000 1.000 1.000 
UK 2008 IS -W- In BLME 1.000 1.000 1.000 ـــ 1.000 0.695 0.695 
UK 2008 IS -W- In GhB 0.542 1.000 0.542 irs 1.000 0.178 0.178 
   MEAN 0.847 1.000 0.847  1.000 0.624 0.624 
SWISS 2008 IS -Pr FPB 1.000 1.000 1.000 ـــ 1.000 0.326 0.326 
   Mean (cross country. Is 08) 0.886 1.000  0.886   1.000 0.550 0.550 
UK 2008 CO- In Rothschild  1.000 1.000 1.000 ـــ 1.000 1.000 1.000 
UK 2008 CO- In Arbuthnot  0.306 0.309 0.990 drs 0.337 0.067 0.198 
UK 2008 CO- In St. Charter 0.700 1.000 0.700 drs 1.000 0.998 0.998 
   MEAN 0.669 0.770 0.897  0.779 0.688 0.732 
SWISS 2008 CO-Pr Hyposwiss Private B. 0.944 0.965 0.978 drs 0.963 0.555 0.576 
   
Mean (cross country. Co 08) 0.738 0.819 0.917   0.825 0.655    0.693 
UK 2009     IS - In EIIB 1.000 1.000 1.000 ـــ 1.000 0.889 0.889 
UK 2009 IS -W- In BLME 0.878 1.000 0.878 irs 1.000 0.576 0.576 
UK 2009 IS -W- In GhB 0.268 0.314 0.854 irs 0.856 0.048 0.056 
   MEAN 0.715 0.771 0.911  0.952 0.504 0.507 
SWISS 2009 IS -Pr FPB 0.997 1.000 0.997 drs 1.000 0.228 0.228 
   Mean (cross country. Is 09) 0.786 0.829 0.932     0.964 0.435 0.437 
UK 2009 CO- In Rothschild  0.788 0.999 0.789 drs 0.999 0.860 0.861 
UK 2009 CO- In Arbuthnot  0.429 0.433 0.992 irs 0.447 0.094 0.211 
UK 2009 CO- In St. Charter 0.735 1.000 0.735 drs 1.000 1.000 1.000 
   MEAN 0.651 0.811 0.839  0.815 0.651 0.691 
SWISS 2009 CO-Pr Hyposwiss Private B. 1.000 1.000 1.000 ـــ 1.000 1.000 1.000 
   
MEAN (cross country. Co 09) 0.738 0.858 0.879   0.862 0.739 0.768 
   MEAN (Is.  08-09) 0.836 0.910 0.909   0.980 0.493 0.494 
   MEAN (Co. 08-09) 0.740 0.838 0.898     0.843   0.697 0.731 
crste = technical efficiency from DEA CRS, vrste = technical efficiency from DEA VRS, scale = scale efficiency = crste/vrste, te = 
technical efficiency, ce = cost efficiency, ae = allocative efficiency = ce/te, IS=Islamic bank, CO= Conventional bank, 
In.=Investment, W-In = Wholesale Investment bank,  and Pr. =Private. 
 
 
(TE08-09>AE08-09). The visible CE advantage for conventional banks over Islamic banks may con-
tinue over time with the gap rising from 10.5% in 2008 (calculated as 65.5% - 55%) to 30.4% in 
2009. These results suggest that the conventional banks have, on average, a slightly superior per-
formance in controlling (minimizing) costs (more cost-efficient) over Islamic banks during the 
years 2008 and 2009. This could be explained by the fact that the size of conventional banks and 
their involvement in wholesale banking put them in the better position to offer competitive pric-
ing of their banking products and services compared with Islamic banks. 
 
  The Islamic banks’ cost ineﬃciency may be due to: i) under- utilization of inputs, ii) the greater 
costs incurred in order to have greater promotional and marketing activities and higher invest-
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ment in technology, and finally iii) the novelty and small size. Islamic banks operated at smaller 
scale compared to their counterparts-conventional and thus, cost inefficiencies exist because they 
were not able to benefit from economies of scale (ES) over the sample period.  
 
  In terms of allocative efficiency (AE), conventional banks surpass Islamic banks with the AE 
score of 73.1% compared with AE score of 49.4% for Islamic banks. Islamic banks suffer an in-
creasing trend in their allocative inefficiency (from 55% in 2008 to 43.7% in 2009). This may be 
caused by regulations not controlled by management due to fluctuations and instability in factor 
prices. However, Islamic banks with a low AE could increase their output by changing the mix 
of their inputs usage.  
 
  Despite the small size of Islamic banks in Europe, it is obvious that they are technically more 
efficient than conventional banks.2 Therefore, they are more able to operate closer to their effi-
cient frontier compared to conventional banks (TEIS-M08-09=0.980 > TECO-M08-09=0.843) (Fig. 6.1). 
The value of 0.980 means that the banks are 98% efficient and can produce the same level of 
output by using 2% lower inputs. This suggests that managers of Islamic banks are relatively ef-
ficient at choosing the appropriate input mix at given prices, but they are less efficient at utilizing 
all factor inputs. Results also demonstrate that there are unrealized benefits that could be 
achieved through an increase in size for small Islamic banks or through consolidation. Overall, 
results show that the banks, either Islamic or conventional banks, have higher TE scores than AE 
and/or CE. This illustrates that the bank’s inefficiency is caused primarily by the choices of inpu- 
 
 
  Fig. 6.1: Average pure technical efficiency scores (DEAVRS) by individual bank, 2008-2009  
___________________________ 
2
 Technical efficiency is decomposed into pure technical efficiency (DEAPTE or vrste) which captures the management practices, and scale efficiency (DEAscale), 
which shows whether or not the bank operates under optimal size.. Banks that are not considered scale efficient will experience either increasing return-to-scale (IRS), 
which indicates they were operating at scale that is too small or decreasing return-to-scale (DRS), which indicates they were operating at scale that is overly large. 
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ts price mix (Fig. 6.2). By and large, a trend comparison of bank
ventional banks have an increasing (upward) trend in CE, AE, and TE over sample years. On 
contrast, Islamic banks suffer
(CE08=0.550 < CE09=0.435) due to the low scores of AE (AE
 
  Results further indicate that the poor and inefficient management practices (PTE or VRS) are 
the main drivers of conventional bank
efficiency scores are higher than its pure technical efficiency (
Conventional banks have mostly a decreasing return
operating at too large a scale and should shrink the output endowments. 
 
Fig. 6.2: Average X-efficiency Scores (TE, CE, and AE) by Individual Bank, 2008
 
that the SE for Islamic banks in Europe is relatively high over 2008 and 2009, yet still less than 
the banks PTE (VRSte =0.910
mostly scale in nature rather than 
tions had a stronger influence on bank
tices. However, a possible reason for lower efficiency of Islamic banks is that several new Isla
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  Islamic banks in the UK (except Gatehouse Bank) have a constant return to
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outputs in Europe. Overall, results indicate that the vast majority of the Islamic banks are operat-
ing at either CRS or IRS. This suggests that the managers of Islamic banks are relatively good at 
taking advantage of decreased cost from IRS operations. In the Swiss banking industry, however, 
the stand–alone Islamic bank, namely FPB, has a DRS suggesting that the inefficiency of Swiss 
Islamic banks is largely caused by too big outputs, and thus, could improve efficiency by scaling 
down banking operations and activities. 
 
 
  Eventually, our findings reveal no striking differences across countries (Switzerland and the 
UK) in terms of mean efficiency. Tiny variations are mainly due to country specific factors that 
could be related for example to differences in the competitive structure of markets.3 Simple 
comparison between the two countries suggests that the Swiss banks with (CE) efficiency scores 
of 32.6% in 2008 and 22.8% in 2009 are, on average, less cost efficient than the UK banks with 
scores of 62.4% and 50.4% in 2008 and 2009, respectively. By and large, it seems that the Islam-
ic banks have taken the opportunity to exploit the European banking integration through compe-
tition. Islamic banking product holding Shari’ah principles is considered as a new innovative 
product in the European market, whereas the conventional banking system relies on the tradi-
tional products. This could be a good prospect for Islamic banks in Europe to take advantage of 
innovation in spurring its efficiency through competition. 
 
6.5.2. The EIIB Financial Performance: Accounting Ratio-Based Approach  
 
  The findings from the financial ratio analysis (FRA) show different but interesting results as 
shown in Table 6.7- the appendix. In terms of bank’s profitability performance, the Profit to To-
tal Expenses ratio (PER), Return on Asset ratio (ROA) and Return on Equity ratio (ROE4) (Fig. 
6.3) exhibit a significant downward trend, reflecting a poor financial performance over the pe-
riod 2005-2008. The bank’s negative net income 5 (Fig. 6.10), the decline in asset value results 
from the effects of the financial crisis that emerged in 2007, 6 and the lack of expertise, products 
_________________________________________
 
3
 Regardless of the small sample size and the arbitrary selection of the conventional banks based on the banks profit average values, it is clear 
that Islamic banks in the UK perform relatively better than Islamic banks in Switzerland. This might be attributable to the different banking struc-
tures in each country and the fact that Islamic banks in the UK are more mature than their peers in Switzerland. Thus, the legal framework for 
banking activities in Switzerland might not suit the unique Islamic banking principle which leads to underperformance of Islamic banks. 
 
4
 Table 6.5 in the appendix reports a detailed description of the abbreviations used in the "FRA".  
 
5
 Despite the negative effects of the global crisis in 2008, the EIIB operating income increased from £ 13m to £ 13.2m (2%). Meanwhile, the 
banks expenses declined by 18% from £ 10.4m to £ 8.5m. 
 
6 The severe decline in the commercial real estate market and the IPD property index during the year 2008 negatively affect the performance of 
EIIB. The bank increased provisions on the property portfolio by £14.7m, resulting in a loss for the year of £14.8m after tax. 
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and services were the main drivers behind the inadequate profitability performance. This is de-
spite the fact that the bank had relatively limited exposure to the subprime events because it did 
not engage in the purchase or trade of mortgage-related financial products, which provoked the 
downfall of some of the world's largest investment banks. There are also various reasons for the 
lower profitability performance of the EIIB. First, in order to provide the guarantee of deposi-
tor's deposits and trust, EIIB maintains a high level of liquidity. In 2008, the bank has net liquid 
asset equal to 48% of customer deposits which is materially higher than the regulatory minimum 
of -5%. Second, it could be due to increased competition in the Islamic investment banking in UK 
starting from 2007. It should be noted, however, that the EIIB’s poor profitability performance is 
statistically insignificant as the means of (PER, P-value=0.108), (ROA, P- value=0.269) and 
(ROE, P -Value =0.288) are different between the two periods, just before and after the crisis (P-
value>0.05). 
 
  In terms of bank’s efficiency performance, the efficiency ratios: Asset Utilization ratio (AU) 
and Operating Efficiency ratio (OE) show an increasing (upward) trend over time (Fig. 6.4). This 
implies that the bank is effective in utilizing and using its high productive asset leading to im-
proved productivity. This also suggests that the bank is more efficient in managing (minimizing) 
its operating expenses and generating more operating revenues. Findings, however, suggest a 
statistically insignificant difference in the bank’s efficiency performance between the period before  
  
      Fig. 6.3: Profitability measures % (2005-2008)                           Fig. 6.4: Efficiency measures % (2005-2008) 
 
and after the crisis. By and large, the fundamental characteristic of the bank based on the pre-
vious results is the paradox its high operational efficiency performance and its low (poor) profit-
ability performance. This occurs despite the more general trend that the higher efficiency is asso-
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ciated with higher profitability. However, plainly, judging the performance of the bank on the 
basis of profitability alone would overlook the bank with high efficiencies. In fact, "100% effi-
cient bank can be found across a wide range of profits, which indicates that high profitability is 
not exclusively related to high efficiency" (Camanh and Dyson, 1999). 
 
  To evaluate the bank’s liquidity risk and its ability to pay obligations, three measures of liquidi-
ty are employed: the Current Ratio (CA), Current Asset Ratio (CAR) and Loan to Asset Ratio 
(LAR). These ratios reflect the structure of assets as a measure of liquidity. Results reveal that 
both (CA) and (CAR) ratios decrease (have a downward trend) over time. Meanwhile, the bank’s 
LAR ratio increases during the period 2005-2006 but decreases afterwards. This is mainly due to 
the fact that the Islamic investment bank is a new bank in the UK which led to an increase in the 
bank’s assets (size) as it expanded its investment in facilities. The high value of LAR during the 
first time window (years before the crisis) could be an indication of potentially higher profitabili-
ty and risk. It further illustrates that the bank is loaned up and has a low liquidity (yet quite 
enough to revive bank lending). On the other hand, in the post crisis period, the decline in the 
ratio demonstrates that the bank faces a lower risk of default. These results also suggest that the 
bank has started a reasonable focus on short term rather than long-term investments (Fig. 6.5). 
The liquidity measures, however, do not actually show any statistically significant difference be-
tween the period before and after the crisis (Table 6.6). The means of the two periods for CA, 
CAR, and LAR are not statistically different. This indicates that bank's liquidity position remains 
relatively unchanged between 2005-2006 and 2007-2008. Such a finding rejects our assumption 
that EIIB will hold less liquidity in the subsequent years of operation when the bank becomes 
more mature. 
  
  Furthermore, our results show an increasing trend in the Loans to Total Assets (LTA) ratio to 
measure the bank's community commitment (Fig. 6.6). This indicates that the bank is committing 
for supporting long-term development projects despite the fact that Islamic banks appear com-
monly to be either unable or unwilling to participate in long-term projects. In terms of the inter-
temporal analysis, the (t) test reveals a statically reliable difference between the period before 
and after the crisis (LTA, P -value=0.005). 
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             Fig. 6.5: Liquidity measures, % (2005-08)                                     Fig. 6.6: Commitment to Muslims Economy -% 
 
  The bank’s performance of risk and solvency measured by Debt Equity Ratio (DER), Debt to 
Total Assets Ratio (DTAR), and Equity Multiplier ratio (EM) (Fig. 6.7), shows a significant in-
crease from 2005-2007, followed directly by a clear downward trend from 2007-2008. Nonethe-
less, over a period of time, the bank mitigates the risk, hence, becomes relatively less risky, more 
solvent, and operates with lower use of debt. This could be explained partially by the fact that 
investments in government securities become much larger. 
 
   Although the comparison of the bank’s risk and solvency ratios in pre-crisis and post-crisis pe-
riods reveal a deterioration of risk, results suggest a non-significant statistic as: (DER, P = 
0.129), (DTAR, P = 0.201), and (EM, P = 0.129). Meanwhile, Equity ratio shows a statistically 
insignificant deterioration (ER, P = 0.201) over the period 2005-2007. This reflects the expansion 
of the bank in total assets, the more speculative situation because of the effect of high leverage,7 
and the greater possibility of financial difficulty arising from excessive debt burden. However, 
starting from 2008, the bank shows a slight decrease in its total assets, reflecting a strong finan-
cial structure of its equity.  
 
  It is worth mentioning that the equity market as a whole has also been impacted adversely by 
the global financial crisis of 2007 due to a lack of liquidity, reduced fee generation and subdued 
investors demand. Consequently, the stock price performance of Islamic banks has generally imi- 
_______________________________ 
7
 Islam is considered to be against the "excessive" leverage. Hence, leverage needs to be controlled to ensure that credit does not 
exceed the ability of the borrower to repay. 
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tated the largely downward trend of conventional banks. As a result, EIIB has not been immune 
from the effects of the global recession. It has been facing a decline in the share price and thus, 
has a poor track record (Fig. 6.9).  
 
  Some critics argue that Murabaha is not a pure Islamic product. Despite the criticism, the bank's 
involvement in delivering Murabaha products (loans) appears to be the most dominant8 and has 
increased significantly from 2005 to 2008 as a result of the increase in the bank’s capital.9 The 
bank’s average supply of loans under this category has increased by 3.61%  in the post-crisis pe-
riod. The difference in means in post versus pre-crisis periods is statistically significant (P -
value=0.001) (Fig. 6.8). However, Mudaraba and/or Musharaka are not popular as Murabaha in 
the UK because they are less profitable, more risky, and/ or incur high monitoring costs.  
 
 
  Fig. 6.7: Risk and solvency Measures-% (2005-08)             Fig. 6.8: Investment & financing portfolio -% of financing 
 
 
6.6.   Conclusions 
 
  Our extensive DEA-based analysis suggests that the Islamic investment, wholesale and private 
banks operating in Europe are technically inefficient. In spite of that, they tend to operate closer 
to the efficient frontier than conventional banks. The inefficient management practices are the 
main drivers of conventional bank’s technical inefficiency. Islamic banks suffer, however, from 
the problems of sub-optimal scale of operations. They also experience a high allocative inefficie- 
___________________________________________ 
8
 In 2008, Murabaha financing is responsible for over 90% of EIIB’s value of assets on the balance sheet. 
9
 In 2008, the bank had a strong capital base of £163 m which is 680% of the minimum regulatory requirement. 
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ncy, which indicates they seem to have problems with the choices of input prices. Taking the ad-
vantage of their size, conventional banks are better at controlling costs than Islamic banks 
 
  Our findings also show that the conventional banks have mostly a decreasing return-to-scale of 
efficiency scores. Such a result indicates they are operating at a scale that is overly large and, 
hence, should shrink their output endowments. In contrast, Islamic banks are operating at either 
constant or increasing return-to-scale where scale efficiency is relatively less than technical effi-
ciency. This, however, suggests that the managers of Islamic banks are relatively good at utiliz-
ing all factor inputs and taking advantage of decreased cost from increasing return to scale opera-
tions. Additionally, such a result indicates that the technical inefficiency for Islamic banks ap-
pears to be mostly due to the bank’s size of operation rather than to their management practices 
given the novelty and small size of Islamic banks in Europe.  
  In terms of the financial ratio analysis, findings show that the European Islamic Investment 
Bank (EIIB) shows a significant downward trend in its achieved profitability reflecting a poor 
financial performance. This is due to the decline in asset quality, high level of liquidity, increas-
ing competition and higher operating costs. In contrast, the bank’s efficiency performance is in 
an upward trend over the sample years, revealing that it is more efficient in managing the operat-
ing expenses, generating more operating revenues, and using and deploying assets. Results also 
suggest that the bank’s growth rate of liquidity gradually decreases when it becomes more ma-
ture. Due to the larger investments in government securities, the bank mitigates the business risk 
and becomes relatively less risky and more solvent, particularly during the financial crisis of 
2007. Finally, the inter-temporal analysis of the profitability, liquidity, risk and solvency, and 
efficiency in pre-crisis and post-crisis periods does not show any statistically significant differ-
ences. By contrast, the ratio that measures the commitment of Islamic banks to the Muslim econ-
omy exhibits a significant difference, indicating that the bank is committing to support long-term 
development projects along with the short-term financing. 
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Appendix-Ch.6  
Table 6.5 
Brief description of the financial (Accounting) performance measures 
The Description The Ratio 
The profitability ratios are used to assess the capability of a bank to generate earnings as com-
pared to its expenses and other relevant costs incurred during certain period of time. 
 
Profitability Ratios 
 
ROA = profit after tax/total asset. It shows how a bank can convert its asset into net earnings. 
The higher value of this ratio indicates higher capability of the bank. This ratio provides indi-
cator for evaluating the managerial efficiency.  
 
Return on Asset (ROA) 
ROE = profit after tax/equity capital. This ratio indicates how bank can generate profit with 
the money shareholders have invested. The higher value of this ratio shows higher financial 
performance. Like ROA, this ratio is also a good indicator of managerial efficiency.  
 
Return on Equity (ROE) 
PER = profit after tax/total expense. This ratio indicates profitability of a bank with regard to 
its total expenses. A high value of this ratio indicates that the bank could make high profit 
with a given expenses. 
 
Profit to Total Expenses (PER) 
The liquidity ratios measure the capability of a bank to meet its short-term obligations. The 
higher value of this ratio indicates that the bank has larger margin safety to cover its short-
term obligations. 
 
Liquidity Ratios 
CR = current asset/current liability. This ratio indicates the capability of a bank to meet the 
current liability with the current asset. The high value of this ratio indicates that the bank is 
more liquid.   
 
Current ratio (CA) 
CAR = current asset/total asset. This ratio shows composition of bank’s asset. The high value 
of this ratio indicates that the bank has more liquid asset than long term asset. 
 
Current asset ratio (CAR) 
LAR measures the liquidity condition of the bank. LAR measures liquidity of a bank in terms 
of its total assets. That is, it gauges the percentage of total assets the bank has invested in 
loans (or financings). The higher is the ratio the less the liquidity is of the bank. However, 
high LAR is an indication of potentially higher profitability and hence more risk. 
 
Loan to Asset Ratio (LAR) 
Solvency ratios indicate the risk inherent in the bank as a result of its debt. Risk and Solvency Ratios  
 
DER = debt/equity capital. This ratio shows how a bank finances its operation with debt rela-
tive to the use of equity.  
 
 
Debt equity ratio (DER) 
DTAR = debt/total asset. This ratio indicates the proportion of assets financed with debt. A 
high value of this ratio provides indication that the bank involves in more risky business.   
 
Debt to total assets ratio (DTAR) 
EM = total asset/share capital. This ratio is a measure of financial leverage. It shows a 
bank's total assets per dollar of stockholders' equity. A higher equity multiplier indicates high-
er financial leverage, which indicates signal for possible risk failure.    
  
Equity multiplier ratio (EM) 
ER is a financial ratio indicating the relative proportion of equity used to finance a bank's 
assets (Total Owner's Equity / Total Assets). The ratio is a good indicator of the level of leve-
rage used by a bank. It measures the proportion of the total assets that are financed by stock-
holders and not creditors. 
 
 Equity Ratio (ER) 
Ratios that are typically used to analyze how well a bank uses its assets and liabilities internal-
ly. Efficiency ratios can calculate the turnover of receivables, the repayment of liabilities, and 
the quantity and usage of equity. 
 
Efficiency Ratios 
AU = total operating income/total asset. This ratio measures capability of a bank to generate 
revenue with its asset. The high value of this ratio indicates the high productivity of bank’s 
asset.  
 
Asset utilization ratio (AU) 
OE = total operating expense/total operating income. This ratio indicates how efficiently a 
bank uses its assets, revenues and minimizing the expenses. In other words, it shows how well 
the bank could reduce the expenses and improves productivity. 
 
Operating efficiency ratio (OE) 
To evaluates the bank’s community involvement. Commitment to Economy and Muslim Com. 
 
LTA = long term loan/total loans. A high LTA indicates a bank commitment for supporting 
long term development projects. 
 
 
Long term loan ratio (LTA) 
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Table 6.6 
Financial performance of EIIB before and after the financial crisis of 2007: T
                              2006            2007          2008            2009            2010
                    Fig. 6.9: Stock price for (EIIB)-5 years volume
                      Source: ADVFN plc.2010 
 The Ratio 
 
 Profitability Ratios 
 ROA 
 ROE 
 PER 
 Efficiency Ratios 
 AU 
 OE 
 Income Expense Ratio (IER) 
 Risk and Solvency Ratios 
 DER-times 
 DTAR 
 EM 
 ER 
 Liquidity Ratios 
 CA-Times 
 CAR 
 LAR 
 Commitment to Economy and Muslim Community
 LTA 
 AND FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE IN S
STUDY FROM THE EUROPEAN FINANCIAL
  
174 
-test-b
 
 
 Fig. 6.10:  EIIB profit before tax (£m) over 2005
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SUMMARY CONCLUSIONS AND SCOPE FOR 
FURTHER WORK 
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7.1.   Brief introduction 
 
  The purpose of this dissertation is to explain the fundamental principles and characteristic of 
Islamic finance, and also to explore the possibilities of the implementation thereof in the Western 
world. The thesis firstly introduces the socio-economic rationale underpinning Islamic finance, 
as it will be difficult to appreciate the resultant financial techniques without an understanding 
and appreciation of these principles. It then compares the objectives of Islamic finance with that 
of conventional finance. Having firmly established the philosophy and difference in the Islamic 
finance approach, the different modes of financing in Islam have been explained along with 
examples given of their application. The focus then moves to create some understanding of the 
specific risk profile and challenges which are particularly associated with Islamic finance.  
 
  Islamic banking and finance has emerged as one of the most rapidly expanding sectors in the 
global financial system. Therefore, we attempt, in this thesis, to explore the emergence and the 
continual growth of Islamic banking and finance which is widely spread inside as well as outside 
the Islamic countries, specifically during the global financial crisis of 2007 and the consequent 
adverse market conditions. However, the Islamic perspective on this crisis is also presented to 
show how Islamic economic system might help to bring stability to the world's economy. 
 
  From an empirical point of view, the goal of this dissertation has been to investigate the 
efficiency and the productivity performance of the first established full-fledged Islamic 
commercial banks in Europe (i.e. the UK and Bosnia and Herzegovina "BiH") against 
counterparties conventional banks operating in each sample country, on the one hand, and also 
against Islamic commercial banks from Muslim-majority countries: the GCC-States (namely: 
Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates), Malaysia, Azerbaijan, and  
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Turkey, on the other hand. Utilizing the sample period of 2005-2008, we particularly employs 
the non-parametric analysis approach, the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), to generate 
efficiency scores for our sample banks. The DEA-based Malmquist productivity indices are also 
calculated to measure the banks' relative productivity changes (progress or regress) over time. 
Moreover, the OLS-regression technique is used to determine the impact of the internal and 
external factors on bank's performance and also to check the robustness of the results obtained 
from the DEA scores.  
 
  Additionally, we use separate efficiency-profitability matrix analyses, based on the efficiency 
scores and profitability ratios, for a selected sample of banks, specifically to determine the 
characterization of their performance. Furthermore, in order to investigate the association of the 
efficiency scores with the common financial (accounting) ratios, we compute the banks' 
Spearman's rho correlation coefficients between the two variables.  
 
  Eventually, the thesis aims at analyzing the (cost)-X-efficiency levels and financial 
performance of Islamic investment, wholesale, and private banks from the UK and Switzerland 
relative to the interest-based banks in the same countries. To this end, we primarily utilize the 
DEA-approach to estimate the X-efficiency measures over the time interval 2008-2009. We then 
perform various well-known financial ratios to evaluate the overall performance of the first 
European Islamic investment bank in the UK during 2005-2008. In order to determine the 
differences of the banks' performance in pre versus post the global financial crisis of 2007, we 
employ the inter-temporal analysis using the matched pairs T-Test, the most commonly used 
method to evaluate the differences in means between two groups. 
 
  By and large, this chapter summarizes and highlights the main results and conclusions drawn 
from the work undertaken in this dissertation. This is followed by suggestions for possible future 
research directions and potential areas of exploration.   
 
7.2. Summary and Conclusions  
 
7.2.1. Preliminary summary of results: Market information-based analysis 
 
  In recent years, Islamic finance has grown rapidly across the world at an estimated growth rate 
of 15-20% per annum. It offers bright prospects for those involved and thus, rapid growth 
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outside its historical boundaries is expected to continue over time. The ethical principles of 
Islamic finance make them attractive to a wide spectrum of ethically-conscious clients who 
desire a socially just financial system. More Muslim-clients are choosing to invest in Islamic 
financial instruments and solutions available through long-established Islamic banks from 
Muslim countries. Muslims, as well as non-Muslims, banking customers in the West are also 
increasingly attracted by the ethical Islamic model. Recognizing the importance of Islamic 
finance, many financial players have decided to respond to the market demands. This was 
particularly through establishing new banks, switching from conventional to Islamic methods of 
banking operations, the establishment of Islamic windows, moving from Islamic windows to 
separate subsidiaries, and shifting from being a bank-like finance company to become a full-
fledged bank. At the countries' level, European governments are trying also to out-compete each 
other in setting a viable framework for establishing Islamic finance.  
  Despite the growing interest and the immense, robust, and rapid growth of the Islamic banking 
and finance industry, this novel area of finance has not been completely immune to the global 
economic uncertainty, as it is part of the wider global financial system and consequently will be 
affected by all financial dealings. Most recently, Islamic financial institutions have been 
negatively affected, to a certain degree, by the financial crisis, which has hit the industry’s 
sources of funding and property values in 2007. However, by and large, Islamic financial 
markets avoided, as compared to their conventional peers, the speculative investments and the 
complex financial instruments, and have no money invested in uncovered loans financial 
derivatives and toxic assets. Therefore, they are comparatively less vulnerable to the impacts of 
the financial crisis and are also amongst the first markets to recover from the negative impacts of 
the present global economic recession. This might be particularly due to the flush of oil wealth in 
the Gulf region, the small size of Islamic banks, and the newness of Islamic finance market.  
  Because we applied different types of empirical analysis in this thesis and came up with 
significantly different findings, we introduce in the next section the conclusions for our empirical 
chapters, relatively, as they originally appear in the proposed papers. 
7.2.2.        Summary of the results of our empirical analysis: 
 
7.2.2.1. Proposed paper 1: Efficiency performance of IBB against Islamic banks from 
Muslim-majority countries and also against conventional banks from the UK  
   Our empirical analysis in this thesis shows that the Islamic Bank of Britain (IBB) is technically 
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inefficient (pure technical efficiency scores (PTE) < 1), with the average technical efficiency 
scores range between DEAPTE=30.6% and DEAPTE=90.1%. IBB is also inefficient in exploiting 
the economies of scale (ES) given its scale of operations. It appears that the bank’s inefficiency 
arises from inefficient management practices (pure technical inefficiency > scale inefficiency)
 
as 
compared with small Islamic banks in Muslim-majority countries and small conventional banks 
in the UK. Bank’s relative inefficiencies, however, become rather scale (size) in nature relative 
to large Islamic and conventional banks. IBB might substantially enhance its efficiency by 
scaling up activities to a certain level, the mid-size level.  
 
  Findings also illustrate that the small Islamic banks (including IBB) and small conventional 
banks exhibit initially, compared to the large Islamic and conventional banks, poor efficiency 
scores. Despite the prevailing market conditions being adverse, the bank’s efficiency 
performance subsequently gradually increases with the passage of time. This is mainly due to its 
novelty and small size. In contrast, large conventional banks, on average, have an upward trend 
of estimated efficiency, generally with declining increments. Meanwhile, the large Islamic 
bank’s inefficiency increased (the rate of efficiency improvement decreases) over time, partly 
due to the complex credit risk monitoring arrangements. These results, however, indicate that the 
larger the bank, in term of total assets, the more affected by the financial instability which 
suggests that "the bigger is not always the better". The results also propose that the IBB has a 
substantial room for improvements to sustain its competitive edge, taking into consideration that 
it is, to a certain extent, better in utilizing resources (cutting costs) than generating revenues.  
 
  In terms of the correlation coefficient between the bank’s DEA-efficiency scores and it’s 
financial performance, findings illustrate that the efficiency measures calculated using DEA 
method are robust, highly correlated with the results obtained by ROA and ROE, and thus can be 
used separately and/or concurrently with the standard accounting measures in determining Islamic 
banks performance within and outside the UK. However, there is an absence of such argument in 
the UK non-Islamic banking sector at which the information contained in the conventional 
financial measures are not closely corresponded to that contained in efficiency measures.  
  Moreover, findings show that the IBB falls in the question marks quadrant in the 4-quadrant 
efficiency-profitability matrix. This indicates that the bank exhibits low profitability and 
efficiency performance and thus, is considered to be under-performing. IBB is probably under-
resourced and lacks appropriate skills and therefore, with a favorable environment and additional 
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resources, it might improve its efficiency and profitability. By increasing efficiency, the bank 
can possibly move to the “star” quadrant.  
 
  In terms of the DEA-second stage analysis, results suggest that the technically more efficient 
banks are those that have greater profitability and loans intensity, on average acquire less debt, 
and have a lower market share. IBB, however, is relatively superior in terms of lending intensity 
and capital adequacy relative to both Islamic and conventional banks. 
 
7.2.2.2. Proposed paper 2: Efficiency and productivity performance of IBB and BBI relative to 
Islamic banks from Muslim countries and conventional banks from the UK and Bosnia 
  Findings suggest that the Bosna Bank International (BBI) and the Islamic Bank of Britain (IBB) 
are relatively technically more inefficient compared to Islamic banks from Muslim countries, and 
conventional banks operating in the UK and Bosnia (BiH) banking industries. Bank’s 
inefficiency, by and large, stems from inefficient management practices. Non-optimal size of 
bank’s operations contributes also, to some extent, in the bank’s overall inefficiency. Findings 
indicate that the BBI is comparatively more capable to operate closer to efficient frontier than 
IBB, but IBB, by contrast, provides more growth potential by recording a respectable positive 
trend in estimated efficiency performance.  
 
  Pertaining to the analysis of the Malmquist Productivity Indices (MPI) of the Islamic banking 
sector, results indicate that the BBI managed to achieve high positive growth in total factor 
productivity (TFPch), largely due to the high average growth in technical efficiency (TEch). The 
bank yields also high-growth rates of technological (innovation) efficiency (TECch). This trend, 
however, subsequently reverses, apparently due to the global crisis of 2007. By contrast, IBB, as 
well as the average Islamic banking sector within and outside Europe, suffered not only a 
relative declining but also a negative growth rate in total factor productivity, driven mostly by 
the significant regress on banks' innovation. Overall, it seems that the Islamic bank’s total 
productivity growth is contributed to a large extent by the pure technical efficiency changes. 
 
  By and large, in contrast to the performance of the entire Islamic banking sector, our results 
show that both the IBB and the BBI experienced preliminary a remarkable growth in technical 
efficiency prior to the financial crisis, but unexpectedly faced significant declines after the 
emergence of the crisis, primarily due to lack of management skills. Nevertheless, IBB and BBI 
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continue to produce better substantial increase in technical efficiency as compared to some of 
other Islamic banks from Muslim-majority countries. 
 
  In comparison with conventional banks in BiH banking sector, BBI showed superior 
performance in its total productivity and technical efficiency. The bank’s progress in total 
productivity is originally attributed to the constant improvement in it’s technological innovation. 
BBI, however, progressively loses its superiority over other banks in terms of both indices (i.e. 
TFP and TE). Despite of that, the bank still clearly retains high mean growth rate in both indices 
over the sample years. However, the improvements in management practices appear to be less 
important source for future growth in the bank’s technical efficiency performance, as compared 
to the optimal size component.  
 
  Similarly, IBB relatively recorded, as compared with conventional banks in the UK, high 
average regress in total productivity performance motivated mostly by the bank’s regress 
(TECch 05-08 <1) in the (average-years) innovation component. This is apparently despite the 
yearly consistent upward trend in the bank’s technology innovations. IBB, however, is 
perpetually lagging behind its counterparties banks in terms of technical efficiency, largely due 
to the acute inferior management operations.  
 
  In terms of the ordinary least squares (OLS)-regression analysis, overall results suggest that the 
more efficient Islamic banks are larger in size, show significantly greater profit potential, have 
less tendency to acquire high levels of debt, and have increased investment in skills. Finally, a 
more efficient use of banks resources is strongly associated with a higher GDP-per capita.  
 
7.2.2.3. Proposed paper 3: X-efficiency and financial performance of investment, wholesale and 
private Islamic banks relative to conventional banks in Switzerland and the UK 
 
  The presented results suggest that the Islamic investment, wholesale, and private banks 
operating in Europe are technically inefficient, on average TE = 98% <1. Bank's inefficiency 
appears to be mostly due to the choices of inputs price mix and the bank's sub-optimal 
(inadequate) size of operations. Islamic banks, however, still maintain much higher mean 
technical efficiency scores than conventional banks. Bad management is the main driver of 
conventional bank’s technical inefficiency. Benefiting from their large size (total assets), 
conventional banks are slightly better at controlling costs than Islamic banks. Islamic banks also 
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experience, to a certain degree, low (cost)-efficiency (CE), with overall scores of 49.3%, and 
poor allocative-efficiency (AE), with average scores of 49.4%, compared to conventional banks.  
 
  Our findings also show that the conventional banks have a decreasing return-to-scale of 
efficiency scores. This suggests that the banks should shrink their output endowments. Islamic 
banks, by contrast, are operating at either constant or increasing return-to-scale. This clearly 
indicates that the managers of Islamic banks are better at utilizing all factor inputs than their 
conventional counterparts.  
  Additionally, the findings reveal that the Islamic investment banks that are operating in Europe 
show a clear paradox between their high-efficiency scores and low-profitability performance. 
Islamic investment banks are less risky, more solvent, but suffer a gradual deterioration in 
liquidity position. The banks' supply of Murabaha (mark-up) financing appears to be the most 
dominant and has increased significantly over years.  
 
  Finally, the inter-temporal analysis of the bank's profitability, liquidity, risk and solvency, and 
efficiency, in pre- and post-crisis of 2007, does not show any statistical significant differences. 
Meanwhile, the ratio that measures the bank's community involvement (commitment to economy 
and Muslim community) exhibits a significant difference. This indicates that the bank is 
committing to support long-term development projects along with the short-term financing. 
7.3. Further work  
 
  This thesis seems to have raised plenty of questions that have been reasonably answered. It has 
also highlighted a number of topics on which further research would be beneficial to expand and 
strengthen the results. Because the current work analyzes the comparative efficiency and 
productivity performance of the European Islamic banks using both the DEA technique and the 
DEA-Malmquist approach, it would be an asset to the work if the results are proven by applying 
alternative methodologies to the same data. To this end, we could, for instance, use either the 
stochastic frontier approach or the deterministic frontier approach. Additionally, it is useful to 
change the DEA input and output mixes and/or to extend the empirical analysis to cover more 
Muslim and European countries which have started recently to operate in accordance with 
Shari'ah law in banking operations. Furthermore, due to the short time (history) over which 
Islamic banking has been operating in Europe and consequently the absence of readily available 
high quality financial data, our analysis was carried out utilizing only 4-years, between 2005 and 
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2008, and subsequently, we can significantly increase the robust of our results by covering longer 
time intervals (e.g. 2005-2011). We finally could present a new perspective on performance 
evaluation of the Islamic banking operations in Europe by investigating, for the first time, the 
relative efficiency, productivity, and (cost) and (profit) X-efficiency levels, of the full-fledged 
Islamic banks and the conventional banks' Islamic windows which are operating in both Muslim-
majority countries and Europe. 
 
  Another area of further work is to examine the hypothesis that the ethical investment has 
inferior performance relative to their unscreened benchmarks. Using traditional performance 
measurement techniques, we can test, for example, whether returns earned by investors who 
purchase shares in the FTSE Global Islamic Index are apparently different from their index 
counterpart FTSE All -World Index, both in the short and long-run. This will highlights the 
impact of the ethical screening on the performance of FTSE Global Islamic index. It is also very 
much useful to investigate the performance of the FTSE4 Good index, which is a recently 
established socially responsible index, and to compare it robustly with the FTSE Global Islamic 
and FTSE All-World indices. Islamic equity fund, however, can also be examined by employing 
a number of performance measures such as: Sharpe, Treynor, Jensen-Alpha and their variants.  
 
  Finally, one of the fields that can be differently analyzed in recent times is the Islamic bond 
markets. More specifically, we could measure the comparative performance of the Islamic bonds 
(Sukuk) against the traditional (conventional) bonds over a certain time period. In such a study 
we can empirically examine the yield to maturities of Sukuk and conventional counterparts for 
various issuers. We can also investigate the impact of the issuance of Sukuk on risk structure of a 
firm, discuss the possible underlying reasons, and assess the role and the overall impact of credit 
ratings in the Sukuk performance.  
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